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The Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) is an approach to analysing organisational resilience based on the idea 
that four abilities (responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating) underpin resilient system performance 
(Hollnagel, 2010). Although the RAG has undergone some rudimentary methodological development, it 
requires significant further elaboration and testing. 
Research Questions 
How can the RAG be further developed to provide a replicable context specific process? 
How can the views of healthcare staff be incorporated for analysing organisational resilience?  
Methodology 
A constructivist epistemology informed an exploratory sequential mixed method research design with 
nursing staff on an Acute Medical Unit (AMU) in a large, inner city London teaching hospital.  
Phase One 
This qualitative element of the study used focus groups to explore nurses’ everyday clinical work. Eighteen 
nurses took part in nine focus groups, with two to five participants in each focus group. A thematic analysis 
found that the nurses work was extremely complex, and that social interaction facilitated their adaptations.  
Phase Two 
This quantitative element of the study used a cross-sectional survey design, with survey items directly 
informed by the thematic analysis of the focus group data, to explore the views of 77 nurses on the AMU 
about how well the system could respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. The results showed the nurses 
thought the AMU was most effective at responding and least effective at monitoring.  
Phase Three 
This qualitative element of the study used semi-structured interviews with seven nurses to reflect on the 
survey results and explore system level interventions to improve the potential for resilient performance. The 
nurses provided detailed insights into the survey results and suggested high-level interventions for improving 
the potential for resilient system performance.  
Discussion 
This thesis advanced the RAG by developing a replicable process for healthcare professionals to analyse 
the organisational resilience of their healthcare systems. It also showed the resilience engineering theoretical 
perspective can be used to engage healthcare professionals to analyse the organisational resilience of their 
healthcare system and work towards interventions for quality improvement. The main limitations were the 
findings were restricted to a nursing population, the lack of evaluation, the limited findings on quality 
improvement and the lack of Patient and Public Involvement (PPI).  
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may 
be published without proper acknowledgement.  
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Chapter 1 – History of Safety in Healthcare  
 
1.1 Overview of thesis  
 
This thesis is about using a resilience engineering theoretical lens to analyse and improve the 
safety of healthcare systems. The resilience engineering field is conceptually well developed but 
lacks empirical testing and methods for using it in practice. This thesis advances the Resilience 
Analysis Grid (RAG) by developing and implementing a replicable, context specific process for 
healthcare professionals to analyse and improve the organisational resilience of their healthcare 
system. The findings of the thesis show the resilience engineering theoretical perspective can be 
used to effectively engage healthcare professionals to analyse the organisational resilience of 
their healthcare system and work towards interventions for quality improvement.   
 
The primary research questions are high-level exploratory questions, guiding the thesis towards 
responding to the limitations of the RAG identified in the narrative review. The secondary research 
questions unpack the high-level exploratory questions with more specific questions to be 
answered.   
 
The primary research questions are: 
 
How can the RAG be further developed to provide a replicable context specific process? 
 
How can the views of healthcare staff be incorporated for analysing organisational resilience?  
 
The secondary research questions are: 
 
What is Work-As-Done for nurses? 
 
How can nurses’ Work-As-Done be understood in terms of the four resilience abilities?  
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How can the development of responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items be 
informed by accounts of Work-As-Done? 
 
How can the results of applying the RAG inform quality improvement? 
 
To answer these research questions, this study used a constructivist epistemological lens to 
inform a mixed method study design, with three research phases. It was conducted with nursing 
staff on an Acute Medical Unit (AMU) in a large, inner city London teaching hospital. An initial 
qualitative phase used focus groups to explore how nursing staff manage the complexity of their 
everyday clinical work. Then, a quantitative phase used a cross-sectional survey design, with 
survey items directly informed by the thematic analysis of the focus group data, to explore the 
views of the wider nursing population on the AMU. A final qualitative phase supported nursing 
staff to reflect on the survey results and identify potential system improvements. 
 
This first chapter provides an overview of safety in healthcare and identifies how resilience 
engineering theory offers a response to the limitations of the current healthcare safety paradigm. 
The second chapter is a narrative review of methods for analysing organisational resilience in 
healthcare, which identifies the Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) as the most promising approach 
for analysing organisational resilience. The third chapter presents the methodology of the thesis, 
introducing the theoretical underpinning and mixed method research design. The fourth, fifth and 
sixth chapters introduce the development and implementation of a three-stage reflective process 
for analysing and improving the potential for resilient performance of a healthcare system. Finally, 
chapter seven discusses the contributions of the thesis to the resilience engineering field and the 
limitations of the methods used.  
 
1.2 Safety in Healthcare  
 
Safety is the one of the most important dimensions of quality for delivering healthcare (Singh, 
2014; Kohn et al, 1999). However, around one in ten patients still experience harm in healthcare 
systems around the world (Vincent et al, 2001) and understanding how to improve the safety of 
healthcare systems remains a challenge. Current approaches to understanding and improving 
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the safety of healthcare systems have had limited effect and some researchers suggest progress 
appears to have stalled (Braithwaite et al, 2015; Hollnagel et al, 2015). This chapter briefly 
explores the history of safety in healthcare to understand its origins, achievements and current 
limitations. Resilience engineering (RE) theory is then introduced as an alternative paradigm for 
understanding the safety and quality of performance in healthcare systems. This theoretical 
perspective focuses on understanding the complexity of everyday work and suggests that 
adaptations are necessary for maintaining effective system performance (Hollnagel et al, 2006; 
Hollnagel et al, 2015).  
 
Healthcare safety is defined as the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes 
or injuries resulting from healthcare processes (Vincent, 2010). Today, healthcare safety is a 
distinct discipline with a systematic focus on understanding and improving the safety of systems 
and reducing harm to patients (Emanuel et al, 2008). Healthcare systems are increasingly 
complex due to advancements in knowledge and technology, treatments and diagnostic 
techniques, ageing populations and increases in chronic health conditions (Shojania & Panesar, 
2014). This makes healthcare safety more challenging than ever before. Although healthcare 
safety is a global endeavour, this thesis focuses on healthcare safety from the perspective of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom.  
 
1.2.1 A Brief History of Safety in Healthcare 
 
Relative to the history of healthcare, it is only recently that safety has become an explicit focus of 
healthcare systems (Kohn et al, 1999; Donaldson et al, 2000). The healthcare safety movement 
has been shaped by many influences, including reflections on the nature of human error (Reason, 
1990), studies on the extent of clinical error (Brennan et al, 1991; Wilson et al, 1995; Vincent et 
al, 2001), the subsequent move to systematically improve the quality of care across healthcare 
systems (Kohn et al, 1999; Donaldson et al, 2000), high-profile cases of healthcare failings 
(Walshe, 2001; Walshe, 2003; Sinclair, 2000; Douglas et al, 2001), development of High 
Reliability Organisations (HRO) in other high risk industries (Reynard et al, 2009) and the 




Before this explicit focus on the safety of healthcare systems, the prevailing attitude was 
acceptance of the inherent harm of healthcare practice and that quality was a normal outcome of 
dedicated work by capable healthcare professionals (Vincent, 2010). Adverse outcomes were 
viewed as inevitable, but unfortunate consequences of delivering healthcare. However, from the 
late 1800s this began to change as a series of influential clinicians, such as Florence Nightingale, 
conducted individual studies and produced isolated reports investigating things that went wrong 
in healthcare (Vincent, 2010; The Healthcare Foundation, 2013b). These reports and studies 
shaped a wider understanding that poor quality and adverse outcomes could be inherent to the 
structures and processes of a healthcare system itself (Vincent et al, 2013).  
 
Reports of medical injuries and medication errors intensified from the 1960s through to the 1980s 
(The Health Foundation, 2013b; Chung & Custer, 2017) However, it wasn’t until Brennen et al’s 
1984 retrospective study of patient records in New York that the scale of the problem of 
preventable adverse events became more widely recognised (Reynard et al, 2009). A series of 
large retrospective case studies followed in Australia in 1992 (Wilson et al, 1995), Denmark in 
1998 (Schiøler et al, 2001), New Zealand in 1998 (Davis et al, 2002), UK in 1999 (Vincent et al, 
2001), Canada in 2000 (Baker et al, 2004) and France in 2002 (Michel et al, 2004). They formed 
part of a growing body of evidence that around one in ten patients experienced some form of 
adverse event whilst receiving healthcare. Crucially, they showed that many adverse events were 
the results of human error and were therefore largely preventable (Leape, 1994). By today’s 
standards, this is flawed thinking (Hollnagel et al, 2015). It wasn’t until later that understanding of 
humans’ roles in accidents changed, from viewing human actions as the cause of errors, to 
understanding humans as part of a wider complex system, the components of which interact in 
ways that lead to positive and negative outcomes (Hollnagel, 2016a).   
 
On a similar time line, a series of high-profile cases brought healthcare failings to the attention of 
the media, the public and wider political discourse (Smith, 1998). An early example of this is the 
unexpectedly high number of deaths from infant cardiac surgery at the Royal Bristol Infirmary in 
the NHS, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, which had a mortality rate almost double that 
of other NHS hospitals (Morris, 2001). The subsequent inquiry is one of the first reports to use a 
systems approach to analyse what happened. The outcome of the inquiry shows that poor 
performance and errors are more than the result of individual actions but are the products of 
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systems that are not working (Treasure, 1998; Walshe & Offen, 2001). Similar high-profile cases 
of healthcare failings in the NHS include the deaths of nineteen elderly patients from food 
poisoning in 1986 and serious breaches of security at Ashworth High Security Hospital from 1995 
to 1996 (Walshe, 2003). There are similar cases in other healthcare systems around the world; 
such as unexpectedly poor paediatric cardiac surgery outcomes in Winnipeg, Canada in 1994 
(Sinclair, 2000), and a series of repeated complaints in King Edward Memorial Hospital in Perth, 
Australia through the 1990s (Douglas et al, 2001). These high-profile healthcare failings around 
the world increased public awareness of variability in the quality of healthcare systems and began 
to challenge the notion that quality is a natural consequence of the hard work of healthcare 
professionals (Emanuel et al, 2008). 
 
The publication of the reports To Err is Human (Kohn et al, 1999) and An Organisation with a 
Memory (Donaldson et al, 2000) is seen by many as catalysts for the global patient safety 
movement (Shojania & Panesar, 2014; Chung & Custer, 2017). These reports moved discussion 
of safety in healthcare from a series of individual reports and high-profile failings to the forefront 
of public, professional and political discourse and have fundamentally changed the way safety is 
regarded in healthcare (Emanuel et al, 2008). One of the primary aims of To Err is Human was 
to establish patient safety as a compulsory activity of healthcare organisations, by developing 
national programmes, improving reporting systems and driving safety in clinical practice by 
involving healthcare professionals, regulatory agencies and the public (Kohn et al, 1999). This 
was a call for a systematic approach to patient safety across all elements of healthcare systems. 
On the other hand, An Organisation with a Memory recognised the unique complexity of 
healthcare systems, which combine processes, technologies and human interactions (Donaldson 
et al, 2000). It acknowledged that understanding safety means moving beyond human error and 
examining the deeper, system factors that affect clinical work in healthcare organisations. The 
report suggested this can be done by improving how performance data are collected, analysed, 
and used to improve healthcare systems (Donaldson et al, 2000). There was a clear message 
that modernising the way the NHS learns from things that go wrong should include unified 
mechanisms for reporting and analysing adverse events, developing a more open culture for 




An Organisation with a Memory has a strong focus on learning from other high-risk industries, 
which had already successfully transformed their approaches to safety with well-established 
safety practices and powerful external regulators (Vincent, 2010). These high-risk industries, such 
as aviation, nuclear power and the petrochemical industry experienced a series of large-scale 
industrial accidents in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Tenerife aircraft accident in 1977, the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and the Piper Alpha oil rig explosion in 1988 (Reynard et al, 
2009). These disasters were costly because of lives lost, physical damage to property, financial 
losses, damaged reputations and environmental damage (Reynard et al, 2009). In response, 
these high-risk industries developed more sophisticated systems approaches to understanding 
and improving the safety of their operations (Reynard et al, 2009; Shojania & Panesar, 2014). 
Decades of detailed investigations in domains such as aviation and nuclear power showed that 
major accidents are often the result of a combination of minor mishaps, inadequacies and errors 
that happen throughout large complex sociotechnical systems (Macrae, 2014). This continued 
dedication to improving the safety of their operations informed the development of High Reliability 
Organisations (HRO) theory. The hallmark properties of these organisations are preoccupation 
with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to 
resilience and deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). These properties represent an 
overarching attitude to strive for increasingly safer system performances (Dekker, 2016). Since 
the 1990s some HROs have managed to achieve a zero rate for major accidents over many 
consecutive years (Reynard et al, 2009).  
 
A common criticism of HRO research is that there are rich descriptions informing understanding 
of HRO processes in very specific contexts, however little is known about the extent to which 
these processes are transferable to wider organisational contexts (Waller & Roberts, 2003; 
Leveson et al, 2006; Lekka 2011). For example, one of the primary sources of understanding 
HRO processes comes from observations of work on a U.S. naval aircraft carrier (Hopkins, 2007). 
It is unclear how relevant these organisational processes are to a healthcare context. The theory 
underpinning HRO, High Reliability Theory, is just one theoretical perspective attempting to 
understand performance in complex sociotechnical systems. It can be contrasted with Normal 
Accident Theory (NAT), which maintains that accidents are inevitable in complex organisations 
that operate high-risk technologies (Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 1995). Despite the apparent success 
of HROs and the underpinning High Reliability Theory, this theoretical perspective does not yet 
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have solutions to the challenges of maintaining safe performances in complex sociotechnical 
systems. The patient safety literature makes regular references to HRO processes (Pronovost et 
al, 2006; Lekka, 2011; Tolk et al, 2015). However, there is little evidence of HRO processes being 
successfully translated into healthcare settings (Lekka 2011). 
 
In response to the publication of these foundational safety reports (Kohn et al, 1999; Donaldson 
et al, 2000), there have been concentrated efforts to improve the safety of healthcare systems 
across the NHS (Vincent, 2010). There has been a dramatic shift from viewing error as the result 
of individual actions, to recognising the wider system impacts on healthcare professionals’ 
activities (Macrae, 2014; Hollnagel, 2016). Learning has been established as an essential 
component of healthcare safety (Kohn et al, 1999; Donaldson et al, 2000). To this end, learning 
systems were introduced at national and local levels across the NHS, for example the National 
Reporting and Learning System was introduced in 2001 to capture all adverse events reported in 
the NHS in England and Wales (The Health Foundation, 2013b). The first incident was reported 
in 2003 and by 2013, nine million incidents have been reported (The Healthcare Foundation, 
2013b). Over the years safety initiatives have become increasingly sophisticated, as research 
and practice have developed (Vincent et al, 2013). For example, in 2008 the World Health 
Organisation Safe Surgery Checklist represented a systematic global effort, with evidence-based 
interventions, to improve the safety of surgical interventions and reduce adverse outcomes (The 
Health Foundation, 2013a).  
 
There has been almost two decades of explicit focus on improving the safety of healthcare 
systems. However, the healthcare industry is still some way off reaching similar levels of 
improvement to the safety of operations as other high-risk industries, such as aviation and nuclear 
power, have achieved (Hudson, 2003; Vincent, 2010; The Health Foundation, 2013a). In 2013, 
the findings from a public inquiry into the catastrophic failings in the standards of care at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, raised many concerns about the safety of the healthcare 
systems (Francis, 2013). Crucially, the recommendations in response to these failings suggested 
that healthcare providers needed to focus on the continual reduction of harm by embracing an 
ethic of learning, abandoning blame as a tool and embedding the voice of patients (Berwick, 
2013). So, thirteen years after the publication of An Organisation with a Memory, healthcare has 
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continued to struggle with effectively implementing learning systems to improve the safety of 
healthcare systems.   
 
The influential reports To Err is Human and An Organisation with a Memory galvanised the global 
healthcare safety movement. This focused work in healthcare systems around the world to 
improve the way safety is discussed, measured and improved (Vincent, 2010). There has been a 
dramatic shift from viewing error as the result of individual actions, to recognising the wider system 
impacts on their activities. A lot of the work in healthcare safety has borrowed from other high-
risk industries, but healthcare has not yet demonstrated similar levels of improving the safety of 
system performance.  
 
1.2.2 Limitations to Current Safety Approaches in Healthcare 
 
The current healthcare safety paradigm has well established methods for understanding errors 
and adverse events, such as morbidity and mortality conferences, autopsies, case analysis, root 
cause analysis and error reporting systems (Thomas & Petersen, 2003). However, there is 
growing concern that progress has appeared to stall (Shojania & Panesar, 2014). Despite the 
calls to action from To Err is Human and An Organisation with a Memory, the patient safety 
movement has not made as much progress as anticipated (Hollnagel et al, 2015). Despite 
decades of work attempting to reduce the rate of adverse events in healthcare systems around 
the world, it remains largely unchanged (Kellogg et al, 2017). Some suggest that the slow 
progress is an indication that current methods are not sufficient for understanding the complexity 
of modern healthcare systems (Hollnagel et al, 2006). 
 
‘Never Events’ are serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not occur if 
existing national guidance and safety recommendations are implemented by healthcare providers 
(NHS England Patient Safety Domain, 2015). An example of a Never Event is the misplacement 
of a Naso/Orogastric tube (National Patient Safety Agency, 2010). Table 1-1 shows the number 
of Naso/Orogastric tube misplacements per annum since the advent of Never Events in 2009 to 




Table 1-1 Number of Naso/Orogastric tube misplacements from 2009 to 2017 
Year Number of Naso/Orogastric tube 
misplacements 
01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 41 
01/04/2010 to 31/03/2011 Unable to find data  
01/04/2011 to 31/03/2012 23 
01/04/2012 to 31/03/2013 9 
01/04/2013 to 31/03/2014 16 
01/04/2014 to 31/03/2015 10 
01/04/2015 to 31/03/2016 40 
01/04/2016 to 31/03/2017 26 
01/04/2017 to 31/01/2018 21 
 
(National Patient Safety Agency 2010, NHS England Patient Safety Domain Team 2013, NHS England Patient Safety 
Domain Team 2014, NHS England Patient Safety Domain Team 2016, NHS Improvement 2017b, NHS Improvement 




Although the definition of Never Events and the way they are reported and measured has 
changed, which makes comparisons across years difficult, Table 1-1 illustrates that there was an 
initial reduction in the frequency of the misplacements of Naso/Orogastric tubes between 2009 
and 2012. Then, from 2012, there has been a relatively stable number of these events and they 
continue to happen regularly. Many things could explain the fluctuating frequency of this Never 
Event, for example the changing definitions, changing reporting methods or increases in 
reporting. Despite the system barriers, repeated staff training and clear national policy about this, 
Naso/Orogastric tubes continue to be misplaced. The concept of Never Events, the way they are 
measured and their incidence and prevalence across the NHS is an example of the limitations of 
current approaches to understanding and improving safety in healthcare.  
 
Patients continue to be put at risk of harm, and health care organisations are struggling to learn 
effectively from past experiences to improve the safety of delivering healthcare (Sujan et al, 2017). 
There is growing consensus that lessons learnt through current methods for analysing adverse 
events, such as root cause analysis, are not based on a holistic understanding of the context of 
the clinical work in complex healthcare systems (Hegde et al, 2013). Changing the guidelines or 
protocols in response to a root cause analysis just changes the way in which the healthcare 




The progress of the global patient safety movement has been much slower than anticipated 
(Pronovost et al, 2011). The calls to action from To Err Is Human (Kohn et al, 1999) and An 
Organisation with a Memory (Donaldson et al, 2000) effectively galvanised healthcare systems 
across the world to adopt more systematic approaches to healthcare safety. However, since then 
global efforts at understanding and preventing adverse outcomes have shown limited effect. 
There are still high-profile cases of healthcare failings around the world, with little evidence to 
suggest that repeated inquires and subsequent recommendations have lasting impact (Vize, 
2016). Some suggest there is a need to adopt another way of thinking about safety in healthcare 
systems because current methods have not produced the intended effect (Hollnagel et al, 2015).  
 
There may be other explanations for the unexpectedly slow progress of the global patient safety 
movement. Rather than inadequacies of the methods themselves, the problems might lie with the 
lack of expertise and experience implementing them. There is growing recognition that an 
immature science of safety and quality makes measurement and evaluation of progress difficult 
in healthcare (Pronovost et al, 2011). Previously, the implementation of patient safety initiatives, 
whilst having face validity, have often been poorly evaluated and their effects were not always 
well understood (Shekelle et al, 2013). For example, studies of some practices that have strong 
perceived benefits, such as implementing rapid response teams, have yielded conflicting results 
(Shekelle et al, 2013). However, our understanding of the factors affecting successful 
implementation of patient safety initiatives is improving (Dixon-Woods et al, 2012) and there is a 
growing evidence base for the effectiveness of some interventions (Shekelle et al, 2013).  
 
The slow progress of the patient safety movement is one of many reasons that makes resilience 
engineering theory appealing for understanding safety in healthcare systems. However, it is not 
the only reason. The theoretical underpinning recognises the pivotal role of healthcare 
professionals’ ability to adapt to the varying demands of a healthcare system and thus maintain 
patient safety. This recognises healthcare professionals’ skills and clinical experiences more 
effectively than many aspects of the current patient safety paradigm (Hollnagel et al, 2006; 
Hollnagel et al, 2013). Engagement with clinicians is a crucial success factor in improvement 
initiatives and is a strength of a resilience engineering approach. Of course, the challenges of 
implementing and evaluating interventions effectively is still a problem for resilience engineering 
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theory, perhaps more so due to the infancy of the theoretical perspective and lack of established 
methods. 
 
1.3 Resilience Engineering  
 
Resilience engineering theory offers a different perspective for understanding safety in large, 
complex socio-technical systems (Hollnagel et al, 2006). It recognises that adaptation is 
necessary for successful performance and safety should be about maximising what goes right, 
as well as minimising what goes wrong (Hollnagel et al, 2015). This theoretical perspective is not 
specific to healthcare and is used across a range of domains such as aviation, railway industries 
and nuclear power (Resilience Engineering Association, 2017). However, a dedicated movement 
for using this theoretical perspective to improve the safety of healthcare systems has grown over 
time (Hollnagel et al, 2013; Wears et al, 2015; Braithwaite et al, 2016). An exploration into the 
origins of resilience engineering theory and its conceptual foundations is necessary to understand 
how it differs from the existing healthcare safety paradigm and what it offers for improving it.  
 
1.3.1 Origins of Resilience Engineering  
 
Resilience is a popular concept used across a range of fields such as ecology, metallurgy, 
individual and organisational psychology, supply chain management and safety management 
(Bhamra et al, 2011; Hosseini et el, 2016; Hollnagel et al, 2016). There are broad similarities in 
how the concept of resilience is employed across these fields, with characteristics such as 
resistance to pressure or the ability recover quickly (Bhamra et al, 2011). However, resilience 
engineering theory is about understanding, analysing and improving resilient system performance 
(Hollnagel, 2016). Organisational resilience is the ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior 
to, during or following events (changes, disturbances and opportunities) and thereby sustain 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel et al, 2015). 
Throughout this thesis the term resilience refers to organisational resilience as understood 




To understand how resilience engineering theory offers a different perspective for safety in 
healthcare, it is first necessary to understand the characteristics of large, complex socio-technical 
systems. A simple definition of a system is a set of connected parts that work towards a whole 
(Hitchins, 1992). A complex system has large numbers of connected parts, large numbers of 
relationships among connected parts and nonlinear relationships between them (Rouse, 2003). 
This complexity increases with the number of connected parts and the number and nature of the 
relationships between them. Examples of this sort of complexity include engineered systems, 
such as jet engines and nuclear power plants. In these types of systems, the system components 
and the relationships between them are known due to design (Rouse & Serban, 2011), but in 
many human systems, such as healthcare, processes are intractable because it is not possible 
to anticipate all possibilities and paths of action when autonomous agents interact. 
 
The complexity of a system greatly increases when the connected parts include people and the 
relationships between them are social (Rouse & Serban, 2011). These types of systems are 
nonlinear and dynamic. They have autonomous agents (healthcare professionals) whose 
behaviour is determined by intentionality and social rules, rather than shaped by the engineered 
dynamics governing the system (Rouse & Serban, 2011). These social rules influence the way 
agents behave. There are variations in behaviour between groups of agents in different parts of 
the system and there is often conflict between their goals and behaviours. In response to this, 
agents adapt to each other’s behaviours. This means overall system structure changes over time 
and behavioural patterns emerge rather than being designed into the system (Rouse & Serban, 
2011). When investigating events in these large, complex sociotechnical systems, even with a 
deep understanding of the context, it still might not be possible to explain the working of higher-
level phenomena in terms of lower-level phenomena (Rouse, 2007). The open nature of complex 
sociotechnical systems means they are often influenced by political, economic, cultural and 
organisational forces (Vincent, 2010). These are the types of systems that are the object of 
resilience engineering theory. 
 
In healthcare systems, even simple tasks depend on a wide range of social (psychological and 
team) and technical (equipment and infrastructure) factors (Macrae, 2014). Healthcare systems 
are increasingly complex due to advancements in knowledge and technology, treatments and 
diagnostic techniques, ageing populations and increases in chronic health conditions (Hollnagel 
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et al, 2015). Proponents of resilience engineering theory maintain that the concepts and methods 
for understanding these systems have not progressed at the same rate as the complexity of the 
systems themselves (Hollnagel et al, 2006). Therefore, the methods are not sufficient for 
understanding how these complex systems work or how to improve their performance. This is the 
crux of why resilience engineering theory offers the potential to improve the knowledge and 
practices of safety in the healthcare domain.  
 
The Resilience Engineering Association (REA) is the central body for the development and 
propagation of this field (REA, 2017; Berg et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018). There is no single 
point of origin for the start of the resilience engineering movement, but its beginning can be 
mapped to several closely related events; including the first REA symposium in Sweden 2004 
and the first resilience engineering book (Hollnagel et al, 2006), which collated the ideas from the 
first symposium (Bergström et al, 2015). These early works represent the initial ideas that 
informed the development of the resilience engineering field. From the outset, there is a clear 
intention to use these new theoretical insights to develop methods and tools to deliberately 
manage the adaptive ability of organisations to function safely (Nemeth & Herrera, 2015). 
However, during these early stages of development there is no real consensus about what these 
core concepts mean (Patriarca et al, 2018).  
 
The REA symposia and resilience engineering book series continued to mark the incremental 
development of the resilience engineering field. The REA symposia continued every two years 
and there have been seven symposia from 2006 to 2017 (REA, 2018). There are ten books in the 
resilience engineering book series by Ashgate Publishers. It should be noted that Ashgate was 
taken over by CRC Press in 2016 (CRC Press, 2018). The initial books continued to collate the 
ideas from the symposia, however the scope of the books grows wider as the resilience 
engineering field develops. Initially the core ideas of the resilience engineering field are only 
published in these symposia proceedings and book series. However, as a consensus about the 
meaning of the core concepts develops (Bergström et al, 2015), research informed by resilience 
engineering theory is published in peer-reviewed academic journals (Furniss et al, 2011a) and 
other outputs, such as white papers (Hollnagel et al, 2015). The literature demonstrates a long 
and complex history to the concept of organisational resilience (Patriarca et al, 2018). This 
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process of theory development is reflected in the diverse definitions and indicators of resilience 
proposed over the past decade (Berg et al, 2018).  
 
In a recent review of the resilience engineering literature, Berg et al (2018) suggest that the core 
concepts of this field are the distinction between Safety I and Safety II (Hollnagel, et al, 2006), the 
distinction between Work-As-Done and Work-As-Imagined (Hollnagel et al., 2015), and 
performance variability (Hollnagel, 2012). The distinction between Safety I and Safety II is one of 
the foundational concepts for resilience engineering theory and represents how this theoretical 
perspective differs from traditional approaches for understanding safety in complex systems. 
Safety I is characterised by focusing on negative outcomes. From this perspective, safety is about 
minimising, measuring and understanding things that go wrong. Safety II represents the resilience 
engineering approach and is characterised by focusing on positive outcomes. For this 
perspective, safety is about understanding and maximising what goes right (Hollnagel et al, 2015).  
 
The Safety II perspective is underpinned by a series of related concepts about how work is done 
in complex sociotechnical systems. A central concept is that that adaptations are necessary for 
successful performance (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2008). People do their best to 
ensure the system works under various conditions by changing the way they work to respond to 
the demands in front of them (Hollnagel, 2016). The variability of everyday performance provides 
the impetus for the adaptations that are necessary to respond to dynamic system conditions 
(Hollnagel et al, 2015). Adaptation to changing conditions is why things go right most of the time. 
However, it is also the reason why things go wrong. Adaptations are the source of both success 
and failure. Outcomes are emergent from the interaction of system components and the 
complexity of sociotechnical systems means that these cannot always be predicted or explained 
by the system components themselves (Rouse, 2007). Crucially, an adaptation that normally 
leads to positive outcomes can lead to negative outcomes. The Safety II perspective advocates 
that safety is about maximising the conditions where adaptation leads to positive outcomes 
(Hollnagel et al, 2013).  
 
The theoretical distinction between Work-as-Imagined and Work-as-Done accounts for the 
necessity of adaptations for ensuring successful system performance (Hollnagel et al, 2006). 
Work-as-Imagined (WAI) provides the basis for planning and represents an idealised version of 
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how work will be achieved. Work-as-Done (WAD) represents the work as it is actually achieved 
in the messy reality of complex systems (Hollnagel et al, 2015). Resilience engineering theory 
suggests that there is a necessary distinction between WAI and WAD because the variability of 
demands in a complex sociotechnical system mean that it is impossible to plan for all eventualities 
(Hollnagel, 2010). People working in the system must deviate from WAI to ensure successful 
performance across a range of conditions. This is Work-as-Done. There is a consensus that 
exploring organisational resilience should focus on everyday work, rather than disasters or 
exceptional circumstances, because this represents the normal ways in which people adapt to 
ensure everyday successful system performance (Hollnagel et al, 2015). Furthermore, 
organisational resilience is an emergent property of system performance and can only be viewed 
in the ‘doing of the work’ (Hollnagel, 2010).  
 
Although the distinction between Work-As-Done and Work-As-Imagined is one of the core 
theoretical components of resilience engineering theory, understanding how work is done in 
complex systems is not exclusive to resilience engineering. Other approaches originating from 
the human factors discipline, such as Human-Computer Interaction (Dix, 2009; Helander, 2014), 
Naturalistic Decision Making (Klein, 2008; Zsambok & Klein, 2014) and Distributed Cognition 
(Hollan et al, 2000), also seek to understand how work is achieved in complex sociotechnical 
systems. Distributed cognition, for example, has emerged as an approach to system design which 
maintains the ways people make decisions and interact are dependent on the external 
environment as well as internal cognitive processes (Furniss et al, 2011). The environment can 
be analysed from a cognitive perspective, such as roles, artefacts and the physical layout of the 
environment and these can all impact how people process information (Furniss et al, 2011). 
Advocates for the utility of distributed cognition theory maintain this should inform the design of 
systems to maximise their effectiveness (Hollan et al, 2000). This approach has been applied in 
healthcare to analyse the roles of artefacts in facilitating communication within clinical teams 
(Nemeth et al, 2004; Xiao, 2005).  
 
Resilience engineering theory moves beyond other approaches for understanding Work-As-Done 
in complex systems by proposing that the key focus of understanding performance in complex 
sociotechnical systems should be on how effective performance is maintained in the face of 
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variable system demands. It thus frames the importance of understanding everyday work as a 
problem of understanding human behaviour in response to complexity.  
 
1.3.2 Resilient Healthcare 
 
Researchers and clinicians have applied the resilience engineering theoretical lens to 
understanding and improving safety in healthcare systems (Berg et al, 2018). This is known as 
resilient healthcare (RHC) and is defined as ‘the ability of the health care system (a clinic, ward, 
a hospital, a country) to adjust its functioning prior to, during or following events (changes, 
disturbances or opportunities), and thereby sustain required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions (Wears et al, 2015). The Resilient Health Care Network (RHCN) brings 
together researchers and healthcare practitioners, dedicated to studying resilient healthcare and 
applying the theory in practice (RHCN, 2018). There have been seven annual RHCN meetings 
since 2012 (RHCN, 2018). There are also four resilient healthcare books (Hollnagel et al, 2013; 
Wears et al, 2015; Braithwaite et al, 2017, Hollnagel et al, 2018). These books and meetings 
represent the incremental conceptual and methodological development of resilient healthcare 
theory and practices (Berg et al, 2018). 
 
The current healthcare safety paradigm is based on retrospective analyses of errors, however 
resilient healthcare focuses on ‘everyday clinical work’, particularly on the ways it unfolds in 
practice (Braithwaite et al, 2017). Resilient healthcare theory can explain the limitations of the 
current healthcare safety paradigm. The hidden assumption of current safety practices in 
healthcare, such as accident investigation and root cause analysis is that complex systems can 
be meaningfully decomposed into their constituent parts and malfunctions in these parts can be 
identified and fixed (Hollnagel et al, 2015). Human error or technological failures are examples of 
malfunctions of these system parts (Hollnagel et al, 2015). Safety practices are therefore largely 
concerned with identifying the causes of things that go wrong and changing processes to prevent 
them from happening again. However, the nature of complex sociotechnical systems means that 
processes do not happen in a linear fashion and decomposing them into their constituent parts is 
not useful for understanding system performance. Instead, constant variability in the conditions 
under which healthcare is provided mean that adaptation is necessary to ensure successful 
outcomes (Hollnagel et al, 2015). However, the same adaptations that result in successful 
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outcomes can also result in adverse outcomes (Hollnagel et al, 2006). This is a key distinction 
from the current safety paradigm. Resilient healthcare focuses on ways to understand and 
improve the successful outcomes from adaptations at a systems level, whilst trying to reduce 
adverse outcomes (Hollnagel et al, 2013). 
 
The two main approaches for operationalising resilient healthcare concepts are the four resilience 
abilities and the Centre for Applied Resilience in Healthcare (CARe) model of organisational 
resilience (Berg et al, 2018). The CARe model of organisational resilience (Figure 1-1), 
operationalises the key resilient healthcare concepts and the way they interact, to guide empirical 
investigation of resilient healthcare practices (Anderson et al, 2016). Demand and capacity are 
broadly defined, so they capture all elements of work across micro, meso and macro levels (Back 
et al, 2017). This means that system demands include the number and acuity of patients, as well 
as standards of patient care and hospital targets. System capacity to meet these demands spans 
staffing level and skill mix, as well as organisation of services and escalation protocols (Anderson 
et al, 2016). The model conceptualises Work-as-Imagined as the planned alignment of system 
capacity with system demand. However, the reality of the fluctuating nature of healthcare systems 
meant that system capacity can never fully account for system demands.  
 
 




In response to this, healthcare professionals adapt or adjust their work to meet fluctuating system 
demands. In this way, they re-align system capacity with system demand and allow the healthcare 
system to function. This is the Work-as-Done. These adaptations are necessary for the system to 
function, but they lead to both success and failure (Hollnagel et al, 2006). Success and failure are 
also broadly defined, given that the dynamic trade-offs can change what is considered successful 
in different contexts (Anderson et al, 2016). The intention of the model is that it provides a broad 
outline of how the main resilient healthcare concepts interact with each other, to support empirical 
of investigation of resilient healthcare practices, rather than provide a complete understanding of 
resilient healthcare theory (Anderson et al, 2016).  
 
The four resilience abilities operationalise a different set of core resilient healthcare concepts 
(Berg et al, 2018). The four resilience abilities originate from a broader resilience engineering 
theoretical perspective and provide some structure for understanding organisational resilience in 
practice (Hollnagel, 2010). Organisational resilience is an emergent property of system 
performance, it is something a system does rather than something is has (Hollnagel et al, 2015). 
A more specific understanding of organisational resilience can be achieved by considering what 
makes a resilient performance possible (Hollnagel, 2010). To this end, Hollnagel (2010) suggests 
four abilities that are equally necessary and jointly sufficient to enable resilient performance. 
Currently they are known as the four resilience abilities, but in the past, they were referred to as 
the four cornerstones or the four potentials for resilient performance (Hollnagel, 2010; Hollnagel, 
2015). All these terms referred to the same four concepts: 
 
1. The ability to respond – being able to respond to expected and unexpected 
disturbances or take advantage of opportunities; by employing prepared responses or 
by changing the current mode of functioning. 
2. The ability to monitor – being able to look for that which is or could affect the 
performance of the system in a positive or negative sense. 
3. The ability to learn – being able to learn the right lessons from the right experience.  
4. The ability to anticipate – being able to anticipate developments (both positive and 




The accessibility of the four resilience abilities means they have been widely used to understand 
resilience healthcare practices (Berg et al, 2018). They are also central to the Resilience Analysis 
Grid (RAG), which is an approach for analysing organisational resilience (Hollnagel, 2010). The 
RAG has been used several times for analysing organisational resilience in healthcare systems 
(Chuang, 2015; Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017).  
 
1.3.3 Current Limitations of Resilience Engineering  
 
A series of literature reviews (Bergström et al, 2015; Righi et al, 2015; Hosseini, et al; 2016; Berg 
et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018) suggest there is now an established consensus about the core 
concepts of resilience engineering theory. Many still believe that resilience engineering theory 
should inform methods and tools to deliberately manage the ability of organisations to adapt to 
pressures and function safely (Nemeth & Herrera, 2015). However, there is ongoing criticism 
there has not yet been sufficient methodological development to support this in practice (Patriarca 
et al, 2018).  
 
The resilience engineering literature demonstrates a complex history to the concept of 
organisational resilience (Patriarca et al, 2018). There have been a range of diverse definitions 
and indicators of resilience proposed over the past decade (Berg et al, 2018). This diffuse set of 
theoretical principles has limited the methodological development of resilience engineering theory 
(Furniss et al, 2011a). Consequently, there has been a lack of empirical testing of these 
theoretical perspectives, with little evidence to support the theoretical claims of the resilience 
engineering principles (Bhamra et al, 2011; Anderson et al, 2016).  
 
The established approaches for operationalising resilient healthcare, (Hollnagel, 2010; Anderson 
et al, 2016; Back et al, 2017) demonstrate value for understanding resilient system performance. 
However, they still require further methodological development to demonstrate they can improve 
the safety of healthcare systems. The CARe model has supported the development of system 
level interventions to improve system performance (Back et al, 2017). However, the four resilience 
abilities still need further methodological development to move from explaining resilient system 
performance to improving resilient system performance. The Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) 
offers the possibility to do this, however there is no clear way to develop new questions specific 
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to a given system (Berg et al, 2018). Unless resilience engineering principles can demonstrate 
an improvement to the quality of care in practice, with clear guidance on how to apply them, the 
ideas will not be taken up by the wider scientific community (Anderson et al, 2016). Resilient 
healthcare theory has generated some tools for understanding resilient system performance, 
however it has not been able to translate these tools to support the analysis of resilient healthcare 
(Berg et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018). 
 
1.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
The current healthcare safety paradigm is limited in terms of improving the quality of care, and 
progress appears to have stalled. Resilience engineering theory offers an appealing alternative 
theoretical lens for understanding safety in healthcare systems. Conceptually, it can account for 
the limitations of the current healthcare safety paradigm. However, without suitable methods for 
its application in practice, resilient healthcare theory may struggle to move from explaining 
resilient system performance to developing ways to analyse and improve it.  
 
Considering the current state of the resilient healthcare field, this thesis aims to advance the 
methodology of resilient healthcare theory and examine its usefulness for quality improvement in 
healthcare. To achieve this, this thesis will advance the Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) by 
developing a replicable process for generating responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating 
questions relevant to a given healthcare system, and then implement this process to explore its 
effectiveness for analysing organisational resilience in healthcare. It will also involve healthcare 
professionals in this process and support them to identify system level interventions to improve 
the potential for resilient performance.  
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Chapter 2 - Narrative Review of Methods for Analysing 
Organisational Resilience  
 
This chapter presents the findings from a narrative review of methods for analysing organisational 
resilience. The intention of the review was to identify existing methods for analysing organisational 
resilience that could be applied to healthcare systems. The researcher considered a narrative 
review most appropriate for examining the resilience engineering literature because it identified 
the different themes of the field and integrated them in order to understand the status of the 
research. The search strategy identified a range of relevant approaches, from conceptual 
conference proceedings to empirically tested methods in peer reviewed academic journals. Most 
of the methods were found in book chapters and conference proceedings. The researcher and 
supervisor team developed evaluative criteria so that these methods could be meaningfully 
compared.        
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Over the course of its development, the resilience engineering community has proposed a series 
of approaches to defining, characterising and modelling the concept of organisational resilience 
(Rigaud et al, 2015). Consequently, there are a spectrum of approaches for analysing 
organisational resilience. This is particularly true of the early resilience engineering literature, 
before the research community reached a consensus about the core concepts (Hollnagel et al, 
2006; Hollnagel et al, 2008). Previous reviews of the resilience engineering literature have 
focused on identifying the areas of research focus (Righi et al, 2015; Patriarca et al, 2018), the 
nature of organisational resilience (Bergström et al, 2015) and methodological approaches to 
studying resilient healthcare (Berg et al, 2018). Initial searches showed there have been no 
reviews examining methods for analysing organisational resilience.  
 
The early thought leaders of the resilience engineering community, such as Hollnagel and Woods 
have been critical of developing methods for measuring organisational resilience (Hollnagel et al, 
2006; Hollnagel et al, 2008; Hollnagel et al, 2015). They were concerned that measuring 
organisational resilience would reduce this complex, nuanced concept to simple numerical 
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figures, thereby undermining the value of this theoretical lens. Despite their concerns, a continued 
interest in resilience engineering theory has motivated researchers to develop methods to analyse 
organisational resilience. As consensus about the core concepts of resilience engineering 
emerged from 2006 to 2015 (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2015), the thought leaders of 
the community have suggested ways that resilient performance could be analysed and proposed 
methods such as the Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) (Hollnagel, 2010) and the stress-strain 
model (Woods et al, 2006). Hollnagel suggests it is not possible to directly measure organisational 
resilience, but it is possible to analyse what makes a resilient performance possible (Hollnagel, 
2010). However, this has not been universally agreed upon and over time researchers developed 
a variety of ways to explain and interpret resilient performance, including measuring, analysing, 
modelling and assessing organisational resilience (Mendonça, 2008; Hollnagel et al, 2010; 
Hollnagel 2014, Rigaud et al, 2015). The aim of this review was to identify and evaluate these 
different approaches to find the most promising method for analysing organisational resilience in 
healthcare systems. To that end, there were several research questions for the review:  
 
1. What are the different ways to analyse organisational resilience?  
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to analysing 
organisational resilience? 
3. Are there any methods for analysing organisational resilience in healthcare? 
4. Can methods used in other complex systems be used to analyse organisational 
resilience in healthcare?  
 
2.2  Methodology  
 
Literature reviews are an essential mechanism for summarising and synthesising the knowledge 
base on a particular subject (Dijkers, 2009; Aveyard, 2014). As the amount of literature about a 
subject increases, so does the need for a review and appraisal of what the literature means for 
the field of inquiry (Pautasso, 2013) (Figure 2-1). There has been increasing interest in finding 
ways to analyse organisational resilience, however there has not yet been a comprehensive 





Figure 2-1 Status of literature and need for literature reviews (Pautasso, 2013) 
 
Resilience engineering is still considered an emerging discipline (Anderson et al, 2016). The 
resilience engineering literature is varied in terms of focus and level of development. A 
combination of qualitative, quantitative and mixed method studies have been published in a range 
of outputs from conference proceedings to peer-reviewed academic journals. This effort has been 
about how to understand organisational resilience in complex systems and not evaluating the 
effectiveness of the resilience engineering theoretical lens. Methods for reviewing evidence and 
synthesising results should be tailored to the research question and the status of the literature 
(Pope et al, 2007). A narrative review method was identified as most effective for identifying and 
integrating the variety of approaches for analysing organisational resilience in the resilience 
engineering community (Grant & Booth, 2009).  
 
Narrative reviews are flexible, which allows them to include different types of evidence, such as 
qualitative and quantitative, research and non-research (Dixon-Woods et al, 2004). This meant it 
could account for the pluralities of the resilience engineering field (Collins & Fauser, 2005; Dijkers, 
2009; Greenhalgh et al, 2018). Since there have been few published studies of applications of 
methods (see p.65), it was not feasible to conduct a systematic review of effectiveness. Narrative 
reviews are often contrasted to systematic reviews, with the former criticised for the risk of 
introducing bias into the search strategy and the later lauded for its rigorous search strategies to 
prevent this (Greenhalgh et al, 2018). Although narrative reviews do not have the same strict 
protocols as systematic reviews, they can still demonstrate the same explicit approaches to the 
identification and selection of evidence, attention to the methodological quality of the studies 
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included and produce a higher order synthesis to produce new knowledge of a research topic 
(Pope et al, 2007).  
 
2.2.1  Scoping the Literature  
 
The researcher carried out initial searches to define the scope of the narrative review (Jones, 
2004). These initial searches used the keywords ‘organisational resilience’, ‘measure’ and 
‘analysis’ with Google Scholar, Medline, Scopus and Web of Science to gain an understanding of 
the resilience engineering literature and its application in healthcare. There were three main 
outcomes of these initial searches. Firstly, resilience is a popular concept used across a range of 
domains such as ecology, metallurgy, individual and organisational psychology, supply chain 
management, strategic management and safety engineering (Bhamra et al, 2011). Secondly, it is 
an ill-defined concept, since the meaning of resilience varied across these domains. Even the 
term ‘organisational resilience’ has different meanings across these domains (McManus et al, 
2008; Hollnagel, 2010). Thirdly, only a small amount of the resilience engineering literature is 
available in peer-reviewed academic journals. Most of the relevant literature is available in a 
resilience engineering book series and the Resilience Engineering Association symposia 
proceedings.  
 
The findings from the scoping searches informed an explicit focus on methods for analysing 
organisational resilience from a resilience engineering perspective. The resilience engineering 
literature shows a continued interest in understanding and improving the safety of complex 
systems (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2015). It also has a growing body of research 
focused on applying these perspectives to healthcare systems (Hollnagel et al, 2013; Wears et 
al, 2015; Braithwaite et al, 2016; Hollnagel et al, 2018). The scoping searches showed that the 
resilience engineering community is tight-knit and foundational thought leaders have had strong 
influence on the development of the field (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2015). Most of 
the early literature is published by the Resilience Engineering Association in a dedicated book 
series and symposia proceedings, however recently there have been more regular publications 
of resilience engineering studies in peer-reviewed academic journals. It was clear that exploring 
the range of methods for analysing organisational resilience needed to account for the way this 






The researcher used a two-stage narrative review design, adapted from Kitson et al (2013), to 
search the resilience engineering literature. The first stage was to identify the well-established 
sources of resilience engineering literature. The second stage was to search these sources for 
methods of analysing organisational resilience, which included searching the citations and 
references of any relevant literature. This was an inclusive review, so critical appraisal was not 
associated with decisions about which studies to include or exclude. However, evaluative criteria 
were used to appraise the different methods for analysing organisational resilience so that the 
spectrum of research, from conference proceedings to articles in peer-reviewed academic 
journals, could be meaningfully compared.  
 
2.2.3 Search Method 
 
The initial scoping searches, previous resilience engineering literature reviews (Bergström et al, 
2015; Righi et al, 2015; Berg et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018), and discussion with supervisors 
and subject experts identified three primary sources of resilience engineering literature: the 
Resilience Engineering Association book series, the biennial Resilience Engineering Association 
symposia and three peer-reviewed academic journals that regularly publish resilience engineering 
articles. During the initial development of the resilience engineering field, the biennial symposia 
were the primary sources of new ideas, with the first symposium held in 2006. The book series 
began with committing these ideas to paper, then over time it began to show a wider scope, with 
books being published more regularly than the symposia and not just limited to ideas from the 
symposia. The books series remains the primary source for the core ideas of the resilience 
engineering field. Gradually over time there has been an increase in articles published in peer 
reviewed academic journals. Specifically, there has been three journals which have published 
most of the resilience engineering articles, including some special editions: Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety; Cognition, Technology & Work; Safety Science.  
 
The researcher examined the titles and abstracts of the conference proceedings of the seven 
Resilience Engineering Association Symposia from 2006 to 2017, and the book chapters and 
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indexes of the ten books of the Resilience Engineering Association book series. Keyword 
searches were used to search the three journal databases, using the terms: ‘organisational 
resilience’, ‘measure’, ‘assess’, ‘evaluate’ and ‘analyse’. The researcher screened the titles and 
abstracts of the articles, then read each article to identify the relevant papers. Conference 
proceedings, book chapters and research articles were included if they made some conceptual 
or methodological contribution to measuring, analysing or evaluating organisational resilience. 
The researcher read the references and citations of literature identified from this search strategy 
to identify any further relevant literature. Two further peer-reviewed academic journals and one 
conference proceeding were found. The detailed search results can be found in Appendix B 
p.212. The narrative review identified 33 relevant articles, but only 32 were included because one 
paper was not available in English (Catalan & Roberts, 2010). Figure 2-2  presents a modified 
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2.2.4 Evaluative Criteria  
 
The scoping searches showed there is a wide range of relevant resilience engineering literature, 
from conference proceedings outlining the conceptual basis for measuring organisational 
resilience to research articles published in peer reviewed academic journals with empirically 
tested methods. This presented a challenge for comparison and subsequent analysis of the 
relevant literature. The researcher and supervisors developed four evaluative criteria (Table 2-1), 
informed by discussion with subject experts and perceived insufficiencies of the literature from 
the scoping searches, to systematically assess and meaningfully compare the literature, despite 
the variation in quality. The criteria were equally necessary and jointly sufficient for considering a 
method appropriate for analysing organisational resilience in healthcare. The researcher 
assessed each paper as poor, moderate or good for each of the evaluative criteria.  
 
The first criterion is conceptual clarity. For a method to have good conceptual clarity, there needed 
to be internal consistency between the concepts used within the method, and a clear link between 
these concepts and resilience engineering theory. The second criterion is methodological 
guidance. For a method to have good methodological guidance, there needed to be a clear 
method for using the method in practice. The third criterion is applicability. For a method to have 
good applicability, a method needed to be applied by researchers that were not involved in 
developing it. The fourth criterion is representation of social elements of resilient system 
performance. Methods for analysing organisational resilience need to capture both social and 
technical aspects of system performance to effectively examine organisational resilience. The 
term ‘social elements’ refers to the social processes that are vital for facilitating resilient 
performance, such as coordination and articulation of work, negotiation of competing goals and 
dynamic trade-offs (Wears & Perry, 2006; Ross et al, 2014; Sujan et al, 2015). This is central to 
understanding resilient performance in healthcare systems, where care is delivered by human 
beings to human beings. An entirely technical method for analysing organisational resilience fails 






Table 2-1 Evaluative criteria of methods for analysing organisational resilience  
Evaluative 
criteria   
Score 





concepts and how they 
relate to analysing 
organisational resilience 
according to resilience 
engineering theory 
Clear relationship between 
underpinning concepts, but 
unclear how they relate to 
analysing organisational 





concepts and how they 
relate to analysing 
organisational resilience 




Clear guidance about 
how to use the method 
for analysing 
organisational resilience   
Some rudimentary 
methods for using this 
method in practice, but 
unclear how to use it 
Entirely conceptual, with 
no clear guidance for 




Applied by researchers 
who were not involved in 
developing the method   
Applied by researchers 
who developed the method 
No application in practice 
Representation 
of the social  
Equal representation of 
social and technical 
aspects of resilient 
system performance 
Some representation of 
social elements of system 
performance, but unequal 
weighting in favour of 
technical elements 
No representation of 





2.3 Search Results 
 




Table 2-2 Papers included in the narrative review 
 
No.  Reference Conceptual 
clarity 
Methodological 
guidance   
Application in 
practice   
Representation 
of social   
1 Woods, D., Wreathall, J. & Anders, S. (2006). Stress-Strain Plots as a Model of an 
Organisation’s Resilience. Paper presented at the 2nd Resilience Engineering 
Association Symposium, France. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
2 Mendonça, D. (2008). Measures of Resilient Performance. In. Hollnagel, E., Nemeth 
C. & Dekker S. (Eds). Resilience Engineering Perspectives, Volume 1: Remaining 
Sensitive to the Possibility of Failure. Ashgate.   
Good Poor Poor Moderate  
3 Woods, D. & Wreathall, J. (2008). Stress-Strain Plots as a Basis for Assessing System 
Resilience. In. Hollnagel, E., Nemeth C., & Dekker S. (Eds). Resilience Engineering 
Perspectives, Volume 1: Remaining Sensitive to the Possibility of Failure. Ashgate. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
4 Johansson, B. & Lindgren, M. (2008). A Quick and Dirty Evaluation of Resilience 
Enhancing Properties in Safety Critical Systems. Paper presented at the 3rd Resilience 
Engineering Association Symposium, France. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
5 Woltjer, R. (2008). Resilience assessment based on models of functional resonance. 
Paper presented at the 3rd Resilience Association Engineering Symposium, France. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
6 Wreathall, J. (2009). Measuring Resilience. In. Nemeth, C., Hollnagel, E. & Dekker, S., 
(Eds). Resilience Engineering Perspectives Volume 2: Preparation and Restoration. 
Ashgate.  
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
7 Ferreira, P., Wilson, J., Ryan, B., & Sharples, S. (2010). Measuring Resilience in the 
Planning of Rail Engineering Work. In. Hollnagel, E., Paries, J., Woods, D., & 
Wreathall, J. (Eds). Resilience engineering in practice: A guidebook. Ashgate.  
 
 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
43 
 
No.  Reference Conceptual 
clarity 
Methodological 
guidance   
Application in 
practice   
Representation 
of social   
8 Hollnagel, E. (2010). Epilogue: RAG – The Resilience Analysis Grid. In. Hollnagel, E., 
Paries, J., Woods, D., & Wreathall, J. (Eds). Resilience engineering in practice: A 
guidebook. Ashgate. 
Good Moderate Good Moderate 
9 Øien, K., Massaiu, S., Tinmannsvik, R. & Størseth, F. (2010). Development of early 
warning indicators based on resilience engineering. Paper presented at 10th 
International Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management Conference. Seattle, 
Washington.  
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
10 Furniss, D., Back, J., Blandford, A., Hildebrandt, M. & Broberg, H. (2011a). A 
Resilience Markers Framework for Small Teams. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 96(1), 2-10. 
Good Moderate Good Moderate 
11 Hollnagel, E. (2012). FRAM: The Functional Resonance Analysis Method. Ashgate. Good Good Good Moderate 
12 Saurin, T., & Junior, G. (2012). A Framework for Identifying and Analyzing Sources of 
Resilience and Brittleness: a Case Study of Two Air Taxi Carriers. International 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 42 (3), 312-324. 
Good Moderate Moderate Poor 
13 Grecco, C., Vidal, M., Cosenza, C., Santos, I. & Carvalho, P. (2013). A Fuzzy Model to 
Assess Resilience for Safety Management. Paper presented at 5th Resilience 
Engineering Association Symposium. Managing Trade-Offs. Soesterberg, 
Netherlands. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
14 Herrera, I, A., Vennesland, A., Pasquini, A., & Silvagni, S. (2013). Planning Measuring 
Resilience Potential and Early Warnings (SCALES). Paper presented at 5th Resilience 




Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
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No. Reference Conceptual 
clarity 
Methodological 
guidance   
Application in 
practice   
Representation 
of social   
15 Lundberg, J., & Woltjer, R. (2013). The Resilience Analysis Matrix (RAM): Visualizing 
Functional Dependencies in Complex Socio-Technical Systems. Paper presented at 
5th Resilience Engineering Association Symposium. Managing Trade-Offs. 
Soesterberg, Netherlands. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
16 Siegel, W., & Schraagen, J. M. (2013). Developing Resilience Signals for the Dutch 
Railway System. Paper presented at 5th Resilience Engineering Association 
Symposium. Managing Trade-Offs. Soesterberg, Netherlands. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
17 Woods, D., Chan, Y. J., & Wreathall, J. (2013). The Stress Strain Model of Resilience 
Operationalizes the Four Cornerstones of Resilience Engineering. Paper presented at 
5th Resilience Engineering Association Symposium. Managing Trade-Offs. 
Soesterberg, Netherlands. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
18 Rankin, A., Lundberg, J. & Woltjer, R. (2014). A Framework for Learning from Adaptive 
Performance. In. Nemeth, C. & Hollnagel, E. Eds. Resilience Engineering in Practice 
Volume 2: Becoming Resilient. Ashgate. 
Poor Moderate Moderate Poor 
19 Azadeh, A., Salehi, V., Arvan, M. & Dolatkhah, M. (2014). Assessment of resilience 
engineering factors in high-risk environments by fuzzy cognitive maps: A 
petrochemical plant. Safety Science, 68, 99-107. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
20 Francis, R. & Bekera, B. (2014). A metric and frameworks for resilience analysis of 
engineered and infrastructure systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 121, 
90-103. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
21 Rankin, A., Lundberg, J., Woltjer, R., Rollenhagen, C. & Hollnagel, E. (2014). 
Resilience in everyday operations a framework for analyzing adaptations in high-risk 
work. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 8(1), 78-97. 
Moderate Poor Moderate Poor 
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No. Reference Conceptual 
clarity 
Methodological 
guidance   
Application in 
practice   
Representation 
of social   
22 Rigaud, E., Neveu, C., Langa, S., & Obrist, M. (2015). Sociotechnical System 
Resilience Assessment and Improvement Method. Paper presented at 6th Resilience 
Engineering Association Symposium. Lisbon, Portugal. 
Moderate Poor Poor Poor 
23 Saurin, T. (2015). Classification and Assessment of Slack: Implications for Resilience. 
Paper presented at 6th Resilience Engineering Association Symposium. Lisbon, 
Portugal. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
24 Shirali, G. A., Motamedzade, M., Mohammadfam, I., Ebrahimipour, V., & Moghimbeigi, 
A. (2016). Assessment of resilience engineering factors based on system properties in 
a process industry. Cognition, Technology & Work, 18(1), 19-31. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
25 van der Beek, D. & Schraagen, J. M. (2015). ADAPTER: Analysing and developing 
adaptability and performance in teams to enhance resilience. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety, 141, 33-44. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
26 Mendonça, D. & Wallace, W.A. (2015). Factors underlying organizational resilience: 
The case of electric power restoration in New York City after 11 September 2001. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 141, 83-91. 
Good Poor Moderate Moderate 
27 Stroeve, S. & Everdij, M. (2017). Agent-based modelling and mental simulation for 
resilience engineering in air transport. Safety Science, 93, 29-49. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
28 Raben, D., Bogh, S., Viskum, B., Mikkelsen, K., & Hollnagel, E. (2017). Proposing 
leading indicators for blood sampling: application of a method based on the principles 
of resilient healthcare. Cognition, Technology & Work, 19(4), 809-817. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
29 Saurin, T., & Werle, N. (2017). A framework for the analysis of slack in socio-technical 
systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 167, 439-451. 
 
 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
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No. Reference Conceptual 
clarity 
Methodological 
guidance   
Application in 
practice   
Representation 
of social   
30 Patriarca, R., Di Gravio, G., Constantino, F., Tronci, M. (2017). FRAM to assess 
performance variability in everyday work: functional resonance in the railway domain. 
Paper presented at 7th Resilience Engineering Association Symposium. Luik, Belgium. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
31 Rubio-Romero, J., Pardo-Ferreira, M., De la Varga-Salto, J., & Galindo-Reyes, F. 
(2018). Composite leading indicator to assess the resilience engineering in 
occupational health & safety in municipal solid waste management companies. Safety 
Science, 108, 161-172. 
Moderate Moderate  Moderate Poor 
32 Jain, P., Mentzer, R., & Mannan, M. S. (2018). Resilience metrics for improved 
process-risk decision making: Survey, analysis and application. Safety Science, 108, 
13-28. 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor 
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2.4 Findings     
 
The resilience engineering literature about measuring or analysing organisational resilience is 
fragmented and inconsistent. Many of the initial ideas were from conference proceedings or 
book chapters and lacked sufficient conceptual development for any rigorous application in 
practice. Subsequently, there was little evidence to support the value of these approaches. 
Many of the articles from the peer reviewed academic journals demonstrated impenetrable or 
inappropriate methods, which did not align with the core ideas of resilience engineering theory 
or the focus of this study.  
 
The findings are structured so that similar theoretical and methodological approaches are 
presented and analysed together. There are three established methods for analysing 
organisational resilience: the Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) (Hollnagel, 2010) the Resilience 
Markers Framework (RMF) (Furniss et al, 2011a) and the Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012). There are attempts to improve each of these established 
methods, however there is no evidence that these attempts added value or advanced these 
established methods (Van der Beek & Scharaagen, 2015; Rankin et al, 2014b; Patricia et al, 
2017). There are a series of methods which use a leading indicator informed approach to 
analysing organisational resilience (Øien et al, 2010; Grecco et al, 2013; Herrera et al, 2013; 
Siegel & Schraagen, 2013; Shirali et al, 2015; Raben et al 2017; Rubio-Romero et al, 2018). 
The final group of methods contains the remaining approaches which do not share any 
conceptual or methodological similarities to these other methods for analysing organisational 
resilience.   
 
2.4.1 Resilience Analysis Grid 
 
The Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) is directly informed by Hollnagel’s understanding of 
organisational resilience (Hollnagel, 2010). He suggests it is not possible to directly measure 
organisational resilience, but it is possible to analyse what makes a resilient performance 
possible (Hollnagel, 2010). There are four abilities that are equally necessary and jointly 
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sufficient to explain resilient performance. Currently these are known as the four resilience 
abilities, but previously they have been known as the four cornerstones or the four potentials 
for resilient performance (Hollnagel, 2010; Hollnagel, 2015). All these terms refer to the same 
four concepts: 
 
1. The ability to respond – being able to respond to expected and unexpected 
disturbances or take advantage of opportunities; by employing prepared responses or 
by changing the current mode of functioning 
2. The ability to monitor – being able to look for that which is or could affect the 
performance of the system in a positive or negative sense 
3. The ability to learn – being able to learn the right lessons from the right experience  
4. The ability to anticipate – being able to anticipate developments (both positive and 
negative) further into the future (Hollnagel, 2010)  
 
According to Hollnagel (2010), analysing organisational resilience should be concerned with 
the extent to which these resilience abilities are present (or absent) in system performance. By 
operationalising these concepts, they are transformed from a series of abstract ideas to specific 
activities that can be observed and analysed using four sets of questions (see Appendix A, 
p.210). Table 2-3 shows an example of the questions for analysing the ability to respond. The 
answers can be measured on a five-point Likert scale, to develop a profile of how well a system 
can perform each attribute. The result is as a proxy measure of organisational resilience 
(Hollnagel, 2010).  
 




Event List What are the events for which the system has a prepared response? 
Background How were these events selected (tradition, regular requirements, design basis, 
experience, expertise, risk assessment, industry standard, etc.)? 
Relevance When was the list created? How often is it revised? On which basis is it revised? Who 
is responsible for maintaining and evaluating the list? 
Threshold  When is a response activated? What is the triggering criterion or threshold? Is the 
criterion absolute or does it depend on internal/external factors? Is there a trade-off 





How was the specific type of response list decided? How is it ascertained that it is 
adequate? (Empirically, or based on analyses or models?) 
Speed How fast is full response ability available? How fast can an effective response be 
implemented?  
Duration For how long can a 100% effective response be sustained? What is the minimum 
acceptable response level and how long can it be sustained? 
Stop Rule What is the criterion for ending the response and returning to a ‘normal’ state? 
Response 
Capability  
How many resources are allocated to ensure response readiness (people, equipment, 
materials)? How many are exclusive for the response potential? Who is responsible 
for maintaining the response ability? 
Verification How is the readiness to respond maintained? How and when is the readiness to 
respond verified? 
 
The results of the RAG can be plotted on a radar chart diagram, to graphically represent the 
results of the analysis (Figure 2-3). Comparisons across different time points can identify any 
change in the potential for resilient performance. In its current form, the RAG provides the 
conceptual basis for analysing the organisational resilience of a complex system, however it is 
limited by an implementation gap. The questions need to be tailored to each new system in 
which the RAG is applied (Hollnagel, 2010), however there is no method for generating new 
questions for each new system. There is face validity for the four resilience abilities, but no 
empirical evidence for them or the original questions (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2-3 Radar Chart diagram comparing RAG applications over time 
 
The RAG has been used in several domains, such as healthcare (Axelsson & Ros, 2015; 
Chuang, 2015; Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017), air traffic management (Praetorius et al, 2012) 
and the space industry (Nemeth et al, 2017). However, the implementation gap means 
researchers have used the RAG in different ways. The most common approach has been to 
directly apply the original RAG questions to a system (Praetorius et al, 2012). Researchers 
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have also attempted to adapt the original questions, so they were more specific to a system. 
For example, some researchers used the original RAG questions as a platform for discussion 
with frontline workers and edited the original questions in response to this (Praetorius et al, 
2012; Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017). Another way was to use local standard operating 
procedures to edit the original questions to be more relevant to a system (Chuang, 2015). All 
these attempts at applying the RAG began with the original questions and attempted to tailor 
them to a system. This meant they explored the four resilience abilities separately, despite 
resilience engineering theory suggesting they are interdependent and simultaneous (Hollnagel 
et al, 2006; Hollnagel, 2010). It was not clear how well the participants involved in these 
discussions understood the subtleties of resilience engineering theory nor how researchers 
presented the questions to them. The original RAG questions are abstract and written in a way 
that is inaccessible to most frontline workers.  
 
There have also been attempts at making more substantial improvements to the RAG. For 
example, one attempt included team work questions in addition to the questions about the four 
resilience abilities (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015). The four resilience abilities are most 
often discussed at an organisational level, but Van der Beek & Schraagen (2015) suggest they 
are as relevant at team level and that team performance affects system performance. To 
account for this, they expand the scope of the RAG with questions about shared 
transformational leadership and cooperation with other teams (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 
2015). Although there may be a connection between team and system performance, the focus 
of resilience engineering theory is system level performance because this is where the heart of 
the complexity lies (Hollnagel et al, 2015). It is not clear how these team work questions could 
be used in other systems because there is no clear guidance for replicating the question 
generation process. A different approach was the conceptual development of the four resilience 
abilities (Rigaud et al, 2015). Rigaud et al (2015) suggest it useful to explore responding, 
monitoring, learning and anticipating in more detail and expand the four resilience abilities into 
nine resilience dimensions. This expansion focuses on analysing a time dimension of the four 
resilience abilities, for example system capacity to monitor past performance, system capacity 
to monitor actual performance and system capacity to monitor potential (future) performance 
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(Rigaud et al 2015). This idea was presented in a conference proceeding with no 
methodological guidance for applying it in practice and there is no evidence of further any 
further development. 
 
In summary, the RAG is conceptually well-developed because there is a clear link between the 
four resilience abilities and analysing organisational resilience. It is one of the most commonly 
used methods for analysing organisational resilience (Nemeth et al, 2017), and there have been 
many applications in healthcare (Axelsson & Ros, 2015; Chuang, 2015; Hunte, 2016; Engvall 
et al, 2017). However, the original questions are abstract, couched in technical language that 
is inaccessible to people not well versed in resilience engineering theory and fail to adequately 
represent the social elements of resilient system performance. The implementation gap is the 
most significant limitation for the method and has resulted in different ways of generating 
questions (Praetorius et al, 2012; Chuang, 2015). There is currently no consensus around how 
to generate questions, with most attempts editing the original questions to suit their system. 
Attempts at developing this method have thus far failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of 
improving its ability to analyse organisational resilience (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015; 
Rigaud et al, 2015). For the RAG, bridging the implementation gap is a clear direction for 
improvement. Doing this effectively should generate questions that are not limited in the same 
way as the original questions.  
 
2.4.2 Resilience Markers Framework 
 
The Resilience Markers Framework (RMF) structures observations of resilient actions in small 
teams (Furniss et al, 2011a). However, the term ‘small teams’ is not clearly defined. The 
framework was developed in response to a lack of common frameworks for analysing 
organisational resilience, which limited the ability of the resilience engineering field to build on 
previous work (Furniss et al, 2011a). The RMF provides a platform for discussion of 
organisational resilience, where specific activities observed in practice (in a particular system) 
are traced to high-level resilience concepts (across different systems in different industries). 
For example, an operator in a nuclear power station control room was observed putting a 
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bookmark in an operation manual in anticipation of a particular future event (Furniss et al 
2011a). This action is specific to the nuclear power domain, however the RMF structures 
analysis of this action so that it relates to higher-level resilience concepts, such as anticipation, 
and this is relevant to different systems in different industries, for example managing discharges 
in a hospital.  
 
There are three parts to the framework (Figure 2-4). The first part of the framework is the 
observation level, which is about observing actions in practice. The second part of the 
framework is the strategy level, which is about analysing the actions from various perspectives 
to construct a resilience narrative. The third part of the framework is the markers level, which 
is about moving from the resilience narrative to higher level resilience concepts that are relevant 
to different systems and industries. The intention is to populate these categories with 
information gathered from observing the actions of people working in complex systems (Furniss 
et al, 2011a). The structure of the framework allows for the observation to capture the social as 
well as the technical actions associated with resilient performance.  
 




Researchers have used the RMF to structure observation of resilient activities in several 
different industries, such as nuclear power (Furniss et al 2011a), healthcare (Furniss et al, 
2011b; Gregg et al, 2014) and air traffic management (Stroeve et al, 2015). These applications 
all focus on teams based in the same location, such as a nuclear power control room (Furniss 
et al, 2011a), chemotherapy day unit (Furniss et al, 2011b), or air traffic control tower (Stroeve 
et al, 2015). They all suggest the RMF helped explain and understand more about resilient 
performance. For example, the anticipating activities used by nuclear power control room 
operatives was useful for explaining how anticipating is part of resilient performance (Furniss 
et al, 2011a). The adaptations of nursing staff using intravenous infusion pump alarms for 
monitoring, in addition to administering chemotherapy drugs, was useful for explaining how 
technology can be used for more than one purpose, in this instance monitoring and treatment 
(Furniss et al, 2011b). However, no one has used the RMF to move from understanding resilient 
performance to analysing resilient performance because it is an observational tool, not an 
analytical tool. It is useful for observing small teams that are co-located, for example in an air 
traffic control tower or nuclear power control room. However, in healthcare there are often 
multiple teams of different healthcare disciplines caring for a single patient. It is in the 
complexity of the interaction and coordination of these teams that many nuanced aspects of 
organisational resilience lie.  
 
There have been some attempts to develop the RMF so that it can analyse resilient 
performance. One attempt was to develop a framework for learning from adaptive performance 
(Rankin et al, 2014a). This focused on cataloguing examples of resilient actions. However, this 
is limited in the same way as the RMF. It does not provide any support for moving beyond 
observation to evaluation. Another attempt to develop the RMF was the framework for 
analysing adaptations (Rankin et al, 2014b). This explicitly focuses on analysing resilient 
strategies employed in everyday work (Figure 2-5). The framework consists of three categories 
of analysis: contextual analysis, enablers of resilient actions and interactions (expected and 




Figure 2-5 Resilient Strategies Framework (Rankin et al, 2014b) 
 
There are several different conceptual elements to this framework, including the observational 
structure of the RMF (Furniss et al, 2011a), the four resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 2010) and 
other resilience engineering theoretical components (Hollnagel et al, 2006). Although these are 
all relevant to analysing organisational resilience, they involve different elements of resilience 
engineering theory and there is no clear explanation about how they interact within this 
framework. Consequently, there is a lack of conceptual clarity. There is also insufficient detail 
for using this framework in practice. 
 
The RMF is conceptually sound, but only supports observing resilient actions of small teams, 
rather than analysing resilient system performance. Despite attempts by others to develop the 
RMF into an analytical framework (Rankin et al, 2014b), the lack of conceptual clarity and 
insufficient methodological development meant they are also of limited value for analysing the 
organisational resilience of healthcare systems.  
 
2.4.3 Functional Resonance Analysis Method   
 
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) provides a way to describe how work is 
done in complex systems using the idea of resonance arising from the variability of everyday 
performance (Hollnagel, 2016b). It is underpinned by four concepts, which inform a well-
established method for modelling complex systems (Hollnagel, 2012). These four concepts are; 
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things go right and wrong in the same way, adaptation is necessary for successful performance 
and this is the source of why things go right or wrong, normal variability of several functions 
can combine in unexpected ways, this variability can resonate and result in unusually high 
variability of normal functions (Hollnagel, 2012). The intention of a FRAM analysis is to produce 
a description of how system components interact, so that unwanted variability can be identified 
and reduced (Hollnagel, 2016b).  
 
However, unwanted variability is not well defined. It appears to be a post-hoc designation 
similar to human error and is used to retrospectively describe human actions that have negative 
outcomes. If this is the case, then post-hoc designations cannot inform a prospective method 
for analysing organisational resilience because these judgements can only be made 
retrospectively.  
 
A FRAM analysis consists of four steps. The starting point is a description and understanding 
of what happens in everyday work situations (Hollnagel, 2016b). The focus should be to identify 
all the elements that are part of important functions, rather than attempt a wider description of 
events. This includes identifying all the aspects that are essential for that function to be carried 
out: time, control, output, resource, precondition and input. (Hollnagel, 2016b). These are the 
conditions that allow the function or activity to happen. Figure 2-6 shows an example of the 
hexagons that FRAM uses to model the six aspects of a function (or activity). Second, identify 
the potential variability of the functions in the FRAM model. Third, define the functional 
resonance based on dependencies between functions and the potential for functional 
variability. Once this analysis is complete, then it is possible to identify ways to monitor 
resonance between the variability of system functions, to reduce unwanted variability (leading 
to poor outcomes) or increase desired variability (leading to good outcomes) (Hollnagel, 
2016b). There is computer software to support the development of these system models 





Figure 2-6 The six aspects of a function or activity in a FRAM module (Hollnagel, 2012) 
 
FRAM has been used for different types of analyses across a range of industries. It has been 
used in healthcare to analyse effectiveness of systems and processes. For example, it has 
been used to analyse the ability of a primary care system to identify and manage sepsis (McNab 
et al, 2018). Figure 2-7 shows an example of this FRAM model and how the connections 
between the hexagons combine to model a primary care system (McNab et al, 2018). It has 
also been used to align Work-as-Imagined and Work-as-Done when implementing clinical 
guidelines (Clay-Williams et al, 2015). Beyond healthcare, it has been used to explore 
accidents in air-traffic management systems (De Carvalho, 2011), model maritime organisation 
systems (Patriarca & Bergström, 2017) and assess risk in sustainable construction industries 
(Rosa et al, 2015). This range of analyses shows that FRAM is not limited to analysing 
organisational resilience, but that the method allows for a variety of different analyses 





Figure 2-7 FRAM model of system to identify and clinically manage sepsis in primary care (McNab et al, 
2018) 
 
There have been several attempts at improving FRAM. One attempt focused on improving 
FRAM’s ability to analyse organisational resilience, by using FRAM to analyse Woods’ (2006) 
five resilience characteristics (Woltjer, 2008). The intention is that the detail of the FRAM model 
could provide some direction for analysing vague resilience characteristics, such as flexibility 
and cross-scale interactions (Woods, 2006). However, this is a conference proceeding and it 
is not clear whether this analysis should be completed for each new system being investigated, 
or whether it is supposed to provide more general guidance about analysing organisational 
resilience. There is no evidence that this provided further value for using FRAM to analyse 
organisational resilience. A different attempt at developing FRAM is the Resilience Analysis 
Matrix (RAM) (Lundberg & Woltjer, 2013). This is about developing the output of FRAM 
analyses and improving the way the findings are visualised. RAM provides a visual 
representation of the functional dependencies in complex systems and can represent system 
behaviours in ways that textual analysis cannot (Lundberg & Woltjer, 2013). This is another 
conference proceeding with little methodological development nor application in practice.  
 
FRAM is a conceptually clear, methodologically well-developed method analysing variability 
between system functions. The FRAM model provides a platform for understanding how system 
components interact and informs a range of different analyses, including, but not limited to 
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analysing organisational resilience. Attempts at developing FRAM did not provide any evidence 
that they increased the value of the method (Woltjer, 2008; Lundberg & Woltjer, 2013).  
 
2.4.4 Leading Indicator Approaches for Analysing Organisational Resilience  
 
A further approach extends to methods that have used a leading indicator approach for 
analysing organisational resilience (Table 2-4). Leading indicators are conditions that precede 
an event and have value in predicting the arrival of this event (Grabowski et al, 2007). They are 
distinct from lagging indicators, which identify conditions that have contributed to an event but 
are only recorded or understood after the event has occurred (Leveson, 2015; Kongsvik et al, 
2010). The intention of leading indicator informed approaches is to proactively identify when 
system performance is deteriorating and no longer able to adapt to expected or unexpected 
demands (Grabowski et al, 2007; Rubio-Romero et al, 2018). In this way, they assess 
organisational resilience as system performance occurs. There are four different ways 
researchers have used leading indicators to assess organisational resilience, including 
analysing the effect adaptations have on outcomes (Øien et al, 2010; Grecco et al, 2013; Raben 
et al 2017), using pre-existing models to identify leading indicators (Herrera et al, 2013), 
assessing system performance in relation to system boundaries (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014) 
and using leading indicators to support quantitative assessment of organisational resilience 
(Shirali et al, 2015; Rubio-Romero et al, 2018). 
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Table 2-4 Leading Indicator Methods for Analysing Organisational Resilience 
Reference  Underlying Concepts Method Domain Application 
Øien, K., Massaiu, S., 
Tinmannsvik, R., Størseth, F. 
(2010). Development of early 
warning indicators based on 
resilience engineering. Paper 
presented at 10th International 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
& Management Conference. 
Seattle, Washington. 
Resilience early warning indicators are a 
way to understand the effectiveness of 
proactive risk management practices 
 
Leading indicator approaches to analysing 
organisational resilience should focus on the 
effect adaptations have on outcomes 
Three main categories of contributing 
success factors for resilient system 
performance: risk awareness, 
response capacity, support  
 
Each factor has specific indicators 
which can be measured 
Oil and Gas Industry  Exploratory study for 
reducing risk of oil 
spills 
Grecco, C., Vidal, M., Cosenza, 
C., Santos, I., & Carvalho, P. 
(2013). A Fuzzy Model to 
Assess Resilience for Safety 
Management. Paper presented 




Analysing organisational resilience should be 
concerned with the anticipation and 
monitoring of trade-offs 
 
Leading indicator approaches to analysing 
organisational resilience should focus on the 
effect adaptations have on outcomes 
Three steps to assess organisational 
resilience: selection of the leading 
indicators, determination of resilience 
ideal pattern (using Fuzzy Set 
Theory), assessment of actual 
resilience level compared to ideal 
pattern 






Herrera, I, A., Vennesland, A., 
Pasquini, A., & Silvagni, S. 
(2013). Planning Measuring 
Resilience Potential and Early 
Warnings (SCALES). Paper 
presented at 5th Resilience 
Engineering Association 
Symposium. Managing Trade-
Offs. Soesterberg, Netherlands. 
Organisational resilience can be analysed 
using existing system models. A detailed 
system model, using several perspectives, 
can identify indicators of resilient 
performance  
Detailed system model should include 
functional, process, information and 
role perspectives. 
 
Uses Woods’ (2006) resilience 
characteristics and Hollnagel’s (2010) 
four resilience abilities 
No Application in 
practice  
Conference paper  
 
Siegel, W., & Schraagen, J. 
(2013). Developing Resilience 
Signals for the Dutch Railway 





Organisational resilience can be analysed by 
quantifying resilience signals 
 
Leading indicators can be developed to 
indicate the status of current system 
performance in relation to system 
boundaries 
Railway industry technical data are 
used to construct a series of 
equations that calculate quantified 
resilience signals  
 
Informed by Hollnagel’s (2010) four 
resilience abilities, with a focus on 
anticipating 
Railway industry  Two retrospective 
case studies 
Shirali, G. A., Motamedzade, M., 
Mohammadfam, I., 
Ebrahimipour, V., & 
Moghimbeigi, A. (2016). 
Assessment of resilience 
engineering factors based on 
system properties in a process 
industry. Cognition, Technology 
& Work, 18(1), 19-31. 
Organisational resilience should be 
assessed quantitatively. This should be done 
using statistical methods - Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Numerical 
Taxonomy (NT) 
PCA and NT are used to assess nine 
leading indicators of resilient 
performance: buffering capacity, 
margin, tolerance, cross-scale 
interactions, learning culture, 
flexibility, anticipation, attention, 
response  





Raben, D., Bogh, S., Viskum, B., 
Mikkelsen, K. L., & Hollnagel, E. 
(2017). Proposing leading 
indicators for blood sampling: 
application of a method based 
on the principles of resilient 
healthcare. Cognition, 
Technology & Work, 19(4), 809-
817. 
Leading indicator approaches to analysing 
organisational resilience should focus on the 
effect adaptations have on outcomes 
The Leading Indicator Identification 
Method (LIIM). Six steps for identifying 
system functions, the variability of 
functions and leading indicators of this 
variability 
Healthcare Case study of blood 
sampling in an 
outpatient clinic 
Rubio-Romero, J., Pardo-
Ferreira, M., De la Varga-Salto, 
J., & Galindo-Reyes, F. (2018). 
Composite leading indicator to 
assess the resilience 
engineering in occupational 
health & safety in municipal solid 
waste management companies. 
Safety Science, 108, 161-172. 
Organisational resilience can be quantified 
and assessed using composite leading 
indicators  
 
Quantifying resilience assessment is 
important for informing decisions about 
improving system resilience  
 
The Composite Leading Indicator 
method - 61 variables corresponding 
to the 61 items from a questionnaire 
designed by Shirali et al (2013) to 
evaluate resilience engineering 
Municipal Solid Waste 
Management 
Case Study of 
occupational health 
and safety 





The most common approach utilised for a leading indicator informed method for analysing 
organisational resilience is to assess the effect adaptations have on outcomes. However, there 
is no consensus about how this should be done. For example, one method uses FRAM to map 
system processes, then identify adaptations and find indicators for how these adaptations affect 
system performance (Raben et al, 2017). This was applied to a healthcare system and explored 
indicators for resilient performance in a blood sampling clinic. Although this method is helpful 
for identifying indicators, there is little work undertaken into how to support the system to 
monitor these indicators. For example, delays in receiving the results of blood tests are an 
indication of deteriorating system performance. However, there is no further suggestion for 
developing system level monitoring for this leading indicator. This has arguably limited the 
ability of this method to analyse organisational resilience in healthcare. A different method 
focuses on identifying contributing success factors, which are specific activities or system 
properties that are indicators of resilient system performance (Øien et al, 2010). The activities 
or system properties that represent the contributing success factors are specific to each 
complex system, however this provides little guidance for identifying these in practice. Some 
approaches use technical, reductive methods to identify the effect adaptations have on 
outcomes. For example, one method uses fuzzy set mathematical theory to identify an ideal 
resilient system performance and then assess actual system performance compared to this 
ideal model (Grecco et al, 2013). Fuzzy set theory is mathematical theory which focuses on 
modelling vague concepts with unclear boundaries (Massad et al, 2008). The intention is to use 
this theory to provide some structure to exploring resilient performance and understand how 
current system performance relates to an idealised version of system performance. The 
technical nature of this approach means that it failed to account for any social aspect of system 
performance. There is also insufficient methodological detail for identifying the ideal resilient 
system performance in another complex system.    
 
Rather than develop new conceptual approaches, some researchers use pre-existing system 
models to inform a leading indicator method for analysing organisational resilience. For 
example, one approach uses a combination of existing system modelling techniques, Woods’ 
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(2006) resilience characteristics and Hollnagel’s (2010) four resilience abilities to build a 
detailed model of system performance (Herrera et al, 2013). The intention is to use the detailed 
system model to identify leading indicators of resilient performance, so that the effectiveness 
of system performance could be understood in real time. However, this is a conference 
proceeding and only provides a conceptual outline of a method. There is insufficient conceptual 
or methodological detail for using this method in practice. There is no explanation about how 
the different elements of resilience engineering theory interact with each other to analyse 
organisational resilience.   
 
A leading indicator approach has also been used to identify the status of system performance 
in relation to system boundaries. The only example of this is specific to railway systems (Siegel 
& Schraagen, 2014). For this method, system boundaries are defined as a combination of 
safety culture pressure, efficiency pressure and ‘least effort’ pressure (Rasmussen, 1997). 
These are the forces that surround a complex system and affect system performance. 
Understanding the status of system performance in relation to these boundaries provides a 
means to analyse resilient system performance (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014). This method 
involves quantifying resilience signals, which are observable elements of a system that indicate 
its ability to respond to expected and unexpected events (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014). It focuses 
on railway systems because railways systems have a specific nature and architecture where it 
is useful to define and quantify system boundaries (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014). The examples 
discussed in the paper are so specific to a railway industry setting that it is difficult to understand 
how this approach for developing leading indicators could be applied to another domain. 
Engineered systems, with more tightly controlled and predictable system components, such as 
nuclear power stations or railways do not behave in the same way as healthcare systems 
(Furniss et al, 2011b; Siegel & Schraagen, 2014). Healthcare systems are more dynamic, less 
predictable and this means it is less valuable to look at system performance in relation to 
system boundaries (Hollnagel et al, 2013; Wears et al, 2015).  
 
There are several leading indicator approaches which explicitly use quantitative methods to 
analyse organisational resilience. For example, one approach uses several statistical methods 
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to analyse a series of resilience indicators in a chemical process plant (Shirali et al, 2015). The 
resilience indicators are informed by Woods’ (2006) resilience characteristics. The intention is 
that these indicators represent elements of resilience system performance and by measuring 
them with quantitative methods it is possible to derive a resilience score. Another quantitative 
approach is to evaluate composite indicators of system performance (Rubio-Romero et al, 
2018). These composite indicators represent 61 variables of resilient system performance 
(Shirali et al, 2013). These composite leading indicators are assigned different weights 
according to their value for the system they are in. Both of these quantitative approaches 
(Shirali et al, 2013; Rubio-Romero et al, 2018) suggest that calculating scores of resilient 
performances is useful for decision makers in large, complex systems. However, this appears 
to be directly opposed to the core beliefs of the resilience engineering community about the 
value of measuring resilient performance (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel, 2010). Reducing 
analysis of organisational resilience to numerical values fails to grasp the explanatory power of 
the resilience engineering lens of understanding system performance (Hollnagel et al, 2015).  
   
The effect of deploying these different approaches has not, however, resulted in a consensus 
for using leading indicator informed approaches for analysing organisational resilience. 
Consequently, there are a range of conceptual and methodological perspectives. When there 
was no conceptual clarity, there was no methodological clarity. This suggests that beyond the 
core idea of leading indicators, there is no real progress for these approaches. There seems to 
be an explicit assumption that monitoring the leading indicators is straight forward, however 
none of the approaches provide any methodological guidance for how to monitor indicators in 
practice. It is not clear therefore, whether there needs to be a prepared response for a leading 
indicator approach to be useful, nor how this prepared response might be developed. Leading 
indicator approaches remain at an early stage of development and although many are well 
aligned with resilience engineering theory, they have not yet been sufficiently developed to 
analyse organisational resilience in healthcare. There are accounts of informal leading indicator 
strategies used by healthcare professionals in isolated healthcare systems (Miller & Xiao, 
2007), which suggests there is value in this approach. However, there is no evidence about 




2.4.5 Other Methods for Analysing Organisational Resilience  
 
The remaining methods for analysing organisational resilience are a series of isolated 
approaches that do not share any significant characteristics with the established RAG, RMF, 




Table 2-5 Articles in 'Other' section of findings in narrative review 
Paper Underlying Concepts Method Domain Application 
Woods, D., Wreathall, J. & Anders S. (2006) Stress-
Strain Plots as a Model of an Organisation’s 
Resilience. Paper presented at the 2nd Resilience 
Engineering Association Symposium, France. 
An analogy can be drawn between the 
behaviour of material experiencing stress 
and the behaviour of a complex socio-
technical system experiencing stress. This 
analogy can inform understanding and 
assessment of system resilience 
A stress-strain model can be 
developed to inform 
understanding adaptations in 
complex socio-technical 
systems 
No specific domain No application in 
practice 
Woods, D. & Wreathall, J. (2008). Stress-Strain 
Plots as a Basis for Assessing System Resilience. 
In. Hollnagel, E., Nemeth C. & Dekker S. (Eds). 
Resilience Engineering Perspectives, Volume 1: 
Remaining Sensitive to the Possibility of Failure. 
Ashgate. 
An analogy can be drawn between the 
behaviour of material experiencing stress 
and the behaviour of a complex socio-
technical system experiencing stress. This 
analogy can inform understanding and 
assessment of system resilience 
A stress-strain model can be 
developed to inform 
understanding adaptations in 
complex socio-technical 
systems  
No specific domain No application in 
practice 
Woods, D., Chan, Y. J., & Wreathall, J. (2013). The 
Stress Strain Model of Resilience Operationalizes 
the Four Cornerstones of Resilience Engineering. 
Paper presented at 5th Resilience Engineering 
Association Symposium. Managing Trade-Offs. 
Soesterberg, Netherlands. 
An analogy can be drawn between the 
behaviour of materials experiencing stress 
and the behaviour of a complex socio-
technical system experiencing stress. This 
analogy can inform assessment of system 
resilience 
A stress-strain model can 
analyse Hollnagel’s (2010) four 
resilience abilities to inform 
understanding adaptations in 
complex socio-technical 
systems 
No specific domain No application in 
practice 
 
Mendonça, D. (2008). Measures of Resilient 
Performance. In. Hollnagel, E., Nemeth C. & Dekker 
S. (Eds). Resilience Engineering Perspectives, 
Volume 1: Remaining Sensitive to the Possibility of 
Failure. Ashgate, UK. 
Organisational resilience is most salient 
during extreme events and this is where 
measurement should focus 
Discussion of examples of 
resilience performance    
 
Application of Woods’ (2006) 
resilience characteristics to a 
retrospective case study   
Electric power 
/telecommunications 
company responding to 
the 2001 World Trade 
Centre attacks  
Discussion of examples 
of resilient practice   
Mendonça, D. & Wallace, W. (2015). Factors 
underlying organizational resilience: The case of 
electric power restoration in New York City after 11 
September 2001. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 141, 83-91. 
Organisational resilience is most salient 
during extreme events and this is where 
measurement should focus 
Discussion of examples of 
resilience performance    
 
Addition of ‘boundary-spanning 
capability’ to Woods’ (2006) 
resilience characteristics  
Electric power 
/telecommunications 
company responding to 
the 2001 World Trade 
Centre attacks  
Discussion of examples 
of resilient practice   
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Ferreira, P., Wilson, J., Ryan, B., & Sharples, S. 
(2010). Measuring Resilience in the Planning of Rail 
Engineering Work. In. Hollnagel, E., Paries, J., 
Woods, D., & Wreathall, J. (Eds). Resilience 
Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook. Ashgate 
Publishing. Farnham, UK. 
Organisational resilience can be used to 
assess the preparedness of a system, not 
only to respond to unforeseen (and 
unforeseeable) events, but also to manage 
known threats and pressures 
Questionnaire assessing the 
organisational resilience in the 
planning of rail engineering 
work. 
 
Application of Woods’ (2006), 
Wreathall’s (2008) and 
Mendonca (2008) resilience 
characteristics 




in the planning of rail 
engineering work  
Saurin, T., & Junior, G. (2012). A Framework for 
Identifying and Analyzing Sources of Resilience and 
Brittleness: a Case Study of Two Air Taxi Carriers. 
International Journal of Industrial Economics, 42 (3), 
312-324. 
Sources of system resilience (SR) and 
sources of system brittleness (SB) should 
be analysed alongside each other. 
 
Analytical framework should not be 
constrained to a single unit of analysis, e.g. 
teams. They should be able to analyse 
organisational resilience across different 
levels.  
Framework for identifying and 
analysing sources of SR and 
SB. This involves describing the 
system to identify sources of 
SR and SB, then analysing 
those sources. 
Air Traffic Management   Two retrospective case 
studies of air traffic 
control episodes  
Saurin, T. (2015). Classification and Assessment of 
Slack: Implications for Resilience. Paper presented 
at 6th Resilience Engineering Association 
Symposium. Lisbon, Portugal. 
Slack can provide resources for dealing 
with both expected and unexpected 
variability. However, in complex systems 
slack interacts with other elements, and this 
can have unintended consequences.  
Assessing system slack is a way of 
assessing its ability to respond to expected 
and unexpected events.  
Discussion of ten classifications 
of slack - origin, nature of the 
resources, availability, strategy 
of deployment, tolerance, 
visibility, side-effects, rate of 
degradation, breadth, hierarchy 
Healthcare Inpatient pharmacy    
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Saurin, T. & Werle, N. (2017). A framework for the 
analysis of slack in socio-technical systems. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 167, 
439-451. 
Slack may either be designed, which 
usually occurs in tightly-coupled systems, 
or opportunistic, which usually occurs in 
loosely-coupled systems. 
 
Assessing system slack is a way of 
assessing its ability to respond to expected 
and unexpected events. 
Eleven step process for 
identifying and assessing slack.  
Healthcare  Maternity ward  
Francis, R. & Bekera, B. (2014). A metric and 
frameworks for resilience analysis of engineered 
and infrastructure systems. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety, 121, 90-103. 
Resilience is a property of a system that is 
capable of effectively combatting disruptive 
events.  
 
A risk modelling approach can be used to 
inform the design of a system so that they 
are able to perform in a resilient manner.  
Resilience analysis framework 
focuses on identifying resilience 
capacities of a system. 
 
Application of resilience 
analysis framework generates a 
resilience metric. 
Electric power company  Applied to a fictional city 
setting  
Azadeh, A., Salehi, V., Arvan, M. & Dolatkhah, M. 
(2014). Assessment of resilience engineering 
factors in high-risk environments by fuzzy cognitive 
maps: A petrochemical plant. Safety Science, 68, 
99-107. 
Quantitative assessment of organisational 
resilience could help management level 
teams make decisions about improving 
safety in complex systems.  
 
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) method 
considers interactions between system 




The results of FCMs are 
combined with a set of 
questionnaire results to 
enhance the accuracy of their 
final weights.  
 
Focuses on resilience 
characteristics of: management 
commitment, reporting culture, 




Petrochemical industry   Petrochemical plant  
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Stroeve, S. & Everdij, M. (2017). Agent-based 
modelling and mental simulation for resilience 
engineering in air transport. Safety Science, 93, 29-
49. 
Qualitative agent based modelling and 
simulation (ABMS) provides a structured 
analysis of organisational resilience.  
 
An agent-based model of a sociotechnical 
system describes the performance and 
interactions of its constituent human 
operators and technical systems in an 
operational context 
Qualitative ABMS includes the 
development of an  
agent based model and uses 
“mental simulation” to identify 
relations and dynamics 
between agents’ states. 
Quantitative ABMS includes 
development of a formal model 
using computer simulation. 
Air Traffic Management  Two case studies about 
how sudden bad 
weather conditions 
influences aircraft 
approach operations  
Jain, P., Mentzer, R., & Mannan, M. S. (2018). 
Resilience metrics for improved process-risk 
decision making: Survey, analysis and application. 
Safety Science, 108, 13-28. 
Quantitative data driven approach to 
analysing organisational resilience  
 
Quantitative information about 
organisational resilience is useful for 
various risk assessors and decision makers  
 
Process Resilience Analysis 
Framework (PRAF) is a method 
of risk assessment with three 
phases – avoidance; survival; 
and recovery.  
 
This includes twenty-four 
resilience metrics covering both 
technical and social aspects of 
system performance  
Process Industry   Case study  
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Several methods are heavily influenced by systems engineering perspectives. For example, one 
approach focuses on identifying sources of system resilience and system brittleness (Saurin & Junior, 
2012). This is a case study of two examples in air traffic management settings. It is largely conceptual, 
with little methodological detail and is an example about how systems engineering perspectives can 
inform methods for analysing organisational resilience. Another example of a systems engineering 
approach is a method for identifying and analysing ‘slack’ (spare resources that can be called on in 
times on need) (Saurin, 2015; Saurin & Werle, 2017). The method focuses on classifying the different 
elements of ‘slack’ and analysing their availability for system performance, to understand how they can 
support resilient system performance. There are two examples of this being used in healthcare and 
they identify how different personnel are available in different parts of the hospital, who could be extra 
support to respond to unexpected system disturbances, despite not being part of the planned response 
(Saurin, 2015; Saurin & Werle, 2017). Systems engineering is an established field focused on the 
design and management of complex systems over their life cycles (Checkland, 1981). Although there 
are similarities between systems engineering and resilience engineering, they are distinct disciplines. 
The systems engineering methods for analysing organisational resilience (Saurin & Junior, 2012; 
Saurin, 2015; Saurin & Werle, 2017) are all highly technical and reductive perspectives for 
understanding and analysing complex systems. They cannot account for the social elements of resilient 
system performance. Consequently, they are of limited value for analysing organisational resilience in 
healthcare.  
 
There are also several quantitative methods for analysing organisational resilience. Like the systems 
engineering methods, these are technical and focus on producing resilience metrics. For example, one 
method uses fuzzy cognitive maps to quantify resilient performance (Azadeh et al, 2014). Fuzzy 
cognitive maps are used to model decision making in complex systems (Kosko, 1986). The justification 
for use is that quantitative data provides information that is more useful for decision makers than 
qualitative data. However, the resilience characteristics at the centre of the model are vague (Woods, 
2006) and it is not clear how quantifying these vague resilience concepts is useful, conceptually, for 
analysing organisational resilience. A different quantitative method for analysing organisational 
resilience uses a resilience analysis framework to generate a resilience metric (Francis & Bekera, 
2014). This analysis framework involves many different components, none of which appear to align with 
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the central concepts of resilience engineering theory. So, the resilience metrics are not representing 
the core elements of resilience engineering theory. There is limited guidance for applying this theory in 
practice. Quantitative methods for analysing organisational resilience are also informed by risk 
assessment processes (Jain et al, 2018). This risk assessment process involves three stages: 
avoidance, survival and recovery. Although Jain et al (2018) use the resilience engineering theoretical 
lens, they subsume it into a wider framework for understanding complex systems which includes 
business impact and system architecture. By doing so, they widen the scope of their framework beyond 
resilience engineering theory and fail to align with the core resilience concepts, such as focusing on 
everyday clinical work, and the distinction between Work-as-Imagined and Work-as-Done. The 
quantitative methods for analysing organisational resilience justify their methods for the ease of which 
quantitative data can inform decisions (Azadeh et al, 2014; Jain et al, 2018). By using such reductive 
methods, they fail to reach the deep, nuanced understanding of system performance advocated by 
resilience engineering theory. These methods are highly technical, with limited guidance on how to 
apply them in practice.   
 
On the other hand, there are also highly conceptual, abstract methods for analysing organisational 
resilience.  Some of these approaches originate from an early stage in the development of the resilience 
engineering field where the ideas were much more diffuse (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2008). 
For example, one approach uses a metaphor from material science to map the behaviour of complex 
systems under stress onto the behaviour of materials under stress (Woods et al, 2006; Woods & 
Wreathall, 2008). The intention is that the science of understanding how materials bend and eventually 
break under pressure could inform understanding of how complex systems bend and eventually fail 
under pressure. However, there is no clear suggestion for using this in practice. Despite further work 
attempting to provide a more robust method (Woods et al, 2013), there is still little improvement beyond 
this approach as a metaphor for analysing resilient performance. Another conceptual approach to 
measuring organisational resilience is to explore how early resilience concepts, such as Woods’ (2006) 
resilience characteristics, could explain resilient performance in specific case studies (Mendonça, 2008; 
Mendonça & Wallace, 2015). These are little more than discussions about how to approach analysing 




There are also a series of individual frameworks and methods developed in isolation, used once and 
rarely applied again. Many use existing systems models to provide structure for analysing organisational 
resilience. For example, one approach uses a risk management lens to analyse organisational 
resilience and employs a method to analyse how well the functions of risk management are carried out 
(Wreathall, 2009). It is not clear how a risk management lens can analyse organisational resilience. 
This comes from one of the early resilience engineering books (Nemeth et al, 2009) where researchers 
are still grappling with how to use resilience engineering ideas in practice. This work is not developed 
any further and there are no examples of it being used by other researchers in practice. Another 
approach is to use agent-based modelling to analyse organisational resilience (Stroeve & Everdij, 
2017). An agent-based model of a sociotechnical system describes the performance and interactions 
of the people that work in it with technical systems in an operational context (Stroeve & Everdij, 2017). 
Although this appears to align with the some of the central ideas of resilience engineering theory, it is 
another highly technical, reductive modelling technique. Like Wreathall (2009), there appears to be little 
further conceptual or methodological development of this method.  
 
Not all these approaches use pre-existing system models or other theoretical perspectives. Some 
researchers developed new models, directly informed by resilience engineering theory, to measure 
organisational resilience. For example, the ‘quick and dirty’ method focuses on evaluating the resilience 
enhancing properties of the system (Johansson & Lindgren, 2008). However, there is no clear 
suggestion for how these resilience enhancing properties should be identified in a new system. Some 
approaches use conceptual frameworks that are so specific to particular domains, they are irrelevant 
to analysing organisational resilience in healthcare. For example, one method focuses on measuring 
resilience in the planning of rail engineering work (Ferreira et al, 2010). This involves a series of 
resilience engineering conceptual approaches from Woods (2006), Wreathall (2009) and Mendonça 
(2008). There is no attempt at making this generalisable to other domains and it is only relevant to the 
railway industry.  
 
None of these methods are useful for informing a method to analyse organisational resilience in 
healthcare. Most of them are either too abstract and conceptual (Woods et al, 2006; Mendonça, 2008), 
or technical and quantitative (Francis & Bekera, 2014; Jain et al, 2018). Many of them represent 
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attempts at using pre-existing frameworks (Wreathall, 2009) or theoretical lenses (Saurin & Werle, 
2017), without any evidence of adding further value to the resilience engineering theoretical lens of 
understanding performance in complex sociotechnical systems. Furthermore, none of these 
approaches demonstrate sufficient conceptual clarity, methodological guidance, application in practice 
or representation of social elements of system performance to be considered useful for analysing 




Despite its recent origins (Hollnagel et al, 2006), there has been a plethora of different conceptual and 
methodological approaches for using the resilience engineering theoretical lens to understand 
performance in complex sociotechnical systems (Berg et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018). However, there 
are only a few established methods for analysing organisational resilience that have been used in 
practice (Hollnagel, 2010: Furniss et al, 2011a; Hollnagel, 2012). Most of the other methods identified 
in the review, particularly from the early stages of the development of the resilience engineering field, 
are suggestions about how this theoretical lens could be explored in practice (Woods et al, 2006; 
Mendonca, 2008). These early methods demonstrate moderate conceptual clarity, but poor 
methodological guidance and are varied in how well they represent the social elements of system 
performance. Yet, as the field has developed, they have been set aside as theoretical cul-de-sacs, and 
this means they are rarely applied in practice. There have been frequent attempts at linking the 
resilience engineering theoretical perspective with models and methods from other fields, to gain some 
leverage for using this concept in practice (Wreathall, 2009; Saurin & Junior, 2012; Azadeh et al, 2014; 
Jain et al, 2018). However, this rarely turns out to be useful because they fail to effectively align with 
the nuances of resilience engineering theory and lack conceptual clarity. Early attempts at developing 
methods are mainly found in the resilience engineering book series and Resilience Engineering 
Association symposia. However, as the identity of the field has become more established, the wider 
scientific community are more accepting of the resilience engineering theoretical lens and now appear 
more regularly in peer-reviewed academic journals (Azadeh et al, 2014; Stroeve & Everdij, 2017; Jain 
et al, 2018). Despite this, there is still considerable variability in the methodological guidance and 
representation of the social elements of system performance of these more recent methods. There now 
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appears to be more stability about what the central resilience engineering ideas mean (Berg et al, 2018), 
but there is still a need to establish methods for using them in practice (Patriarca et al, 2018). 
 
The RAG (Hollnagel, 2010) and FRAM (Hollnagel, 2012) are the only established methods for analysing 
organisational resilience that have sufficient methodological development to guide their use in practice. 
They have both been used to analyse organisational resilience in healthcare systems (Chuang, 2015; 
McNab et al, 2018). However, they are both limited in their ability to represent the social elements of 
system performance. The RMF (Furniss et al, 2011a) is limited to structuring observation of resilient 
practices in small teams and therefore has limited value as a method for analysing organisational 
resilience in healthcare systems (Nemeth & Herrera, 2015). Despite a broad similarity in terms of their 
approach, there is no consensus about how leading indicator informed methods should analyse 
organisational resilience. The lack of conceptual clarity means there is a lack of methodological 
development.   
 
FRAM is the most popular resilience engineering method for modelling and analysing complex systems. 
It has the most well-developed method, including specific software for developing system models, and 
a committed group of researchers to propagate this approach (Hollnagel, 2016b). A FRAM analysis 
focuses on developing a model of a system or process, then using the model to inform various analyses, 
such as analysing system performance, understanding accidents or implementing guidelines 
(Hollnagel, 2016a). Conceptually, the unclear definition of unwanted variability (discussed earlier 2.4.3, 
p.54) leaves some irregularity at the heart of this approach. On the other hand, the RAG represents a 
more fruitful approach to analysing resilient healthcare practices. It is conceptually well developed and 
explicitly orientated toward analysing organisational resilience (Hollnagel, 2010). However, it is 
methodologically limited because the original RAG questions (Appendix A, p.210) are abstract, couched 
in unnecessarily technical language and there is no suggestion for how they should be adapted to local 
contexts. Despite this, it has been applied many times in healthcare (Chuang, 2015; Hunte, 2016; 
Engvall et al, 2017). The original questions do not represent the social elements of system performance. 
However, a process for generating questions relevant to a local context could improve this. There is a 
clear direction for improving these methodological limitations and previous applications show that the 
RAG can be used in a healthcare context.  
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This thesis is about moving resilience engineering theory forward. To do this, the resilience engineering 
community should have a range of approaches for analysing organisational resilience. The FRAM has 
already undergone significant methodological development and testing. Its limitations have already 
been discussed. Conceptually, the RAG had the most promise as an alternative approach for analysing 
organisational resilience. However, it requires further methodological development and testing. This 
thesis responds to the RAG’s methodological limitations, by developing a reflective process for nursing 
staff to analyse and improve the organisational resilience of their healthcare system. There are three-
stages to this reflective process, beginning with focus groups with nursing staff to identify the 
challenging elements of everyday clinical work and how they manage this. Then, the researcher 
developed responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating questions, informed by the views of the 
focus group participants, to explore the views of the wider nursing population. Finally, nursing staff 
reflected on the results of the questions to identify potential system level interventions to improve the 
ability of the system to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. The next chapter considers the 




Chapter 3 - Methodology  
 
As discussed, the starting point for the thesis was dissecting out the limitations of the RAG method. The 
narrative review identified that the original RAG questions (Appendix A p.210) are abstract, technically 
focused and do not effectively address the social elements of resilient system performance. The biggest 
limitation is the lack of any established process for moving from the original RAG questions to new, 
specific questions for a given system. This resulted in considerable variability in how the RAG has been 
used in practice (Praetorius et al, 2012; Chuang, 2015; Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017).  
 
3.1 Research Questions  
 
The primary research questions are high-level exploratory questions, guiding the thesis towards 
responding to the limitations of the RAG identified in the narrative review. The secondary research 
questions unpack the high-level exploratory questions with more specific questions to be answered.   
 
The primary research questions are: 
 
How can the Resilience Analysis Grid be further developed to provide a replicable context specific 
process? 
 
How can the views of healthcare staff be incorporated for analysing organisational resilience?  
 
The secondary research questions are: 
 
What is Work-As-Done for nurses? 
 
How can nurses’ Work-As-Done be understood in terms of the four resilience abilities? 
 
How can the development of responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items be informed 




How can the results of applying the Resilience Analysis Grid inform quality improvement? 
 
3.2 Theoretical Underpinning  
 
A constructivist epistemological lens guides the way this thesis explores organisational resilience with 
nursing staff on an Acute Medical Unit (AMU). This theoretical underpinning informs a mixed method 
research design, which focuses on exploring the everyday clinical work with healthcare professionals 
because they are the experts of their systems. There are three distinct phases to the thesis: focus 
groups with nursing staff to explore the challenging elements of their work, development of survey items 
from the focus group data to explore the wider nursing population’s views about how well the AMU can 
respond, monitor, learn and anticipate, and finally interviews with nursing staff to reflect on the survey 
results and suggest system level interventions to improve the potential for resilient performance. 
 
Despite its conceptual development, resilience engineering theory provides little insight into how 
organisational resilience should be explored in practice (Anderson et al, 2016; Berg et al, 2018). 
Organisational resilience has been described as an emergent property of system performance and can 
be viewed in the performance of everyday clinical work (Woods, 2006; Hollnagel, 2011; Hollnagel et al, 
2015). The nature of performance in complex systems means that organisational resilience is 
distributed in complex ways across various system functions and activities (Anderson et al, 2016). It 
emerges during performance as people, processes and equipment simultaneously interact and react to 
meet the constantly fluctuating demands of a healthcare system. It cannot be observed or explained by 
any single person, process or unit (Back et al, 2017).  
 
A philosophical world-view that can inform how to study this complex phenomenon is constructivism. 
Constructivism is a broad term, which has been used across many disciplines and encompasses a 
range of philosophical positions (Beaumie, 2010). However, it is an epistemological constructivist 
position that is most useful for understanding how we can study organisational resilience in healthcare. 
A constructivist epistemological stance maintains that knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is 
constructed by collective human thought, activity and interaction (Beaumie, 2010; Lenman & Shemmer, 
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2012; Collin, 2013). Knowledge is not a product of objective observation of the world, but of the social 
processes and interactions in which people are constantly engaged (Burr, 2015). This is known as 
intersubjectivity (Kim, 2001). As a culture or society, we construct our own versions of reality between 
us (Burr, 2015).  
 
A constructivist epistemological position suggests that it is understanding the social processes and 
interactions between healthcare professionals and patients that we can know about resilient 
performance in healthcare systems. Healthcare systems are made up of healthcare professionals, 
patients and the clinical environment. Every healthcare professional follows a set of rules and 
associated practices which govern the scope of their agency. They do the best they can for their patients 
in these roles with the means available to them by the healthcare system. These are the processes by 
which healthcare professionals interact with each other, patients and the clinical environment. The 
complexity of system performance arises out of the dynamic relationships between agency, goals and 
circumstances of the healthcare professionals and patients (Onuf, 2012).  
 
This means that studying organisational resilience in healthcare is about more than observing actions 
in practice. It is about understanding what healthcare professionals are doing in the context of their 
clinical environment and the pressures that impact them day to day. This encompasses a range of 
phenomena, such as individual decision making, interactions with patients and interactions with other 
healthcare professionals, including negotiating the tension between competing goals. The healthcare 
professionals that work in the system are the experts of this and it is necessary to talk to them about 
how they manage in their clinical environment. A further layer of complexity is that patients are at the 
centre of healthcare systems. They bring their own set of agency, goals and circumstances. We can 
know about resilient performance of healthcare systems by understanding the interaction of healthcare 
professionals, patients and the clinical environment. 
 
This thesis explicitly focuses on nursing work as a lens for understanding resilient system performance. 
Many studies of resilient healthcare are observational studies (Berg et al, 2018). They generate 
knowledge of resilient system performance by observing healthcare professionals conduct their work 
(Wears & Perry, 2006; Ross et al, 2014; Sujan et al, 2015; Back et al, 2017). In many of these studies, 
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nursing work is central to resilient system performance. This is because nurses are often the most 
numerous healthcare discipline, have the most contact with patients and are central to facilitating the 
work of the multidisciplinary healthcare team (Allen & May, 2017). Through the constructivist 
epistemological lens of understanding organisational resilience, they are central to the processes by 
which we can understand resilient system performance. There is growing evidence that nurses are 
central to the safety of healthcare systems (Aiken et al, 2012).  
 
The researcher recognises that focusing on one healthcare discipline is a limitation for the thesis 
because it runs against the grain of resilience engineering theory. The theory advocates a systems 
perspective for understanding performance in complex sociotechnical systems (Hollnagel et al, 2006; 
Hollnagel et al, 2015) and this means acknowledging the range of healthcare disciplines working in the 
system. However, the time and resource limitations (a single researcher) of the thesis meant that it was 
not possible to study all these disciplines in depth. This meant it was necessary to define manageable 
system boundaries to explore the research phenomenon. Rather than study many healthcare 
disciplines at a superficial level, this thesis focuses on nursing work to understand resilient system 
performance at a deeper level. The researcher’s clinical experiences working as a nurse in the research 
setting provided insight into the challenges involving healthcare professionals in research. In particular, 
they were aware that fluctuating clinical demands would provide an ongoing barrier to including nurses 
in the research process. Additionally, much of the work in the thesis was about moving from theory to 
practice, focusing on one healthcare discipline allowed the researcher to ensure the explorative nature 
of the research was as guided as possible.  
 
This thesis explores organisational resilience with a constructivist epistemological perspective, through 
a nursing lens to develop a replicable process for generating responding, monitoring, learning and 
anticipating questions, to respond to the methodological limitations of the RAG and develop a viable 






3.3 Research Setting   
 
The research was conducted on an Acute Medical Unit (AMU) in a large teaching hospital in London. 
The AMUs are designated hospital wards specifically staffed and equipped to receive patients 
presenting with acute medical (as distinct from patients requiring surgical intervention) illness from 
Emergency Departments (EDs) or the community for assessment, care and treatment (Scott et al, 
2009). They have multidisciplinary (typically doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, 
pharmacists, social services) teams that comprehensively assess and manage both medical illness and 
functional disability and are often geographically co-located with emergency departments and key 
diagnostic services such as radiology (Bell et al, 2008). Patients are often unstable and at high risk of 
deterioration after initial treatment in the ED. This type of hospital unit has various titles, such Acute 
Assessment Unit (AAU), Acute Admissions Ward (AAW) or Medical Assessment Unit (MAU), however 
they all broadly refer to the same type of hospital ward (Scott et al, 2009). Following initial assessment 
and treatment, patients are either discharged home from the AMU or transferred to a specialty ward 
appropriate for their condition, usually within 72 hours of arrival (NHS Improvement, 2017a). AMUs 
have a high turnover of patients being admitted, transferred and discharged daily. They serve to reduce 
overcrowding in EDs, improve bed management and create a smoother flow of patients through the 
hospital (Scott et al, 2009). 
 
The AMU in this study opened in June 2015, combining the staff from two separate AMUs in the hospital. 
This was part of the hospital’s intention to create an ‘emergency floor’ with the ED, AMU, Clinical 
Decision Unit (CDU – an extension of the ED) all geographically co-located. The AMU in this study had 
sixty-two bed spaces and is organised into three zones (Figure 3-1). There are typically between twenty 
to thirty admissions during a twelve-hour shift. The bed spaces are organised into bays of four or five 
beds and individual side rooms, most commonly used for isolating infective patients, providing privacy 
for end of life patients and isolating aggressive or mental health patients. Nursing staff normally work 
twelve-hour shifts, changing between day and night shifts. The staffing allocation for the unit plans for 
twelve nurses and seven healthcare assistants on each shift. However, this varies on a regular basis 
according to the changing demands of the unit, such as short staffing due to illness or extra staffing due 




Figure 3-1 Map of the Acute Medical Unit 
 
On each shift there is a coordinator, who oversees patient flow (admissions from ED, transfers to other 
wards, discharges home) and problem solving on the unit. The co-ordinator is always a senior nurse 
and they are not allocated any patients. Each zone has a group of nurses and healthcare assistants 
allocated to work in that area. One of these nurses is always the nurse-in-charge (NIC). The NIC is 
responsible for coordinating the nursing work in the zone, facilitating breaks for nursing staff and being 
a source of support for problem solving. The NICs are more experienced nursing staff, but there is more 
variability amongst experience and expertise of the individuals in this role compared to the coordinator 
role. The NIC is not allocated patients, unless there are problems with short staffing. The other nurses 
in the zones are paired up with healthcare assistants and allocated specific bays and side rooms to look 
after (by the NIC). The organisation of nursing work means they often remain in these allocated areas, 
thus reducing opportunities for interaction between nursing staff in the same zone. There is also little 
interaction between nursing staff in different zones during clinical shifts.  
 
 
   















This was an effective location for studying organisational resilience in healthcare because of the 
fluctuating system demands, the variety of healthcare disciplines working alongside each other and the 
organisational complexity of the unit. Healthcare staff must constantly adapt the way they work in 
response to fluctuating system demands. Personal, professional, team, discipline, unit and hospital 
goals regularly conflict. The researcher worked part-time as staff nurse on this unit for the duration of 
the thesis. This meant that reflexivity was an important part of the research journey and is discussed 
later in this chapter (see p 89). 
 
3.4 Research Participants  
 
The research participants were the nursing staff on the AMU. At the beginning of the study there were 
about 100 nursing staff rostered to work on the unit, which included a range of roles and level of 
experiences. However, there was high turnover of staff during the study and so during the data 
collection for phase one there were 77 nursing staff rostered on the unit. Notably many experienced 
nurses left the unit and many newly qualified nurses started work. According to senior nursing staff, the 
AMU is a popular destination for newly qualified nurses because of the high patient acuity and 
opportunity to hone assessment skills. The senior nursing staff also suggested that although a high 
turnover of staff is normal, with a balance of nurses leaving and joining each year, the turnover of staff 
on the AMU during the study was unusually high.  
 
There are different roles within the nursing team on the AMU (Table 3-1). In the NHS, staff are paid 
according to pay bands (Royal College of Nursing, 2017). This is a common way to distinguish between 










Table 3-1 Nursing team roles on the AMU 
Job Title Pay Band Description of Responsibilities 
Nursing assistants 2-3 Unregulated. Normally receive several weeks training. 
Regular tasks include personal care such as feeding and washing, and 
limited healthcare interventions, such as assessing skin integrity, removing 
peripheral cannulas and recording patient’s vital signs 
Junior Staff 
Nurses 
5 Belong to a professional register. Graduate trained. 
Regular tasks include assessing, planning, delivering and evaluating 
healthcare interventions 
Junior staff nurses worked in a team with nursing assistants and were 
allocated to care for between five to seven patients per shift. 
Senior Staff 
Nurses 
5 Belong to a professional register. Graduate trained. 
Same roles as junior staff nurses, with additional coordinating 




6 Belong to a professional register. Graduate trained. 
Senior coordinating responsibilities, such as NIC or coordinator  
Deputy Ward 
Managers 
6 Belong to a professional register. Graduate trained. 
Senior coordinating responsibilities, such as NIC or coordinator. 
Significant amount of administrative work necessary for the operation of an 
inpatient hospital ward, such as staff development and conducting root 
cause analyses of various negative outcomes. 
Ward Managers 7 Belong to a professional register. Graduate trained. 
Senior coordinating responsibilities, such as NIC or coordinator 
Significant amount of administrative work necessary for the operation of an 
inpatient hospital ward, such as staff development and conducting root 
cause analyses of various negative outcomes. 
Senior administrative work, such as producing the staff rota every six 
weeks and managing complaints  
Matron 8 Belong to a professional register. Graduate trained. 
Oversaw several hospital wards (in the same directorate, e.g. acute 
medicine)  




The matron and ward managers are the gatekeepers for the AMU and were involved throughout the 
research process, to ensure that data collection strategies were robust and pragmatic, whilst minimising 
disruption to the clinical work on the unit.   
 
3.5 Research Design  
 
The original RAG questions are technical, abstract and couched in a language that is inaccessible to 
those who are unfamiliar with the research topic. This is a needless barrier for nursing staff to engage 
with the principles of resilience engineering. Rather than start with the original RAG questions, the 
researcher decided to start with the experiences of nursing staff managing their everyday clinical work 
on the assumption that nurses knew their healthcare system the best and that what they found 
challenging was likely to be at the heart of the complexity of system performance. The constructivist 
epistemological lens suggests that understanding resilient system performance in healthcare is about 
understanding the interaction between the healthcare professionals, patients and the clinical 
environment. This was the starting point for the research design.  
 
The main research questions are about exploring how the Resilience Analysis Grid could be further 
developed to provide a replicable process for generating context specific questions for analysing the 
organisational resilience of a healthcare system and how the views of healthcare staff can be 
incorporated for doing this. These are exploratory research questions, and this informed an exploratory 
mixed method research design. Although the later stages of the thesis explore how a resilience 
engineering theoretical lens can inform quality improvement, the primary research questions are not 
orientated towards quality improvement, so did not inform the research design.  
 
A mixed method research design informed a three-stage process for generating responding, monitoring, 
learning and anticipating questions to analyse the organisational resilience of given healthcare system 
and, support healthcare professionals to reflect on the results and identify potential interventions for 
improving resilient performance. This was the response to the RAG’s implementation gap. The intention 
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was that this process could be repeated in any healthcare system with any group of healthcare 
professionals. It was developed and tested with nursing staff on the AMU.  
 
The first stage was facilitating focus groups to explore the challenges of everyday clinical work. It was 
not practical to talk to all of the nursing staff about all of their work, so in the focus groups there was a 
representation of the different nursing roles on the AMU. The second stage was generating questions 
for the four resilience abilities, directly informed by the focus group data, for a cross-sectional survey to 
capture the views of the wider nursing population about how well the AMU could respond, monitor, learn 
and anticipate. The third stage was to support nursing staff from the focus groups to reflect on the 
results of the survey and identify potential system level interventions to improve the AMU’s potential for 
resilience performance.  
 
3.5.1 Mixed Methods  
 
Researchers have used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse organisational 
resilience (Hollnagel, 2010; Mendonça & Wallace, 2015; Jain et al, 2018). However, there is growing 
consensus that mixed methods are an effective way to study this complex research phenomenon 
(Mendonça, 2008; Berg et al, 2018). The researcher used a modified explanatory sequential mixed 
method research design (Creswell & Clark, 2011) (Figure 3-2). A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches allowed for a greater depth and breadth of understanding than either of these 
approaches could achieve separately (Creswell, 2013). This aligned well with the resilience engineering 
theoretical perspective of reaching a deeper, more nuanced understanding of complex sociotechnical 
system performance. The exploratory sequential mixed method design (Figure 3-2) consisted of two 
distinct phases; qualitative data collection and analysis, followed by quantitative data collection and 
analysis (Creswell & Clark, 2011). The quantitative data collection and analysis builds on the results of 





Figure 3-2 Creswell & Clark’s (2011) Explanatory Sequential Mixed Method Research Design 
 
This is a well-established research design for testing elements of an emergent theory (Creswell & Clark, 
2011) and developing instruments (Creswell, 2013). The researcher used it for exploring the views of a 
small group of research participants in detail, followed by the collection of quantitative data from a larger 
number of researcher participants (Creswell et al, 2004). This was followed by a final phase, where the 






3.5.2 Overview of Research Design  
 
There were three distinct phases to the research design (Figure 3-3). Phase one involved the qualitative 
exploration of the everyday clinical work of nursing staff through focus group discussions. It involved a 
small group of nurses recruited to represent the different nursing roles on the AMU and known as the 
expert group. Phase two involved developing responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating items, 
informed by thematic analysis of focus group data, for a cross-sectional survey. The survey was then 
administered to all nursing staff on the AMU. This was the quantitative phase of the mixed method 
study. Phase three involved interviews with members of the expert group (from phase one) to reflect on 
the survey results and identify potential system level interventions to improve the organisational 
resilience of the AMU.  
 
Figure 3-3 Flowchart of Research Design 
 
 
3.5.3  Phase One – Exploring Everyday Clinical Work 
 
Phase one explores the research question ‘What is Work-As-Done for nurses?’ and ‘How can nurses’ 
Work-As-Done be understood in terms of the four resilience abilities?’. The aim was to elicit accounts 
of the nurses’ everyday clinical work to inform the development of responding, monitoring, learning and 
anticipating survey items specific to the AMU, in the next phase of the research design (Chapter 5 – 
Phase Two). The constructivist epistemological lens for understanding organisational resilience 
suggests exploring Work-As-Done should be about understanding the process by which nursing staff, 
other healthcare professionals and patients interact with each other and the clinical environment. This 



















their everyday clinical work, why they found it challenging and how they managed these challenges. It 
was not practical to talk to all nursing staff in sufficient detail about their experiences, so the researcher 
recruited fourteen participants to take part in a series of focus groups discussing their everyday clinical 
work in detail. This group of participants were known as the expert group and they had continued 
involvement in the study in phase two (feeding back about the representativeness of survey items to 
focus group discussion) and phase three (reflecting on the results of the survey). The researcher 
transcribed all the focus group data and thematically analysed it using a resilience engineering 
theoretical lens.  
 
The resilience engineering literature demonstrates there are many ways to explore Work-As-Done, 
such as ethnographic observations or semi-structured interviews (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al 
2013). In this study, the researcher used focus groups to explore the Work-As-Done in everyday clinical 
work. The strength of focus groups as a research method is the insight gained from the interaction 
between participants (Finch et al, 2014). This aligned well with the social constructivist epistemological 
underpinning of the thesis. Knowledge of organisational resilience comes from understanding the social 
processes and interactions between healthcare professionals, patients and the clinical environment. 
Furthermore, the researcher’s own clinical experiences suggested that much of the work that nursing 
staff do to manage the complexity of their everyday clinical work involved internal decision making, such 
as prioritisation and delegation. Ethnographic observations would be less effective at capturing these 
internal activities. Finally, the healthcare professionals that work in the system are the experts of this 
and it is necessary to talk to them about how they manage in their clinical environment. Focus groups 
were the most effective research method to capture these elements of the research phenomenon.  
 
3.5.4 Phase Two – Item Development and Survey Application 
 
Phase two explored the research question ‘How can the development of responding, monitoring, 
learning and anticipating survey items be informed by accounts of Work-As-Done?’. The aim of phase 
two was to develop survey items, directly informed by the thematic analysis of focus group data in phase 
one, for a cross-sectional survey which explored how well the AMU could respond, monitor, learn and 
anticipate. The intention was to extrapolate the findings from the thematic analysis in phase one, to 
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explore the wider nursing population’s views about the potential for resilient performance on the AMU. 
The survey was administered to all nursing staff on the AMU. Item development involved a conceptual 
leap, informed by resilience engineering theory, from accounts of managing the challenging elements 
of the everyday clinical work to survey items appropriate for a self-administered, cross-sectional survey. 
The researcher, in conjunction with the Faculty statistician, developed an analysis plan that focused on 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrices to compare survey results between different sub groups 
of nursing staff.  
 
3.5.5 Phase Three – Reflecting on Survey Results 
 
Phase three explored the research question ‘How can the results of applying the Resilience Analysis 
Grid inform quality improvement?’. The aim of phase three was to support the expert group to reflect 
on the results of the survey and identify potential interventions to improve the unit’s potential for resilient 
performance.  This phase also involved asking the ward managers of the AMU to identify their safety 
and quality priorities for the unit. The intention was to compare their priorities with the survey results 
and expert group reflections to identify whether and in what way the RAG process contributed to safety 
and quality improvement.  An evaluation of this process was not included in the research design. A 
comprehensive evaluation of this three-stage process would require implementation of the suggested 
interventions for improvement and this was outside the scope of the study. This sort of evaluation was 
not appropriate given the early stage of development of the RAG. Instead, to incorporate the users’ 
views of the usefulness of the method and of applying this three-stage process a reflective process was 
built in to the research design. This fit with the explanatory nature of the study because it supported 
further exploration of the experience of the project and the usefulness of the results rather than asking 
direct questions about effectiveness. 
 
3.6 Reflexivity  
 
In this thesis, the researcher viewed reflexivity as an ongoing relationship between the researcher and 
the research, rather than something that should be recorded to demonstrate competence with a 
particular methodology. Attia and Edge (2017) suggest reflexivity is a process of on-going mutual 
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shaping between the researcher and research. They make a distinction between two types of reflexivity. 
Prospective reflexivity focuses on the effect the whole-person-researcher has on the research and 
retrospective reflexivity which focuses on the effect of the research on the researcher (Attia & Edge, 
2017). 
 
Prospective reflexivity seeks to support the researcher to develop their capacity to understand the 
significance of the knowledge, feelings, and values they bring to the research and how this shapes the 
research (Attia & Edge, 2017). They suggest there are four concepts that should inform this type of 
reflexive practice (Figure 3-4): Trust, Collaboration, Corroboration and Trustworthiness. Insider 
researchers need to construct a foundation of trust and all their research builds on this. Once this trust 
has been established, it motivates participants to be more involved with the research process and this 
collaboration generates more credible data. Engaging effectively with the research participants 
throughout the research process can motivate participants to provide more alternative sources of data, 




Figure 3-4 Attia & Edge’s (2017) conceptual relationship between Trust, Collaboration, Corroboration and 
Trustworthiness for Prospective Reflexivity 
 
The researcher worked as a nurse on the AMU for the duration of the thesis. They did not start working 
on the AMU with the intention of becoming an insider in the research setting. However, the researcher’s 
clinical experiences provided useful insights into understanding resilient healthcare theory and how to 
explore this in practice. As the researcher progressed with the research design, it became clear that 
conducting the research in the place they worked provided opportunities to reach a deep, nuanced 
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understanding of the resilient practices of a healthcare system that may not have been possible if they 
conducted the research elsewhere. Much of resilience engineering theory is couched in technical, 
abstract language which can be a barrier for healthcare professionals to use this theoretical perspective 
for understanding and improving the performance of their healthcare systems. The researcher wanted 
to involve healthcare professionals in the research process because they know their system more 
intimately than anyone else and therefore have the best understanding of the adaptations necessary 
for facilitating resilient system performance (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2013; Wears et al, 
2015; Braithwaite et al, 2016).    
 
The researcher had pre-existing professional and social relationships with the nursing team before any 
recruitment for the study began. As an experienced staff nurse, the researcher was more senior than 
the newly qualified nurses and healthcare assistants, but less senior than the junior sister/charge nurses 
and ward managers. The researcher was very aware of the changing dynamics of the relationships 
between when he was a nurse on the unit and when he was a researcher on the unit. He did not engage 
with any clinical activities whilst on the unit in a research capacity and did not engage in any research 
activities whilst on the unit in a clinical capacity. When he was on the unit in nursing uniform, he was a 
nurse and when he was on the unit in his own clothes he was a researcher. He used this visual signature 
to support the distinction between roles, and this was useful for both the researcher and his colleagues.  
 
The first challenge for conducting research on the AMU was to establish trust with the gatekeepers 
(ward manager and matron) and the nursing staff. Establishing trust with the gatekeepers was about 
involving them in the research design process, so they could raise concerns about the potential for the 
research to affect the clinical work on the unit and negatively impact the safety of patient care. The 
researcher did this by emailing them the research design as it developed. This was most important 
when planning the focus groups in phase one because this had the biggest potential to interrupt clinical 
work. The researcher wanted to make sure the nursing staff did not feel they were being assessed. The 
ward management team worked hard to maintain the quality and safety standards on the AMU and this 
often meant working towards targets, for example supporting patients to complete experience surveys 
each month or completing incident reports. The researcher did not want to add further concerns for 
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them, so made it clear he wanted to use a new research perspective to understand and improve safety, 
rather than assess the managers’ ability to run an inpatient hospital ward.  
 
Establishing trust with the remainder of the nursing staff was about reassuring them the researcher was 
not assessing their individual performance but assessing the way the unit works. The researcher worked 
hard to explain the resilience engineering theoretical lens was a new way to understand safety, one that 
recognised nurses’ abilities to adapt to various demands as central to maintaining patient safety and 
getting work done. Once they understood this, most of the nursing staff were willing to engage openly 
about their experiences managing their everyday clinical work. It provided them with a voice to express 
their expertise, which current safety and quality practices do not do very well.  
 
Once trust had been established with both the gatekeepers and the nursing staff, it provided a platform 
for collaborating with the nurses as research participants to explore their clinical environment as experts 
in their own system. This meant effectively capturing Work-as-Done and exploring the everyday clinical 
work on the AMU. The next three chapters are devoted to the three phases of the research design. At 
the end of each of these chapters, there is a reflexivity section where the researcher discusses his 
experiences pertinent to that part of the research. Then, there is a final retrospective reflexivity section 








Chapter 4 – Phase One – Exploring Nursing Staff’s Everyday Clinical 
Work  
 
Phase one explores the research questions ‘What is Work-As-Done for nurses?’ and ‘How can nurses’ 
Work-As-Done be understood in terms of the four resilience abilities?’. The aim was to elicit accounts 
of the nurses’ everyday clinical work to inform the development of responding, monitoring, learning and 
anticipating survey items specific to the AMU. The constructivist epistemological lens for understanding 
organisational resilience suggests exploring Work-As-Done should be about understanding the process 
by which nursing staff, other healthcare professionals and patients interact with each other and the 
clinical environment. To understand this effectively, it is necessary explore the work from the 
perspective of the nursing staff because they have the best understanding about what elements of the 
work are challenging, why it is challenging and how they manage it. This meant engaging nursing staff 
in discussion to explore their everyday clinical work. There is no guidance about how to do discuss 
everyday clinical work with nursing staff from a resilience engineering perspective, so the researcher 
and supervisors needed to create a script to facilitate discussion.  
 
4.1 Design  
 
This was a qualitative study, using focus groups to explore the complexity of nursing staff’s everyday 
clinical work. This was an interpretative approach which explored what it was like for the nurses to work 
on the AMU. Focus groups were an effective method because they are designed to facilitate interaction 
between research participants to explore views about the research topic (Finch et al, 2014). This fit well 
with the constructivist epistemology of the thesis because research participants constructed accounts 
of their work by interacting with each other. The researcher used Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic 
analysis framework to conduct an interpretive thematic analysis of the focus group data, moving beyond 
the collective experiences discussed in the focus groups to create deeper insights about what was 
challenging about the nurses’ everyday clinical work, why it was challenging and how they managed 






4.2.1 Data Collection  
 
There was considerable work around planning the focus groups. The researcher wanted to conduct the 
focus groups in the hospital, during working hours so that nursing staff did not have to travel anywhere 
to be involved in the research. To do this effectively, the researcher negotiated the time and location 
for the focus groups with the gatekeepers of the AMU (matron and ward managers), in order to reach 
a compromise between access to research participants and maintaining patient safety. The 
gatekeepers agreed that focus groups could be held in the ward managers’ office, on Tuesday to 
Thursday from 1400 to 1600 because these were normally the quietest times on the unit. Then, there 
were regular revisions to these preparations to consider the daily, fluctuating pressures on the AMU 
such as short staffing, sudden influx of patients from the ED and rapidly deteriorating patients. 
Additionally, the nature of the staff rosters meant there was different sets of nurses on each shift. 
Consequently, the combination of participants changed for each focus group. 
 
The participants were nursing staff on the AMU. The researcher used purposive sampling to select an 
expert group, which represented the range of nursing roles and levels of experience on the AMU. The 
intention was that this expert group would be involved throughout the three phases of the thesis. 
Recruitment focused on identifying the different roles and levels of experiences across the nursing staff 
on the AMU. The researcher sent all the AMU nursing staff an email, put up information posters around 
the unit and provided a verbal reminder into the daily staff briefing (attended by all nursing staff at the 
beginning of each shift). Most of the expert group were self-selecting by responding to this recruitment 
drive. However, no nursing assistants came forward to be part of the focus groups. So, the researcher 
needed to approach several nursing assistants in person and ask them to be part of the expert group. 
In total, eighteen nurses agreed to be part of the expert group, this included three nursing assistants, 
ten staff nurses and two junior sisters. This meant there were junior and senior nursing team members, 
including nurses who were often the NIC and coordinator. The matron and ward managers were not 
included in the focus groups because the researcher was concerned that some nursing staff may feel 




The eighteen nurses in the expert group formed a pool of focus group participants. When the local 
working conditions allowed for a focus group to be conducted on a given day, the researcher checked 
how many participants from the expert group pool were available. If there were at least five members 
of the expert group available on that day, then the researcher continued with the focus group. The 
intention was that each focus group would represent the range of nursing roles and experiences, 
however this was not always possible. In total, there were nine focus groups. Table 4-1 shows which 
participants attended each focus group. The researcher and supervisor facilitated the focus groups and 
they lasted between thirty-five and fifty minutes. The researcher used a digital Dictaphone and their 
own mobile phone to record the focus groups. Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics 
committee (Appendix D, p.217) and interview participants gave written consent to participate in focus 
group discussions.  
 
Table 4-1 Numbers, Dates and Participants for the Focus Groups in Phase One 
No. Date Participants 
1 24/03/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse, Nursing Assistant  
2 24/03/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse, Band 6 Junior Sister 
3 25/03/17 
Nursing Assistant x 2, Band 6 Charge Nurse, Band 5 (Newly 
Qualified) Staff Nurse, Band 5 Staff Nurse 
4 12/04/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse x 2 
5 12/04/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse, Nursing Assistant 
6 18/04/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse x 2, Band 6 Junior Sister 
7 18/04/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse, Nursing Assistant 
8 26/04/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse x 3 
9 26/04/17 Band 5 Staff Nurse x 2, Nursing Assistant 
 
There was no consensus in the literature about the number of participants that should be used in a 
focus group, however there was recognition that a smaller group is more effective for exploring a 
research subject in more detail (Finch et al, 2014). On most days, it was necessary to have two separate 
discussions because the clinical demand meant it was not safe for five members of the nursing team to 
be away from the unit at the same time.  
 
The researcher and supervisor created a topic guide to ensure focus group discussion effectively 
explored the nurses’ everyday clinical work, informed by the four resilience abilities (Table 4-2). There 
was no guidance in the resilience engineering literature for facilitating discussion of everyday clinical 
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work or the distinction between Work-as-Imagined and Work-as-Done. The focus group script was 
informed by discussion with subject experts, the researcher’s own clinical experience as a nurse on the 
AMU, and the original RAG questions.   
 
Table 4-2 Topic Guide for Focus Groups in Phase One 
Time Section Discussion Points 
5 
Minutes 
Introduction Introduce everyone present 
My role as facilitator: 
- Make sure we discuss as issues as planned 
- Might ask you a direct question or direct conversation away from a point 
you are making 




- One person talking at a time - everyone has something valuable to say 
- Anyone here is free to use information from the discussion, but not to 





Phase One – expert group (you) representing the range of nursing staff on the 
Admissions Ward to discuss everyday work 
 






So, I’d like to start by talking about some of the pressures that you face on the 
Admissions Ward. I think that some of these pressures include things like 
deteriorating patients, multiple admissions at the same time, short staffing, 
equipment problems … 
 
When was the last time that you faced some of these pressures? Did it go well? 
1. Responding 
- Is there a protocol for responding to this? Is the protocol always helpful? 
When the protocol is not helpful what do you do? 
- Is it clear when you need to start the protocol? Do you ever delay your 
response? Do you ever start early? 
- How long does this work for? 
- Are there similar events that do not have a prepared response? 
- Who makes sure the protocol is started? Does anyone else know when 
this is done? 
 
2. Monitoring 
- How do you know when pressures are increasing? What do you look at? 
How regularly do you look at it? 
- Do these indicators let you know in advance or by the time they are 
happening its tool late? (e.g. No-one has had a morning break) 
- Does looking at this always help? (Tell me about a time that it helped … 
Tell me about a time that it did not help …) 
- Who else is doing this? Who else do you talk to about this? 
- Do you use anything other than your ‘gut’ feeling? 
 
3. Anticipating 
- Do you think about what your work load/zone work load/ward work load is 
going to be like during the day? Later in the afternoon? For the night 
shift? During the week? 
- Who thinks about this? Who do you talk to about this? 
- What do you look at? Are there some pressures that you know will be 





- What sort of things happen on the ward to facilitate learning? Is this 
helpful for you? Can you remember a time that learning from something 
was useful? 
- Who do you talk to about your learning? 
- Do you learn from things that go well in addition to things that did not go 
well? 
- After an event when does the learning happen? 
- Who decides what you learn from? 
- Where does learning happen? 
5 
minutes  
Closing I’m going to be doing a similar session with the other members of the expert group 
Then I will send you information about the next focus group 
Eventually I will develop questions based on these discussion points and then test 
these questions with you 
Has anyone got any questions? 
If you have any thoughts or questions please email me 
Thank you very much for your time  
 
 
The first two focus groups were dedicated to identifying what nursing staff found challenging about their 
everyday clinical work. This discussion generated a list of different challenges: 
1. Mismatch between ED handover and patient condition on arrival to the AMU 
2. Deteriorating patients 
3. Skill mix of the nursing team – Newly qualified nurses, medication administration 
competencies  
4. Multiple simultaneous admissions from the ED  
5. Staffing – shortages, sickness, use of temporary nursing staff (bank or agency staff) 
6. Poor teamwork 
7. Equipment problems or shortages 
8. Patient flow pressure – admissions, transfers, discharges 
9. Challenging patients – aggressive behaviour, confusion, mental health  
10. Time management 
11. Prioritising 
12. Complex patients – demand for specific competencies 
 
Subsequent focus groups were offered the opportunity to add to this list, however after the first two 
focus groups there were no additional challenges. The subsequent seven focus groups focused on 
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exploring these challenges in more depth. The intention was to explore why nursing staff found these 
aspects of their work challenging and how they managed these challenges.  
 
4.2.2 Data Analysis  
 
The researcher conducted a theoretically informed thematic analysis of the focus group transcripts. This 
was a combined deductive, inductive approach for analysing the focus group data. The CARe 
Resilience Model (Figure 4-1) provided the theoretical lens for the initial deductive analysis. This 
provided some structure for understanding how the focus group data related to high-level resilience 
concepts, such as adaptations focused on realigning demand and capacity. However, to understand 
the focus group data in more detail, the researcher used an inductive analysis, informed by the four 
resilience abilities, because this was more effective at understanding specific activities nurses used to 
adapt to the variability of system demands and manage the complexity of their everyday clinical work. 
This allowed for a more comprehensive analysis of the focus group data than a simple descriptive 
analysis could provide.  
 
Figure 4-1 CARe Resilience Model 
 
The analysis was informed by Braun and Clarke’s (2006) framework for thematic analysis. The analysis 
started with data transcription and the researcher transcribed all the focus group audio data using 
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Tracy’s (2012) transcription guidelines (Appendix C p.216). The researcher took notes during 
transcription to document any ideas about themes or relationships between participant’s comments. 
Then, the researcher read all the transcripts together and made further notes about any overarching 
themes. Following this, the researcher read each transcript in more detail and line-by-line, generated 
initial codes using NVIVO software programme. Codes that shared similar meanings were collated into 
themes and sub themes. Each theme was then examined to see how it related to the transcripts as a 
whole. The researcher created a map of themes to visualise the relationships between themes and sub 
themes (Figure 4-2). Finally, the names of the themes were edited so that they most effectively 
represented their meaning.  
 
4.3 Findings  
 
This section presents the findings from the thematic analysis of the focus group data. The findings show 
that the nursing staff’s everyday clinical work is incredibly complex. The social element of working in a 
healthcare system involved continuous informal trade-offs and negotiations with other nurses, 
healthcare professionals and even patients. There is a clear link between the effectiveness of 
individuals and team performance and the effectiveness of system performance. There are five main 
themes: Demand, Capacity, Clinical Expertise, Learning From Each Other and Being a Nurse on the 
AMU. Figure 4-2 shows a map of these themes.  
 
In the focus group transcripts, F1 and F2 were the facilitators (researcher and supervisor). P1, P2, P3, 




 Admissions Language Barrier Experience  
 
  
  Discharges Patient Flow Clinical Expertise  Context  
 Demand 
 
 Transfers Equipment Problems Communication  
 
 
 Deteriorating Patients   
 
 Learning From Each Other 






 Being a Nurse on the AMU 
 Teamwork   
 
  Lived Experience 
Temporary Staff Capacity   
 Sense Perception  
  
Newly Qualified Staff Staffing Tension Between Roles  
 




Shortages Nurse in Charge  
 Key Roles 
 
 Coordinator  
Figure 4-2 Map of Themes from Thematic Analysis of Focus Group Data in Phase One 
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4.3.1 Demand  
 
The Demand theme represents the challenges that nursing staff must respond to during their everyday 
clinical work. Table 4-3 shows the six sub themes that represent the range of challenges nurses had to 
respond to. The complexity of their everyday clinical work is driven by having to manage these 
challenges simultaneously at individual, team and system levels.   
 
Table 4-3 Sub-themes associated with the Demand theme 
Sub Theme  Description 
Deteriorating 
Patients 
Supporting clinically unstable patients 
Challenging 
Patients 




Malfunctioning or absent equipment that is required for patient care 
Language Barrier Caring for patients who do not speak English 
Admissions Managing the flow of patients being admitted to the AMU from the ED, GP referral 
or outpatient clinic 
Transfers Managing the flow of patients being transferred to other inpatient hospital wards 
Discharges Managing the flow of patients being discharged home (or equivalent setting) 
Workload Managing the volume, frequency and urgency of tasks that nursing staff need to 
complete 
 
Supporting clinically unstable patients is one of the most significant challenges for nursing staff and this 
is represented by the Deteriorating Patients sub theme. Most of the work is about escalating 
deteriorating patients (to ensure timely assessment by appropriate healthcare professionals or teams). 
There was a clear consensus that escalation protocols could not account for the range of complexities 
for managing deteriorating patients. Each of the nurses were aware of the distinction between what 
they should do (Work-As-Imagined) and what they actually do (Work-As-Done) when escalating 
deteriorating patients. They could consistently present a rationale to justify adjustments to the way they 
used escalation protocols.  
P1: So you’re obviously going to do more routine obs because they’re needing a closer eye on. But if 
they’re scoring. (2) You’d always escalate if they’re different because you don’t know what’s going on. 
P1: Three in one parameter or five. Overall.  
F1: And if it’s five you always escalate? 
P1: Meant to. 
P1: Yer. (3). I’d still escalate if they’re a five. But not always to CRT. Sometimes you get them on the 
phone. And they’re like the plans good. The plans good so we don’t need to do anything. Sometimes 
it’s because you’ve had previous experience with the same situation.  




The discussion of different scores and parameters relates to the National Early Warning Score (NEWS), 
which is central to the escalation protocol. The NEWS is a standardised track and trigger tool, which 
assigns numerical values and subsequent actions to physiological observations e.g. heart rate, 
temperature etc. (McGinley & Pearse, 2012). The higher the NEWS the more unwell the patient, for 
example a NEWS of seven or more mandates emergency assessment by a clinical team with critical 
care competencies (McGinley & Pearse, 2012). The Critical Response Team (CRT) are the clinical 
team with the critical care competencies at this hospital. In the above extract, the nurse is aware of 
what they were ‘meant to do’ in response to a combined NEWS of five or three in one parameter. 
However, they adapted their response to the NEWS according to the clinical needs of the patient. They 
described a range of adaptations, such as escalating a patient earlier than the protocol stated because 
of previous experiences. These adaptations also include choosing not to escalate when they should, 
such as when a patient has a high NEWS due to walking to the toilet and back. The nurse in the above 
extract knew that if they repeated the observations in ten minutes the NEWS would be lower, and 
escalation would not be required. There was general agreement amongst the nurses that clinical 
expertise was necessary for understanding how to adapt the way they use the escalation protocol to 
effectively maintain patients’ safety. This demonstrated the escalation protocol could not account for all 
the different ways patients can deteriorate.  
 
There is an extensive social element to managing the complexity of the conversations around escalating 
deteriorating patients. It affected individual, team and system level responses.  
 ‘F2: So. Does anybody ever say to you? Why did you call me? It was only a two. 
P1: I do start the conversation. With I know it’s only a two. BUT. 
(LAUGHTER [00:29:14]) 
P1: I don't want my ear chewed off. Mm. Yer. I do start off. By saying. I know. He's this. This. And this. 
BUT. Like. 
P2: Hear me out. 
LAUGHTER [00:29:25] 
P1: But his bloods said this. And his chest x-ray said that. Or whatever. And I can see that he might not 
be this stable. Or seemingly stable. For long. You know. I can see it kind of. Going down this pathway. 
F1: And do you always get the response that yo:u. are looking for when you do that? 
P1: Um. 
P2: It depends on how you approach it. ‘ 
(Focus Group Three)  
 
In this instance, the nurse attempted to escalate the deteriorating patient to CRT, however, their 
concerns are not supported by a NEWS of two. The nurse knows this and understands the need to 
gather alternative sources of information such as ‘his bloods [test] said this’, and ‘his chest x-ray said 
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that’. They also know they need to change the language they use to increase the chances of effectively 
communicating their concern. They use phrases such as ‘I know. He’s this … BUT’ to signpost 
awareness their clinical concern is not supported by the NEWS, nonetheless they are still concerned 
about the patient’s condition. The phrase ‘I don’t want my ear chewed off’ suggests this nurse has had 
previous negative experiences of escalating a deteriorating patient earlier than the escalation protocol 
suggests. There was widespread agreement that the variability in the effectiveness of their early 
escalation attempts related to the interaction with other healthcare professionals (or patients). The 
success of their escalation relies on the person(s) in the conversation responding appropriately to their 
social cues. This frequently involves a negotiation between the nurse and another healthcare 
professional to balance the various system demands and collectively identify the best course of action 
for everyone involved. The interaction with other healthcare professionals (including other nurses) is 
not limited to escalating deteriorating patients and affects all other dimensions of the nurses’ everyday 
clinical work.  
 
Alongside deteriorating patients, another frequent demand is patients with challenging behaviour and 
this includes aggression, confusion, delirium and a range of behaviours from patients with mental health 
problems. This is represented in the Challenging Patients sub theme. Nursing staff report that 
challenging behaviour prevents them from implementing healthcare interventions, for example a patient 
refusing to take medication. Identifying effective solutions to these challenges involves making 
decisions informed by a combination of individual and team expertise, guidelines and protocols, and 
the particular context of that episode of patient care.    
P2: Because. Sometimes. You do see it getting escalated late. And that's when it already started with 
things to get out of control. And crumble. 
P1: And you can use the side rooms as well.  
P2: Yer. 
P1: They can be pretty handy as well. I know that sounds terrible. But if there is a deteriorating patient. 
Next to a violent patient. You can't really have things going on in one bay. 
(Focus Group Four) 
 
In this instance, a patient’s violent behaviour prevents the nursing staff from effectively caring for a 
clinically unstable patient in the next bed and the violent patient is moved into a side room. Moving 
challenging patients into side rooms reduces the impact of their aggressive behaviour on other patients 
and staff. This decision is made because there was a side room available, however side rooms are not 
always available, and this forces the nurses to seek other solutions, such as moving the patients that 
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are not being challenging or changing the organisation of nursing work to alter how the team manage 
the patient caseload. Whilst there was general agreement amongst the nurses that the most effective 
actions for managing challenging patients changed according to particular scenarios, it was only the 
senior nurses who could articulate a range of responses to different scenarios. This demonstrates 
identifying effective solutions for the challenging elements of everyday clinical work is a highly nuanced, 
complex activity.  
 
The fluctuating quantity, frequency and priority of tasks is difficult for nursing staff to manage. They 
agreed there is a significant amount of cognitive work keeping track of a constantly evolving list of tasks. 
This is represented in the Workload sub theme. Several of the junior nurses reported that a common 
challenge is the difference between the status of the patient according to the telephone handover from 
the Emergency Department (ED) and the status of the patient when they arrive on the AMU. This is a 
challenge because it forces the nurses on the AMU to change the way they prioritise the tasks in their 
workload. 
P1: So. We got a handover. He was newsing a four. And then. When he actually came to me. He was 
newsing about a TWELVE. And his VBG [blood test] was completely dreadful. There was just a few. 
Little gaps and it was. At a really really bad time. When we had. Like. I think. I think it was part of the 
winter pressures. 
F1: Mm. 
P1: Time. I think. I don't know. I remember that really screwed me. And he was really really sick. Erm. 
He ended up going to intensive care afterwards. So. This patient that. You know. Obviously. His bloods 
I can’t remember exactly what they said about that. But. Erm. I remember I just had. This one view of 
how this patient might come to me. And then he came to me. I was like. That was definitely NOT his 
early warning score. Like. Before. 
(Focus Group Four) 
 
The sickest patient is always their highest priority. In this extract, the nurse needs to manage their 
sickest patient, whilst simultaneously re-prioritising all their other tasks. They often expressed frustration 
at external pressures affecting the way they prioritise their workload, for example new patients arriving 
from ED or the need to transfer a patient to another ward. This challenge was more pertinent to the 
junior nursing staff because they were more regularly involved with direct patient care, whereas the 
senior nurses were more involved with patient flow.    
 
The challenges directly associated with patient flow drew attention to the tension between system level 
priorities and patient care priorities. The sub theme Transfers is about the challenges associated with 
transferring patients from the AMU to another inpatient hospital setting. 
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P1: And then. You kind of. (3). Yer. So they're pushing you. But. You think. Well. There's always stuff I 
need to sort out for this patient before I can go home.  
P2: Hm. 
P1: So:. I don't think. (2). Then. They. They. Said. Downward pressure. They're getting from the. From 
the. SNPs. And the bed manager. And A and E. And we're getting it form them. So. I think. You know. 
(2). Yer. That's. That's one of the problems that I find. I think. 
(Focus Group One) 
 
All the nursing staff talk about ‘Downward pressure’ in a negative way, although this pressure manifests 
in different ways for junior and senior nurses. They view it as an external pressure on their decision 
making, forcing them into prioritising work associated with patient flow over direct patient care. For the 
junior nurses, this pressure forced them to leave non-essential tasks, such as dressing changes or 
therapeutic conversations with patients, and prioritise transferring a patient to another ward. They felt 
uncomfortable leaving these tasks incomplete, despite understanding the wider system pressures of 
the hospital. For the senior nurses, this pressure involved interacting more regularly with senior 
healthcare professionals, such as the site nurse practitioners, who wanted frequent updates about the 
status of the patient flow through AMU. The extent that these external factors affects nurses’ decision 
making varied daily. The most prominent external demand to their decision making is increased 
pressure to move patients out of the ED.  
 
Another example of the tension between system level priorities and patient care priorities is discharging 
patients home. Discharges are complex tasks which require high levels of coordination between several 
different healthcare disciplines, such as doctors, pharmacists and social services. The sub theme 
Discharges represents the challenges associated with discharging patients home from the unit. This 
challenging because nurses are often responsible for facilitating multiple members of the MDT to 
complete tasks to ensure the timely discharge of patients.  
F1: (LAUGHS). Um. And that. And you were having to phone multiple different? 
P1: Yer! As I said. I started with the discharge coordinator. Who said that. We can't help. Because it's 
a CCG. So like. Fine. And I phoned the council. And they couldn't help. Because it was the weekend. 
And then I phoned the. Back to the discharge coordinator. And then. Talking to the 
coordinator here. (2). AND the doctors. And everybody else. And. There was like. No way. This woman 
was going anywhere. Until. Cos. The one thing was. Make sure. That. The. Carers were in place. Before 
you send them home.  
(Focus Group Eight) 
 
In this extract the nurse talks about a situation where they had four different conversations about 
restarting a patient’s package of care to discharge them home. There was consistent agreement 
amongst the nurses that the most regular challenge for discharging patients home was ensuring there 
is sufficient social support systems in place. This often involves multiple conversations with multiple 
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healthcare disciplines before this could be established. The senior nurses were more aware than the 
junior nurses of the impetus for completing these discharging tasks earlier in the day so that social 
support systems are in place when a patient is discharged later in the day. This often led to tension 
between tasks associated with clinical priorities (need to be completed now to support patients now) 
and tasks associated with discharges (need to be completed now to support patients later). This tension 
is present at individual, team and system levels.  
 
Since this was a central London hospital, there was a wide range of different patient nationalities. This 
meant there are often patients that spoke English as a second language, or even spoke no English at 
all. The sub theme Language Barrier represents the challenges associated with supporting patients that 
did not speak English. There are a range of adaptations they used to manage this challenge.  
P1: Er. Yer. A lot of the time. It is. (2). Finding. A. Member. Of. Staff. Because we have quite a multi-
cultural team. Um. So. Quite often. You can find somebody. Um. We do have language line. Obviously. 
But. I think. Everyone is very aware of how much it costs.  
F1: It's pretty expensive isn't it 
P1: Yer! (LAUGHS) 
P2: How much is it? 
P1: £500 just to call. Like. 
P2: Mm. I should be in that job. 
P1: Like even if. You don't even speak to anyone for very long.  
(Focus Group Seven) 
 
There was consistent agreement that the ‘multi-cultural team’ of healthcare professionals on the AMU 
is the most frequent source of support for translation. The system level response is to use a telephone 
interpretation service. However, the nurses view this negatively because of the cost (both financial and 
time costs) associated with using it. They prefer to use informal translation services, such as family or 
healthcare team members, because they found this to be quicker and more effective. These adaptations 
are mainly focused on the healthcare professionals based on the AMU, but in some exceptional 
circumstance it also involves calling the ED when a particular nurse known to speak a particular 
language is working to ask if they could come to the AMU to translate.  
 
Sometimes the medical equipment required for specific healthcare interventions is the source of 
challenges to delivering patient care and this is represented by the Equipment Problems sub theme. 
The most common challenges associated with equipment are missing or faulty equipment. Nursing staff 
use a range of medical equipment for diagnostic and treatment purposes. All the nurses agreed that 
equipment is not usually available at the point of needing it.    
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P1: (2) I think we had one dynamap at one point. 
(Focus Group One) 
 
 
A ‘dynamap’ is an electric sphygmomanometer, used for measuring blood pressure. In this discussion, 
nursing staff report that there is a high demand for these machines in the morning. Nursing staff tend 
to use them at a similar time across the unit and this can result in several people wanting to use the 
dynamap at the same time. The adaptations to missing or faulty equipment involve negotiating with 
other nurses, finding equipment from another location or changing the order of tasks.  
 
4.3.2 Capacity  
 
The Capacity theme encapsulates the system elements that are in place to support nursing staff to 
meet the challenges of their everyday clinical work. There are seven sub themes and they are displayed 
in Table 4-4. Although many elements of the capacity theme are the system’s response to the range of 
demands, these are often the source of further challenges. For example, the staffing levels of nurses 
on the AMU is organised to provide enough nursing staff to meet patients’ needs. However, staffing is 
not straightforward and can be the source of further challenges.   
 
Table 4-4 Sub themes associated with Capacity theme 
Sub theme  Description 
Teamwork Nursing staff working together to meet the demands of everyday clinical work  
Temporary Staffing The challenges working with agency or bank staff  
Newly Qualified Staff The challenges working with staff members that have recently qualified  
Skill Mix The range of abilities possessed by a nursing team  
Staff Shortages The challenges associated with being short staffed   
Nurse in Charge A key role for facilitating successful performance of the nursing team in a zone 
Coordinator A key role for facilitating successful performance of the ward 
 
The complexity of the work on the AMU means that nursing staff need to work together in 
multidisciplinary healthcare teams to keep patients safe. The sub theme Teamwork represents how 
nursing staff work together with each other and other healthcare disciplines to meet the demands of 
everyday clinical work. Teamwork is frequently mentioned as a source of support for challenging work.  
F1: Yer. And I guess. Are there. Is there anything that you find helpful to respond. Um. Manage that? 
So that you don’t get left behind? 
P1: Maybe you try and ask the nurse in charge to try and do a couple of meds. While you try and get 
on top of a sick patient. Or ask the students or HCAs if they could start the obs and washes while I try 
and get everything else sorted. (2). Try and get the team work going.   




There was universal agreement amongst the nursing staff that they frequently have too many tasks to 
complete at the same time and describe good teamwork as a source of support with these tasks. This 
often took the form of supporting a colleague who has more tasks to do than other team members.  
 
The nurses agreed that good teamwork is viewed as a source of support, but poor teamwork is viewed 
as a challenge.  
P1: Another. Example of bad team work is. You have somebody who. (2) Um. A nursing assistant. Um 
an assistant. Who just doesn’t want to do anything the whole day.  
P2: And just will not help you. Well. Will not. Help with the care of the patients. And just sits on a 
computer and disappears for three hours. Whereas. If you work as a team. You get in. Get everything 
done. And. The nursing assistants even. Good team work is. I’ve got three. They talk to each other. I’ve 
got three double washes. In my team. And they’ve got none. So. Good team work would be going and 
helping them. Bad team work would be’- 
(Focus Group Two)  
 
 
The junior nurses thought that poor teamwork is about people not doing their share of the work, whereas 
the senior nurses thought poor teamwork is about people not providing help to others when they have 
less to do. Poor teamwork is associated with a greater personal workload because these tasks are not 
shared across the team.  
 
Staffing is a complex issue. Overall, staffing is viewed as a positive source of support. There was 
universal agreement that having the right number of nurses with the right skills is necessary to 
effectively manage the challenges of everyday clinical work. However, getting this right is not 
straightforward. Nursing staff use a range of adaptations so that patient care is not compromised by 
staffing problems. The sub themes Temporary Staffing, Newly Qualified Staff, Staff Shortages and Skill 
Mix all relate to how nurses manage this. 
 
Short staffing is one of the most common staffing challenges. Normally, it is the result of staff illnesses 
or insufficient numbers of regular nursing staff available to work on the rota. The sub theme Staff 
Shortages represents the challenges associated with an inadequate number of nursing staff on a shift. 
This changes the way nurses manage the complexities of their everyday clinical work.  
P1: Or you might not have enough staff. So. You might need to jump to the wanderguard. Sooner rather 
than later.  
P2: Mm. Yer. 
P1: Just to make sure. You can get on with. The other stuff.  





P1: You would try and bring in a nursing. In the zone. To try and help. But they might be needed to do 
obs and washes. You can't do that. With the curtains open. To keep an eye on this person. So you 
might. Put the wanderguard on. Until you can put. Someone back in the bay. 
(Focus Group Six)  
 
A ‘wanderguard’ is a falls prevention monitor, it alarms when a patient attempts to stand up unaided. 
This piece of medical equipment is commonly used to maintain the safety of patients who are at high 
risk of falling, particularly if they are confused or delirious. Short staffing affects how nursing staff use 
this piece of equipment. Many nurses report they consider using this piece of equipment much sooner 
when they are short staffed because it allows for a greater level of monitoring with fewer members of 
nursing staff. This is an example of how nurses change their practice in response to short staffing.  
 
Effective staffing is about more than just the number of nurses, it also concerns how experienced each 
member of the team is and what skills or competencies they are proficient in. The sub theme Skill mix 
is about the challenges associated with an insufficient mix of skills across the individuals in a team.  
P1: Oh I’ve got another one. I think it’s about training and things? So. You need to go through doing 
special training for trache care. For high flow oxygen. Um. Blood transfusions. (1). I don’t know if that 
would link into skill mix though? 
… 
P1: As well as. Like. Having patients that need all those things on the ward and there is only certain 
nurses that can do that-  
F2: So. Do you mean that you have these complex patients and there is often not the staff that are. 
Credited. Or- 
P1: [Yer. Or maybe they’ve not passed their competencies. Or skills. So they can’t- 
F2: Oh- 
P1: [administer or- 
(Focus Group One)  
 
Some clinical skills require specific training, for example male catheterisation. Only the senior nurses 
tend to be competent in this skill, so when a junior nurse has a male patient that requires a catheter 
and they are not trained in this skill, they need to find a senior nurse to complete this task for them. It is 
important to ensure there is an appropriate skill mix across a nursing team, so they can effectively meet 
the variable demands of their everyday clinical work. The difficulty of managing nursing staff levels on 
the AMU reinforces the finding that the nurses’ everyday clinical work on the AMU is extraordinarily 
complex. Ward managers could not only focus on the numbers of nurses (although system pressures 
to show appropriate staffing levels does) and frequently have to balance experienced and inexperienced 
staff to ensure an appropriate skill mix is available on each shift. This often involves phoning nurses on 




When there are not enough regular nursing staff available the ward managers book temporary nursing 
staff to work on the AMU. There are two kinds of temporary staff, agency staff and bank staff. Agency 
staff are nurses or nursing assistants that are employed by a private agency and hired to work when 
there are not enough regular members of staff available. Bank staff are nurses and nursing assistants 
who work in the same hospital but normally work in another setting and choose to do an extra shift on 
their days off. The sub theme Temporary Staffing represents the challenges of working with agency or 
bank staff. The use of temporary staffing is a common solution to short staffing. However, this is not a 
straight forward solution to shortages. Agency and bank staff are often unfamiliar with the local 
adaptations and are therefore much less effective at adapting to the challenges of everyday clinical 
work. They normally require more support than regular members of staff.  
F1: And they create more work?  
P3: They create more work. So. It’s just easier for us. To take the work load on. (2). I know it doesn’t 
seem nice that way. But by the time you’ve got to do drugs. And. An agency’s drugs. Because they 
can’t do it. And then. Every time. There are obs that need doing. They ask to help getting on to enoting. 
To look at plans. And then also EPR. And printing stickers. And labels. (3). You kind of take on two 
workloads at once.  
… 
P3: It’s kind of. Easier. To get rid of them. Then. (3). Kind of. Evenly.  
F1: Kind of. Reallocated. Your- 
P3: [Yer. Your permanent. Staff.   
(Focus Group Three)  
 
Agency nurses and nursing assistants vary in their effectiveness. Nurses report that some agency 
nurses create more challenges than short staffing and that it is easier to manage short staffing than 
temporary staffing. Effective staffing is not just about making up short falls in regular staff numbers with 
temporary staff because this often created more work for the regular staff. Almost all the nurses report 
that they would rather be short staffed than work with ineffective temporary nurses or nursing assistants. 
The ward managers could not control who arrives when they request a bank or agency nurse. However, 
they use informal strategies such as negotiating more hours with temporary staff (when they are on the 
AMU) who are viewed as effective to gain some control over this process. The senior nurses talked 
about examples of temporary staff that were asked to go home half way through a shift because they 
were ineffective in their role.  
 
A further complexity to the staffing challenges of the AMU are newly qualified nurses. Just as temporary 
staff are not as effective as regular staff, newly qualified nurses are not as effective as regular staff. 
However, the nursing team need to support the newly qualified nurses to develop and become as 
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effective as regular staff. This presents a different challenge than temporary staffing and is represented 
by the Newly Qualified Staff sub theme.  
P4: I’m there today! And. Yer. Like. I have no idea. Is it (Referring to another nurse)? I’m working with 
(Referring to another nurse). And I’ve got no idea what is going in her bay. You know.  
F2: Is it important that you do?  
P4: I’d say so. Just because. Our nurse in charge (Referring to another nurse). She’s so thinly spread. 
Amongst all three bays. Amongst all the patients. That if she. If I can’t find her. I’m a bit like. Oh. Where’s 
(Referring to another nurse)! But she might be with (Referring to another nurse). Who has three sick 
patients? And I just. Don’t know about them. Um. So. I think. In terms of going up to the nurse in charge 
as well. 
(Focus Group Three)  
 
The newly qualified nurses in the focus groups reported they felt less effective in their role because they 
have less clinical experience, take longer to complete tasks and lack local system knowledge. They are 
also less aware of the adaptations used by nursing staff. The more experienced nurses talked about 
the balance between supporting newly qualified nurses to complete tasks, so they become more 
proficient in them and getting the work done themselves to ensure clinical tasks are completed quickly 
enough.  
 
There are individual roles that are key to the effective performance of the team and the system. The 
sub theme Nurse in Charge represents the work the nurse in charge (NIC) does to enable the successful 
performance of the nursing team. The NIC is frequently mentioned as a source of support for the rest 
of nursing team.  
P2: I mean. More often than not. If people are. (2). Erm. Have a higher news score. Then people are 
generally. Quite on top of managing them. Themselves.  
F1: Mm. 
P2: It's just. If. I'm nurse in charge. I would like to know that. Especially for the purposes of handing 
over. As well. 
F1: Yep. And have that awareness of the workload of the zone. 
P2: Yer. So that I know where. Extra help is needed. Or. You know. If that bay is quiet settled. Or quiet 
even. And you can say. Oh. Would you mind giving. So and so a hand. You know. See if they are ok? 
They've got a sick patient. 
F1: Mm. 
P2: It's about using the resources that you've got. 
(Focus Group Four)  
 
The NIC is expected to understand the nursing team’s workload and identify how to coordinate the team 
most effectively. There are a range of activities associated with the NIC role. Many of the junior nurses 
report that an effective NIC helps them with clinical tasks when they feel overwhelmed and is a source 
of advice for decision making. There was overall agreement that there is a lot of variability between how 




In addition to the NIC, there is the coordinator, who is responsible for patient flow through the AMU and 
is normally the most experienced nurse on the unit that day. The sub theme Coordinator represents the 
challenges reported by coordinators to enable the successful performance of the unit. They are a senior 
source of expertise to the nursing staff on the AMU. 
P1: I was just going to add that. Usually. The coordinators are really good in that scenario. They tend 
not to allocate. You know. An additional sicky. To that zone. Because they know that zone is under 
pressure already. 
P2: Uh uh. 
P1: And they might try to empty your bay as well. So if there is the potential for discharges home. You 
know. They would. You know. Try to tighten up on discharges. They'll try to transfer people. That's what 
happened. One time. I think. With me. And they did try to. Like. Not allocate to me. When I had someone 
quite challenging. 
P2: Yer. I definitely had that experience. 
P1: They're just this invisible support. Just comes from nowhere. It's great. 
P2: You probably wouldn't even notice that at the time. Its' only later. That you would notice that. 
(Focus Group Four)  
 
 
One of the main roles of the coordinator is to facilitate patient flow through the unit. This involves 
directing patient admissions from the ED. To do this effectively they need an understanding of the 
workload of nursing teams in each part of the unit. This is a highly nuanced and complex role that 
requires a detailed understanding of how challenges are managed by the nursing team. This role is only 
undertaken by the most experienced nursing staff because only they have sufficient clinical knowledge, 
local system experience and decision-making skills to do this effectively. Despite the relative 
significance of the NIC and coordinator roles for the unit, there was still agreement that there is a lot of 
variability between how individuals work in these roles.  
 
4.3.3 Clinical Expertise  
 
The Clinical Expertise theme represents the individual knowledge and experience that the nurses draw 
upon to manage the complexity of their everyday clinical work. Alongside the system demands and the 
system capacity, there was a set of individual knowledge and skills nurses used to manage the 
complexity of their everyday clinical work. This was part of their Work-As-Done. This theme represents 
how nurses chose to respond to the challenges in their everyday clinical work. There are three sub 
themes associated with this theme and they are displayed in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5 Sub themes associated with Clinical Expertise theme 
Sub theme  Description 
Experience  The range of previous experiences that inform decisions   
Context The particular context that affected decision making   




The Experience sub theme represents the range of previous experiences the nurses use to inform their 
decision making. This is central for identifying which adaptations work in which circumstances. The 
more experience an individual has, the greater the range of adaptations they could use. This provides 
some insight into why newly qualified nurses are less effective in their role and why the most 
experienced nurses are a source of support for others.  
P2: Yer. Try and sell it to them [the medical team]. (LAUGHS). Does that sound really bad? 
F1: No. No. 
P1: I think usually they [the medical team] respond quite well. 
P2: Yer. 
P1: Because I have had a case where I have escalated seemingly well people. But said it. In a way. So 
that they have the potential to be less stable then they are now. And they can see that as well. And 
accept that we might have that foresight. Like. Just because we’ve seen so many of the same things. 
Happen. Over and over. 
(Focus Group Four) 
In this extract, P1 and P2 are explaining why they escalate some patients with certain medical 
conditions earlier than the escalation protocol suggests. They describe previous experiences looking 
after similar patients where they did not escalate a similar patient early enough and they rapidly 
deteriorated. Repeated exposure to the same clinical scenarios allows this nurse to have ‘foresight’ 
about the risks associated with certain medical conditions. These experiences allow nursing staff to 
develop an internal catalogue of adaptations that are effective in certain scenarios. However, this nurse 
also reported that these adaptations don’t always have the same outcome. For example, escalating a 
patient to the medical team before the escalation protocol suggests does not always result in the 
medical team reviewing the patient.  
 
Clinical experience was not enough to explain how the nurses chose to implement the range of 
adaptations at their disposal. Alongside the internal catalogue of previous experiences, the specific 
context surrounding each clinical scenario affected how the nurses adapted to various demands. Each 
adaptation is informed by the particular set of circumstances surrounding it. The sub theme Context 
represents this. Clinical expertise and local system knowledge are not entirely sufficient for effective 
adaptations, the nurses suggest that adaptations need to be informed by the circumstances surrounding 






F1: So. Rather than the workload of the nurse. You look at the experience of the nurse. 
P1: Well. I take both into consideration. If they've a full bay and they're all quite sick. I will help them as 
much as I can. If they're quite stable patients. They are kind of used to the pressures. I think. Maybe 
they can handle their patients. I don't need to focus on you. Just now. One of the newly qualified or 
experienced staff. Just to make sure they're not drowning in their workload. 
(Focus Group Five)  
 
In this example, P1 talks about the decisions they make about who to help when they are the NIC. They 
suggest their decisions would depend on how much experience their team members have. In some 
circumstances they may leave the more experienced nurse with a higher workload and help the newly 
qualified nurse with a smaller workload. However, if both have the same amount of experience then 
they would help the nurse with the greatest workload. The need to pay attention to context highlights 
the complexity of the nursing team’s everyday clinical work.  
 
However, clinical experience and context were not enough to explain how nurses manage the 
complexity of their everyday clinical work. A lot of the decision making is internal to individuals and 
communicating this to other healthcare professionals is necessary for adaptations to be successful. The 
sub theme Communication represents the communication challenges the nursing team experience. 
Nurses report that some members of the team are better than others at communicating.   
P2: [It’s not always. Its. Um. It’s not always the case that you are actually on top of it. Like you never 
know when you go out somewhere. Or they can ask you to get something. And then when you come 
back. Oh they’ve changed this. Oh this patient needs to be on half hourly. Or hourly. Or things like that. 
Ok. Sorry. Nobody told me. You just. You kind of a bit lost. In that. U:m. Time. And then you are wishing 
to go back. What else you can do.  
F1: Right. So maybe you feel like you’ve missed something right at the beginning. And then things have 
changed. And now you’re-  
(Focus Group One)  
  
All the nurses report using a considerable range of adaptations during the focus group discussions. For 
many of the adaptations to be carried out effectively they need the rest of the nursing team to be aware 
of them. This means communication is key for enabling successful adaptations. However, there is 
considerable variation in the effectiveness of communication between team members. The nursing staff 
often report poor communication between different members of the healthcare team. For example, 
healthcare assistants report poor communication between staff nurses and healthcare assistants. Staff 





4.3.4  Learning From Each Other  
 
The four resilience abilities are central to the RAG approach for analysing organisational resilience and 
the focus group script facilitated nursing staff to talk about responding, monitoring, learning and 
anticipating activities in their everyday clinical work. This was effective for discussing responding, 
monitoring and anticipating activities. However, it was challenging for the nursing team to discuss 
learning activities from a resilience engineering perspective, which focuses on learning from what goes 
right. When the researcher attempted to raise learning as a topic of discussion, the nurses associated 
learning with things that had gone wrong. In fact, the term ‘learning’ was not conducive to discussion. 
They talked about activities such as incident reporting or reflecting on what had gone wrong. 
Furthermore, many of the system level learning activities were conducted in another part of the hospital. 
For example, incident report investigations are conducted by a quality and safety team located in a 
different part of the hospital from the nursing staff. However, it became apparent that the focus groups 
provided a space for nursing staff to reflect on their work and this meant they could learn from each 
other.   
P2: No. Be. A lot of them [security staff] are based in A and E.  
P3: Oh are they? 
P2: So. It would be. That's something we could actually.  
F2: Mm. 
P2: Say to security. When you're responding to. Calls here. Please use the back door. Because.  
(Focus Group Six)  
 
In this example, the nursing staff are talking about the different ways the security team work in the 
hospital. P2 and P3 have had different experiences interacting with the security staff. Together they talk 
about how this could change the way they work in the future. By discussing the way they manage their 
everyday clinical work, nursing staff shared their adaptations with each other. Sometimes this meant 
the more experienced nurses shared lessons from previous adaptations and sometimes this meant 
healthcare assistants sharing their adaptations with the staff nurses.  
 
4.3.5 Being a Nurse on the AMU 
 
As the nurses discussed how they manage the challenging elements of their work, they also provided 
insights into what it was like to experience them. The Being a Nurse on the AMU theme represents 
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these experiences. There are four sub themes associated with the Being a Nurse on the AMU and they 
are shown in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6 Sub themes associated with Being a Nurse on the AMU theme 
Sub theme  Description 
Lived Experience What it is like to work as a member of the nursing team on AAW 




Nursing staff experienced tension between the different 
professional roles on the ward 
When the work gets 
hard, you work harder 
Prevailing attitude demonstrated across the nursing team in the 
face of challenging work 
 
When the nurses talk about how they manage their work, they often mention how they use their senses 
to gather information about their clinical environment. The sub theme Sense Perception represents the 
different ways nursing staff experience their work using their senses.   
 
P2: Whereas. If you are walking through. And. Try and. Go into each bay. And. Eyeball. The patients. 
At least. Two or three times. Through the shift. And go into each zone. Regularly. 
P1: And make sure you assess someone as well. 
P2: Exactly. That's right.  
F1: Mm. I think. Some people. Have spoken about. When it's busy. You can feel that it is busy. The 
things that you see. The things that you hear. Allow you to. Kind of. Develop that understanding that. 
Maybe. Things aren't being as well controlled. As. They could be. Um. And. Sometimes. That's possible 
to do with these complex patients. See the behaviour that they're exhibiting. Or. The way that they're 
talking. You can hear the volume that they're using and talking to someone.  
(Focus Group Six)  
 
Across the range of roles and experiences in the focus groups, the nurses report using their sight, 
hearing, smell and touch to gather information about the patients, the unit and the status of the workload 
of the nursing team. They also discuss the ability to ‘feel that it is busy’. This represents how nursing 
staff internalised the information they gathered through their senses and demonstrates their expertise 
for understanding their clinical environment at an almost subconscious level.  
 
Many of the nurses used emotive language to talk about their work. It is clear they experience their 
everyday clinical work as human beings as well as healthcare professionals. It was inextricably linked 
to the ways they managed the challenges of their everyday clinical work. The sub theme Lived 
Experience represents what it feels like to be a nurse on the AMU.  
P2: And. It's difficult sometimes. When they are constantly asking you for it. Which is. Obviously their 
right. They want to go home. They don't want to be holding up the bed. Um. (2). And then that. Like. 
You do sometimes feel like. You are just nagging the doctor for it. Um. And you feel guilty for it. Because 
you know they are going to be seeing. They've prioritised that. It's not on the top of their list. Um. You 
do feel bad. For nagging. 




A common theme is guilt. All the nurses expressed some sense of guilt when their adaptations require 
them to put pressure on other healthcare professionals to complete certain tasks, for example 
repeatedly asking the medical team to complete an electronic discharge letter. These adaptations are 
necessary to get the work done, but nursing staff still feel guilty about doing them.  
 
The sub theme Tension Between Roles represents the tension between different the various healthcare 
disciplines.  
P2: Even today. I'm not. Happy. Because of the communication. I'm not getting the communication. It's 
not a two way thing. It really frustrates ME at work. Because. It should be a two way thing. Like. If I'm. 
Trying to catch up with you. And tell you this. This. Is done. And stuff like that. You should come back 
to me. And be like. This. This. This. Is done. Or maybe we should do this? 
F1: Mm. 
P2: If it's not a two way communication. I don't know how the other person feels. But it frustrates ME. 
Because I need information.   
(Focus Group Five)  
 
The nurses agreed there was regular tension between the medical team and the nursing team. Nursing 
assistants frequently reported tension between nursing assistants and staff nurses. Both nursing 
assistants and staff nurses found poor communication to be a common source of tension between 
healthcare roles. Interaction with other healthcare professionals, the social component to working in a 
complex system, is a frequent source of tension between healthcare professionals. It often stemmed 
from conflicting priorities as system pressures pulled groups of healthcare professionals in different 
directions.   
 
There is a shared attitude amongst the nursing staff on the AMU about how they approach the challenge 
of their everyday clinical work. The sub theme When the work gets hard, you work harder represents 
this shared attitude. 
F1: Yer. Because there is that feeling of. I just need to work harder to get through this.  
P3: Yer. 
F1: Its. Just. Like- 
P3: [Crack on.  
(Focus Group Three) 
 
This attitude is a way for many of the nursing staff to manage the challenges of the everyday clinical 




4.3.6 The Four Resilience Abilities   
It is clear that the four resilience abilities are interrelated and happened simultaneously across micro, 
meso and macro levels. Consider the extract below:  
P1: Um. It. Depends. I mean. If it is a com. A more complex one. Then. You may get the doctors 
involved. To maybe have a. A chat. Sometimes. For whatever reason. People tend to heed a doctors 
advise more than nurses. Um. Or. If it. I mean. It's happened before. We've had patients. Who are. 
Kicking off a bit. Where we've asked SNP [Site Nurse Practitioner] to be involved. And then. It's been 
resolved by getting security to go out with them. And escort them. So they can. Have a cigarette. But 
also. They're not going to. Run away. 
(Focus Group Seven) 
 
In this example, the nurses discuss how they manage challenging scenarios where clinically unstable 
patients, with mental health concerns want to go outside for a cigarette, against medical advice. They 
attempt to generate an effective solution, which balances the patient’s wishes whilst maintaining their 
safety. The nurses anticipate the patient will more likely listen to the medical team than the nursing 
team, so they escalate to the medical team to talk to the patient. They’ve learnt that some patient’s 
behaviour escalates quickly, so they monitor the patient’s behaviour closely whilst they work towards 
an effective solution. They anticipate the need to escalate to the senior nurses in the hospital or the 
security team for more support if the patient’s behaviour escalates. Crucially, it is only by understanding 
the way the nursing staff use elements of responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating at the same 
time, that it is possible to reach a deep enough understanding of resilient performance. In summary, 
the thematic analysis of the focus group data generated five themes which provided a comprehensive 
understanding of the Work-As-Done for nursing staff on the AMU. Part of the analysis involved using 
the CARe model of organisational resilience (Figure 1-1, p.29) and Hollnagel’s four resilience abilities 
– responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating. The CARe model of organisational resilience was 
useful for structuring the high-level resilience concepts, such as demand and capacity. This was 
influential for understanding the salient challenges on the AMU, represented in the Demand and 
Capacity themes. However, the model was not sufficient for exploring the intricacies of the nurses’ 
adaptations in more detail. The four resilience abilities informed a more nuanced analysis of the nurses’ 






4.4 Discussion  
 
Phase one explored the research question ‘What is Work-As-Done for nurses?’ and ‘How can nurses’ 
Work-As-Done be understood in terms of the four resilience abilities?’’. Focus group discussions elicited 
rich descriptions about the challenging elements of the nurses’ everyday clinical work and proved a 
useful way to talk about the adaptations they employed to manage this. A theoretically informed, 
thematic analysis was effective for exploring the focus group data. There were two parts to this analysis, 
an initial deductive analysis informed by the CARe resilience model and then an inductive analysis, 
informed by the four resilience abilities. Both aspects provided valuable insights which allowed the 
analysis to move beyond what the nurses were saying and interpret their meaning to provide a thorough 
understanding of the Work-As-Done. The main findings from the thematic analysis were the level of 
complexity of the nurses’ everyday clinical work and the extent to which the social elements of this work 
were central for enabling adaptations. It was clear that talking about responding, monitoring, learning 
and anticipating activities was helpful for understanding how these adaptations worked and that the four 
resilience abilities are interrelated.  
 
The Demand theme represented the most salient challenges for the nurses on the AMU. These were 
the system demands that they had to respond each shift. The Capacity theme represented the ways in 
which the healthcare system is organised to support the nursing staff to meet the system demands. 
However, it was clear that some elements of the Capacity theme were in themselves challenges. For 
example, staffing is a part of how the work is organised to meet the challenges in the Demand theme. 
However, many elements of staffing where themselves a challenge, such as short staffing or temporary 
staffing. This highlights the layers of complexity involved in the Work-As-Done for the nursing staff on 
the AMU. However, the activities and challenges in the Capacity theme were not sufficient to explain 
how the nurses met the challenges in the Demand theme. There were further levels of intricacy involved 
in their Work-As-Done. These nuances were represented in the Clinical Expertise theme, which showed 
how previous experiences, the particular context of a clinical scenario and the communication around 
adaptations all effected the nurses’ adaptations. The Learning theme was significant because it 
highlighted the lack of system support for learning from what goes right. It did demonstrate that the 
focus groups were themselves an effective time and place for the nurses to reflect and learn from each 
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other. The Being a Nurse on the AMU theme did not add to our understanding of how nurses enacted 
adaptations, but it captured the essence of the experience of being a nurse and constantly having to 
adapt to unpredictable demands.  
  
The CARe organisational resilience model was useful for structuring the initial deductive element of the 
thematic analysis. It helped explain how the nurses’ everyday clinical work is about re-aligning demand 
and capacity through adaptations. The focus group discussions supported the resilience engineering 
perspective that adaptations are necessary for effective system performance, but that the same 
adaptations lead to positive and negative outcomes (Hollnagel et al, 2015; Anderson et al, 2016). To 
reach a deep, granular understanding of specific activities that informed adaptations, a more inductive 
analysis, informed by the four resilience abilities was necessary. The CARe resilience model was helpful 
as an overarching framework to structure the initial analysis of these rich accounts, but further inductive 
analysis, using the four resilience abilities, was necessary to reach a more granular understanding of 
nurses’ adaptations.  
 
The focus group discussion focused on the work of individuals and teams, so it represents the micro 
and meso levels of system performance. However, the focus group accounts suggest that micro level 
performance directly affects meso level performance. For example, the nurses in the coordinating roles 
such as the NIC or the coordinator, talk about monitoring and anticipating activities that they do as 
individuals. Yet, these activities affect meso level performance such as effectiveness of patient flow 
though the AMU. This is represented in the Clinical Expertise theme, which is about the skills and 
knowledge that inform the adaptations nurses use to manage the challenges of their everyday clinical 
work. Although macro level performance is beyond the scope of the study, micro and meso level 
performances affect macro level performance. This supports the view that resilient performance occurs 
across all levels of complex systems (Anderson et al, 2017). This is not something that is well explained 
in resilience engineering theory, where there is a broad focus at systems level (Hollnagel et al, 2006; 
Hollnagel et al, 2015).  
 
The social element of the adaptations for managing the complexity of everyday clinical work is 
considerable. One of the findings from the narrative review is that many approaches for analysing 
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organisational resilience are too technical and could not account for the social elements of resilient 
system performance (2.4.5, p.65). So, there was a preconception that understanding resilient system 
performance should account for the social processes, such as the coordination and articulation of work, 
negotiation of competing goals and dynamic trade-offs with other clinicians or patients (Wears & Perry, 
2006; Ross et al, 2014; Sujan et al, 2015) that are vital for resilient system performance. The focus 
group discussions demonstrate that these social processes are central for enabling the adaptations 
nurses use to manage the complexity of their everyday clinical work. Even a simple adaptation, such 
as delaying the administration of a patient’s antibiotics, needs to be communicated with other nursing 
team members involved in that patient’s care. The complex and intricate nature of everyday clinical 
work means that many adaptations only work if other healthcare professionals know about them.  
 
Focus group discussion identified there are no systems in place on the AMU to support learning from 
what goes right. When discussing learning in the focus groups, there was an overwhelming 
preoccupation with learning from things that went wrong. The Learning From Each Other theme shows 
that focus groups are an effective way for nursing staff to learn from each other. It is clear this was 
mutually beneficial and that there is no opportunity for nursing staff to do this on a regular basis due the 
demanding nature of the clinical work. Focus groups are known to be effective for sharing knowledge 
and information in a work setting. There is well established research about communities of practice and 
how they are useful for supporting organisational learning. Communities of practice are groups of 
people who share a concern, a set of problems or a passion about a topic and who deepen their 
knowledge and understanding in this area by interacting on a regular basis (Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Weneger & Snyder, 2002). They are known to be effective for sharing tacit knowledge and have been 
used across several industries (Lesser & Storck, 2011). More recently, in healthcare, they have been 
used as a tool to improve clinical practice and to facilitate implementing evidence-based practice 
(Ranmuthugala et al, 2011). The evidence suggests they vary in composition, purpose and means by 
which members exchange information and knowledge. (Li et al, 2009; Ranmuthugala et al, 2011). 
Perhaps the focus groups were a good example of how to implement communities of practice with 




The lack of information about learning can be considered a limitation of this approach. It is difficult to 
analyse organisational resilience when there is incomplete information about one of the four central 
theoretical components. Especially if this initial phase will inform further phases for this process. It risks 
reinforcing the status quo, rather than being able to work towards improving resilient performance by 
looking at learning. However, separating the four resilience abilities reduces the explanatory power of 
the analysis. The findings demonstrated that the four abilities happen simultaneously across all levels. 
This is evidence to support interrelated nature of the theoretical relationships between the four resilience 
abilities (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel, 2010). This means that, methodologically, it is not appropriate 
to study the four resilience abilities in isolation because they do not happen in isolation. Previous 
attempts at developing RAG questions have distinguished the four abilities (Hunte, 2016: Engvall et al, 
2017), but this misses much of the complexity of the adaptations necessary for system performance. 
 
The aim of phase one was to investigate the expert group’s everyday clinical work to inform the 
development of items for a cross-sectional survey, which could explore the views of the wider nursing 
population on the AMU. However, not all the findings are relevant to the four resilience abilities and 
therefore not all the findings are relevant for developing survey items in the next phase of the research 
design. The Demand and Capacity themes are most relevant for this. The Clinical Expertise theme is 
more closely associated with individual performance, but its significance to the nursing staff’s ability to 
manage their everyday clinical work suggested that it should be represented in the survey items. 
However, the absence of learning from things that went well meant that the focus group discussions 
are not an effective source for developing learning survey items. The Phenomenology of Nursing theme 
provides insight into what it is like to work as a nurse on the AMU. This theme is important for 
understanding the impact of the work on the people that make up the nursing teams. However, it is not 
relevant to the development of responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items for 
analysing system performance. The next chapter begins with the development of a process for 






4.5 Reflexivity  
 
Conducting the focus groups was the most significant aspect of this phase of the research design. 
There was a considerable amount of planning to ensure the focus groups could be an effective research 
space to support discussion. Initially, the researcher was concerned it would be challenging to support 
the nurses to discuss their everyday clinical work from a resilience engineering perspective. The 
researcher was unsure how his pre-existing professional and social relationships with the nursing staff 
would affect the way the participants interacted in the focus groups. The researcher was also concerned 
that the resilience engineering theoretical terms would be a barrier to discussion because of the abstract 
and technical language of the resilience engineering field. Consequently, the researcher concentrated 
on explaining the purpose of focus groups without using resilience engineering terms and emphasised 
that the intention was to find out how the nurses manage the challenges of their work. Once the focus 
group participants understood the discussion was not an assessment, trust was established, and the 
collaboration began. The participants openly discussed the challenges of their work. The dual identity 
of clinician and researcher was a strength because the researcher knew when to prompt the participants 
to explain something further because they had experienced these challenges himself.  
 
Despite the researcher’s initial concerns, the focus groups were an overwhelming positive experience. 
The participants really engaged with each other and the discussion evolved into an open forum about 
the challenges of their everyday clinical work. Perhaps this was so effective because there was nowhere 
else they could express themselves in the same way. Surprisingly, there was a lot of laughter during 
the discussions. The focus groups created time and space for the participants to talk about their work, 
and the facilitators provided someone to listen to them. This was especially true of the healthcare 
assistants, who often feel marginalised by the nursing staff (as expressed in the focus groups). For the 
researcher, this represented effective collaboration with the nursing staff in the expert group. The 
resilient healthcare theoretical lens was useful for validating the nurses’ experiences managing the 
challenges of their everyday clinical work.  
 
The researcher found they were a participant in the focus groups as well as a facilitator. There were 
many instances where focus group discussion naturally aligned with resilience engineering theory, 
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without any prompting from the researcher. The four resilience abilities were helpful for understanding 
how nurses managed the complexity of their everyday clinical work. This was encouraging early in the 
research process because the value of the resilience engineering perspective was clear. When the 
discussion did not require much prompting, the researcher listened to the participants and added his 
thoughts to the discussion. The researcher learnt from his colleagues as they discussed various 
adaptations for managing the challenges of their everyday clinical work. This emphasised the value of 
the focus groups as means of exploring everyday clinical work because the insights gained from the 
collaborative discussion could not have been gained from the researcher’s own reflections or individual 




Chapter 5 – Phase Two – Item Development and Survey Application  
 
Phase two explored the research question ‘How can the development of responding, monitoring, 
learning and anticipating survey items be informed by accounts of Work-As-Done?’. The aim of phase 
two was to develop survey items from the focus group data, administer the survey to the AMU nursing 
population and analyse the results. This represented a move from the expert group’s perspectives about 
managing their everyday clinical work, to exploring how well the whole nursing population thought the 
AMU could respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. By doing so, phase two was about using the detailed, 
nuanced accounts of the way individuals manage the challenging elements of their work, to analyse 
how well the AMU can respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. There was no useful guidance in the 
resilience engineering literature about using focus group data to inform survey items, so the researcher 
developed a replicable, systematic process for generating questions for the four resilience abilities.  
 
5.1 Design  
 
This was a quantitative study, which involved three parts: item development, survey administration and 
analysis of survey results. Item development involved making a conceptual leap from the focus group 
data, informed by resilience engineering theory, to items suitable for a self-administered survey. The 
intention was that the survey items explored the perspectives of the wider population of nursing staff 
about how well the AMU could respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. A cross-sectional survey design 
was used to collect data at a single point in time from the AMU nursing population. Surveys were self-
administered and there were both, online and paper versions. A data analysis plan, developed in 
collaboration with the Faculty statistician, focused on descriptive statistical analysis of the survey data 
with the intention of exploring the relationships between the views of the different sub groups of the 






5.2 Method  
5.2.1 Item Development  
 
Survey design and item development are well established research endeavours (Aday & Cornelius, 
2006; Brancato et al, 2006; Krosnick et al, 2014). Although it is desirable to use established survey 
items that have been developed and tested using rigorous methods (Reis & Judd, 2014; Krosnick et al, 
2014), the RAG is designed to elicit information about a specific system and therefore a standardised 
questionnaire is not appropriate. Previous researchers have used different methods for developing RAG 
survey items, but these are either too close to the original theoretical items (Appendix A, p.210) (Hunte, 
2016; Engvall et al, 2017) or include conceptual additions which were not sufficient for exploring 
organisational resilience (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015; Rigaud et al, 2015) (For more detail, see 
the RAG section of the narrative review findings, p.47). Therefore, there were no suitable existing survey 
items to draw upon, and no clearly described rigorous methods for generating items. In this study the 
focus group data informed the development of context specific survey items.   
 
Developing survey items informed by the expert group’s description of everyday clinical work was 
challenging because it involved making a conceptual leap from the focus group data, informed by 
resilience engineering theory, to items that were appropriate for a self-administered cross-sectional 
survey. The researcher, in collaboration with supervisors and subject experts, developed an nine-step 
process for generating responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items from the thematic 
analysis of the focus group data. Decisions about the development of this process focused on making 
sure it was replicable, considering common barriers for local quality improvement initiatives such as 
lack of time and resources (Kaplan et al, 2010).  
 
The challenge was to distil what was meaningful about the focus group data into a reasonable number 
of clear, unambiguous self-administered survey items. This necessarily involved reducing the detailed 
accounts of the focus groups into simpler statements to explore the views of the wider population and 
was part of a three-stage process to comprehensively explore the organisational resilience of the AMU. 





Figure 5-1 Flowchart for Question Development in Phase Two 
 
1. Questions generated 
from themes in focus 
group data (n = 599)
2.  Group questions 
into similar meanings                     
(n = 599)
4. Synthesise questions 
with similar meanings 
togehter (n =109)
5. Review questions for 
representativeness of 
focus groups and RE 
theory (n = 54)
6. Send questions to 
expert group for review                     
(n = 54)
7. Edit questions into 
survey format and 
review representation 
of RE theory (n = 36)
8. Send questions to 
Faculty statistician for 
expert review (n = 37)
9. Pilot testing with 
nursing staff (n= 37) 
3. Remove duplicate 
questions (n = 227)
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5.2.1.1 Step One – Generate Questions from Focus Group Data  
 
There were five main themes (Demand, Capacity, Clinical Expertise, Reflection and Being a Nurse on 
the AMU) from the thematic analysis of the focus group data in phase one. The researcher re-read the 
data for each theme and then, starting from the first theme, generated questions, line-by-line, from the 
contents of the theme. The questions were written as comments in Microsoft Word documents. Figure 
5-2 shows an example of this question generation process. In total, 599 questions were generated from 
this step (Appendix E, p.218). The next steps focused on reducing the number of questions into a 
feasible number for a self-administered, cross-sectional survey. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Example of Generating Questions from Deteriorating Patient Theme 
 
5.2.1.2 Step Two – Group Questions Together with Similar Meanings  
 
The researcher printed out the questions and arranged them on a large flat surface to group them into 
similar topics, for example some of the topics from the deteriorating patient theme were escalating 
deteriorating patients, responding to unwell patients and communicating with the medical team. This 
allowed the researcher to better understand the relationships between the questions and identify any 





Figure 5-3 Picture of Questions Grouped into Similar Meanings 
 
5.2.1.3 Step Three – Remove Duplicate Questions  
 
There was considerable overlap between most of the groups of questions and to reduce this overlap, 
227 duplicate questions were removed (Appendix F, p.231).  
 
5.2.1.4 Step Four – Synthesise Similar Questions  
 
There was still considerable similarity between many of the remaining questions, especially those within 
the same group. To reduce this similarity, the researcher synthesised questions with similar meanings 
into a single question. Table 5-1 shows an example of this process, where five questions were 
synthesised into one question. After this step was finished, there were 109 questions (Appendix G, 
p.237). 
Table 5-1 Example of Process for Reducing Overlap Between Questions 
Questions informed by thematic analysis of focus group data  Synthesised question    
Do you ask for help from other members of the team when you are supporting 
the behaviour of a challenging patient? 
Do you feel confident 
knowing when to escalate a 
patient with challenging 
behaviour? 
 
Do you know when to ask for help with a challenging patient? 
When you are getting frustrated with a challenging patient do you tell someone 
else? 
Do you know when to ask for help with challenging patients or patients with 





5.2.1.5 Step Five – Review Questions for Representation of Focus Group Discussion and RE 
Theory 
 
In collaboration with supervisors and subject experts, the researcher reviewed how well the questions 
represented the focus group discussions. Some questions represented elements of discussion that had 
only been raised once, whereas some questions represented core themes which continually emerged. 
The researcher removed 55 questions which did not represent the core themes of the discussions 
(Appendix H, p.240). 54 questions remained.  
 
5.2.1.6 Step Six – Send Questions to Expert Group for Review    
 
The expert group were asked to review the remaining 54 questions for relevance to their everyday 
clinical work and the accessibility of the language for the wider nursing population on the AMU. The 
researcher sent expert group an online survey (Appendix I, p.242) and emphasised reviewing the 
questions from a system rather than individual perspective. The survey asked the expert group to rate 
the questions according to a four-point Likert scale from ‘Definitely don’t include’ to ‘Definitely include’. 
Each question had a suggestion box, which the expert group could use to provide feedback about the 
questions. Figure 5-4 shows an example of how these questions were presented to the focus group 
participants. Seven out of the fifteen focus group participants completed this survey. Many commented 
that there should be fewer questions. Questions with a median score of four (representing ‘Definitely 













5.2.1.7 Step Seven – Edit Questions into Survey Format and Review Representation of Resilient 
Healthcare Theory  
 
Self-administered surveys should be clear and simple because researchers are not present whilst 
participants complete them (de Vaus et al, 2013). The researcher edited the questions to ensure that 
the survey items were unambiguous and representative of resilient healthcare theory (Krosnick et al, 
2014). This was an iterative process, involving several cycles of editing and reflection, which involved 
the researcher and supervisors. Four of the items became increasingly less relevant to resilience 
engineering theory as they were edited, and the researcher removed these from the survey.   
 
There were five response categories for each survey item because this provided sufficient measure of 
intensity and direction of opinion, without overloading the respondent with too many choices and 
increasing the risk of item non-response (Krosnick et al, 2014). The five response categories were 
‘Poor’, ‘Fair’, ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ and ‘Excellent’.   
 
Most of the discussion in the focus groups was about activities associated with responding, with less 
discussion about monitoring or anticipating and very little discussion about learning. The little discussion 
about learning was focused on learning from things that had gone wrong. Using the focus groups as a 
basis for developing survey items risks reinforcing the status quo, since the survey could only then 
represent the current state of the system, not what should be there. To reduce the effects of this 
limitation, resilience engineering theory was used to add questions about learning. Since learning is 
one of the four resilience attributes and central to the RAG framework for analysing organisational 
resilience, the researcher and supervisors decided that learning from things that go right should be 
represented in the survey items. Five additional items were developed by the researcher and 
supervisors to represent learning. These items were informed by resilience engineering theory and local 
knowledge of the clinical area:   
1. Communicating the learning from things that have gone well, despite challenges 
2. Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
3. Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
4. Reporting adverse incidents e.g. patient fall, aggressive behaviour, medicine administration 
error 




In total, there were 37 survey items. 
 
5.2.1.8 Step Eight – Review by Faculty Statistician  
 
The Faculty statistician reviewed the survey and provided feedback to improve its layout. This included 
randomising the items, so they were not presented in order of responding, monitoring, learning and 
anticipating, and advice about the layout of the initial demographic questions. The college statistician 
and researcher developed a data analysis plan (presented in 5.2.3 Data Analysis p.133). 
 
5.2.1.9 Step Nine – Pilot Testing  
 
Three members of the nursing team (not involved in initial focus groups) pilot tested the survey. The 
researcher asked them to complete the survey, encouraged them to ‘think aloud’ and verbalise their 
thoughts as they completed the survey (Krosnick et al, 2014). Several items were edited in response to 
their feedback to make them more accessible to nursing staff on the AMU. 
 
The final survey had three demographic questions asking the participant’s role, how long they had been 
qualified and how long they had been working on the AMU. As well as 37 items about responding, 
monitoring, learning and anticipating activities on the AMU. There were 23 items about responding, six 
items about monitoring, five items about learning and three items about anticipating (Appendix K p.263).  
 
5.2.2 Data collection  
 
The survey was administered to the whole the AMU nursing population (n=77). Data collection lasted 
four weeks. Nursing staff were sent an initial email explaining the context of the study and asking them 
to complete a survey, this email contained a link to complete the survey online. Paper versions of the 
survey were placed in a labelled box at the main nursing station on the AMU. The researcher visited 
the unit in the evenings, four times a week to ask nursing staff to complete a survey. This was a good 




In total 55 surveys were completed, 13 surveys were completed online, and 42 surveys were completed 
on paper. Only two participants provided incomplete survey responses and the missing data were 
treated as missing completely at random. They were handled using pairwise deletion. All statistical 
analysis was done with IBM SPSS Statistics 24.  
 
5.2.3 Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis plan developed with the college statistician recognised that the small population size 
(n=77) limited the statistical tests of the survey data. There were five parts to the data analysis plan: 
 
1. Calculate the total number of participants in each sub-group of the survey population by 
nursing role, length of time qualified and length of time on the AMU. 
2. Calculate the Cronbach’s Alpha for all items and for each of the four resilience abilities.  
3. Calculate a mean score for all items, for each of the four resilience and for each individual 
item. 
4. Compare the overall mean scores of each of the four resilience abilities with the mean scores 
for each sub-group in the survey population  
5. Calculate a correlation matrix of all the survey items to explore relationships between them.  
 
The Likert style data were treated as ordinal because the difference between ‘poor’ and ‘fair’ cannot 
necessarily be treated as the same size as the difference between ‘very good’ and ‘excellent’. So, the 
researcher used Spearman’s rank order correlation test to explore relationships between participants’ 
views (Bryman & Cramer, 2012). 
 
The small population size meant it was inappropriate to conduct psychometric testing or inferential 
statistical analysis on the survey data. However, this was not considered a limiting factor for this 
process. The data analysis plan aligned with the aims of this quantitative phase of the study by focusing 
on exploring the views of the wider AMU nursing population about how well the system could respond, 
monitor, learn and anticipate. It also examined the relationships between these views and the scores 
of the survey items to try and uncover some of the complexity of system performance on the AMU. 
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Further data analysis was not necessary for achieving these aims and was not considered to align with 
resilience engineering theory.  
 
5.3 Findings  
 
5.3.1 Study population  
 
The response rate was 71%, with 55 out of 77 of the AMU nursing population represented in the survey 
results. Table 5-2 shows the different staff groups of the study population, Table 5-3 shows the length 
of time the study population had been qualified by staff group and Table 5-4 shows the length of time 
the study population had worked on the AMU by staff group. 
 
Table 5-2 Nursing Staff Groups of the Study Population 
Staff Group Number of staff who 
completed surveys   
Number of 
staff on AMU 
Percent of staff 
group 
Nursing Assistant (Band 2-3) 14 21 66.7% 
Staff Nurse (Band 5) 23 27 85% 
Senior Staff Nurse (Band 5) 8 12 66.7% 
Junior Sister/Charge Nurse (Band 6) 6 9 66.7% 
Deputy Ward Manager (Band 6)/ Ward 
Manager (Band 7) 
4 8 50% 
Total 55 77 71.4% 
Note. Refer to Table 3-1, p.83 to clarify the different roles and responsibilities of the AMU nursing team  
 
 
Table 5-3 Length of Time Qualified by Staff Group 












year to 2 
years 
From 3 







2 2 2 7 1 14  25.5% 
Staff Nurse (Band 5) 10 7 3 2 1 23  41.8% 
Senior Staff Nurse 
(Band 5) 
1 4 2 1 - 8  14.5% 
Junior Sister/Charge 
Nurse (Band 6) 
- - 2 4 - 6  10.9% 
Deputy Ward 
Manager (Band 6)/ 
Ward Manager 
(Band 7) 






Table 5-4 Length of Time on the AMU by Staff Group 











year to 2 
years 
From 3 






5 4 3 2 - 14  25.5% 
Staff Nurse (Band 
5) 
15 7 - - 1 23  25.5% 
Senior Staff Nurse 
(Band 5) 
- 7 - 1 - 8  14.5% 
Junior 
Sister/Charge 
Nurse (Band 6) 
- 1 3 2 - 6  10.9% 
Deputy Ward 
Manager (Band 6)/ 
Ward Manager 
(Band 7) 
- 1 1 2 - 4 7.3% 
 
There was good distribution of nursing staff at different grades, which was important for gaining different 
perspectives on the system. The staff nurses and senior staff nurses were the most well represented. 
The nursing assistants and deputy ward manager/ward manager groups were the least well 
represented. Most participants were junior nursing staff and had worked on the AMU for a short time. 
This suggested there was a junior nursing workforce on the AMU. 
 
5.3.2  Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, Cronbach’s Alphas for the Four Resilience Abilities 
 
Table 5-5 shows the overall mean score for all survey items (including standard deviation), the mean 
scores for the four resilience abilities (including standard deviation), and the overall Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient for all survey items and for the four resilience abilities.  
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Item Mean (SD) Range 
All Items 37 0.95 - 3.75 (0.42) 4 
Responding 23 0.91 - 3.84 (0.45) 4 
   Escalating a deteriorating patient to the multi-disciplinary team 4.50 (0.77) 3 
   Knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating 4.37 (0.83) 3 
   Informing senior nursing colleagues when there are concerns about a patient 4.33 (0.80) 3 
   Judging when to escalate a patient to more senior colleagues if the clinical picture is 
unclear 
4.22 (0.83) 4 
   Identifying the causes of challenging behaviour e.g. Delirium, dementia, withdrawal 4.11 (0.85) 3 
   Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague earlier than the 
National Early Warning Score (NEWS) recommends 
4.09 (0.78) 3 
   Working effectively as a team 4.07 (0.90) 4 
   Supporting colleagues when responding to aggressive patients 4.06 (1.00) 4 
   Handing over a patient with challenging behaviour to the next shift 4.06 (0.83) 3 
   Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the Emergency Department 
when they have not yet been seen by a medical team 
4.02 (0.94) 3 
   Identifying the causes of a patient’s clinical deterioration 3.96 (0.73) 3 
   Informing all members of the nursing team in a zone about a patient with challenging 
behaviour 
3.96 (0.98) 4 
   Raising concerns about discharging a patient home if this is unsafe 3.94 (0.83) 4 
   Knowing what to do if the medical team’s response to escalating a deteriorating patient 
is insufficient 
3.87 (0.91) 3 
   Supporting staff to develop new skills 3.87 (1.03) 4 
   Coordinating with the multidisciplinary team to facilitate the complex discharge of a 
patient 
3.83 (0.80) 3 
   Communicating with all members of the nursing team about patient care during a shift 3.80 (0.87) 3 














Item Mean (SD) Range 
Responding 23 0.91 - 3.84 (0.45) 4 
   Agreeing the allocation of tasks between colleagues working in the same bay 3.56 (0.88) 4 
   Supporting patients with mental health needs 3.31 (1.04) 4 
   Changing staffing allocation during a shift in response to changed workloads 3.15 (1.20) 4 
   Involving nursing team members in assessing a patient’s mental capacity 3.07 (1.10) 4 
   Including registered mental health nurses (RMNs) during handover to support a patient 
with mental health needs 
2.59 (1.24) 4 
Monitoring 6 0.76 - 3.41 (0.35) 4 
   Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help 3.80 (0.82) 4 
   As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift 3.71 (0.85) 3 
   Having huddles to understand the workload of the zone 3.53 (0.81) 4 
   Informing team members when there are new admissions coming into the zone 3.42 (1.01) 4 
   Coordinating patient transfers from different zones to the same destination 3.02 (1.11) 4 
   Knowing how busy other zones are compared to yours 2.96 (0.98) 4 
Learning 5 0.80 - 3.70 (0.19) 4 
   Reporting adverse incidents e.g. patient fall, aggressive behaviour, medicine 
administration error 
4.02 (0.84) 3 
   Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 3.72 (1.01) 4 
   Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well 3.61 (0.92) 4 
   Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 3.57 (1.07) 4 
   Communicating the learning from things that have gone well, despite challenges 3.57 (1.02) 4 
Anticipating 3 0.73 - 3.79 (0.23) 4 
   Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high 4.02 (1.01) 4 
   Providing the right information to appropriately prepare for new admissions 3.80 (0.81) 3 




It was clear that nursing staff considered the AMU to be most effective at responding (3.84) and 
least effective at monitoring (3.41), with anticipating (3.79) and learning (3.70) between them. The 
items with the highest mean scores were responding items associated with escalating and 
managing deteriorating patients. The items with the lowest mean scores were responding items 
associated with supporting mental health patients.  
 
Cronbach’s Alpha values from 0.7 to 0.8 were considered to show good levels of internal 
consistency (Bland & Altman, 1997; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Cronbach’s Alpha values greater 
than 0.9 were considered high, suggesting redundancy between survey items (Tavakol & 
Dennick, 2011, John & Benet-Martinez, 2014). Responding items had a high level of internal 
consistency (α .91). The other resilience abilities, monitoring (α .76), learning (α .80) and 
anticipating (α .73) demonstrated good levels of internal consistency.  
 
5.3.3 Comparing Mean Resilience Scores for Sub groups of the AMU Nursing Population  
 
Table 5-6 compares the overall mean scores for the four resilience abilities with the mean scores 
of each of the sub-groups of the nursing population. The results show that junior staff nurses rated 
the AMU’s ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate lower than the senior nursing staff.  
 

















Responding 3.84 3.77 3.89 3.77 3.79 4.07 
Monitoring 3.41 3.52 3.37 3.23 3.28 3.83 
Learning 3.70 3.73 3.70 3.53 3.63 4.00 
Anticipating 3.79 3.76 3.82 3.63 3.72 4.17 
 
Table 5-7 compares the overall mean score for the four resilience abilities with the mean scores 
of each of the sub-groups of nursing staff by the length of time they had been qualified. Nursing 
staff that had been qualified from one to two years reported the lowest mean scores for all four 










than 1 year 
Qualified from 1 
year to 2 years 
Qualified from 3 




Responding 3.84 3.98 3.72 3.94 3.78 
Monitoring 3.41 3.51 3.13 3.48 3.52 
Learning 3.70 3.69 3.48 3.80 3.83 
Anticipating 3.79 3.90 3.38 4.17 3.80 
 
Table 5-8 compares the overall mean score of the four resilience abilities with the mean scores 
of each of the sub-groups of nursing staff by length of time they had worked on the AMU. Nursing 
staff that have worked on the unit from three to four years reported the highest mean score for all 
four resilience attributes.  
 
Table 5-8 Resilience Ability Mean Scores by Length of Time on the AMU 
Subscale  Overall 
mean 
score 
Worked on the 




from 1 year 
up to 2 years 
Worked on the 
ward from 3 
years up to 4 
years 
Worked on the 
ward 5 years + 
(since it opened) 
Responding 3.84 3.80 3.81 4.16 3.75 
Monitoring 3.41 3.30 3.32 3.93 3.43 
Learning 3.70 3.60 3.68 4.03 3.68 
Anticipating 3.79 3.65 3.87 4.19 3.57 
 
The tables show that the senior staff nurses, who had been qualified and worked on the AMU for 
one to two years reported the lowest scores for the unit’s ability to respond, monitor, learn and 
anticipate. These were the senior band five staff nurses, who were regularly the NIC of a zone. 
They focused on coordinating nursing work in a zone and were often involved with the most unwell 
or challenging patients. The deputy ward managers/ward managers reported the highest mean 
scores for the AMU’s ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. Generally, it was the most 
senior nurses who had worked on the unit the longest who rated the AMU’s ability to conduct the 
four resilience abilities the highest. The longer a nurse worked on the unit, the higher rating they 
gave the unit to conduct the four resilience abilities. 
 
5.3.4 Correlations Between Survey Items 
 
The researcher used Spearman’s rank order correlation test to examine relationships between 
the 37 survey items as recommended for ordinal data (Bryman & Cramer, 2012). The researcher 




the relationship between survey items; a small association was 0.1, a medium association was 
0.3 and a large association was 0.5 (Cohen, 1988). All the associations were positive. There were 
a considerable number of small and medium associations. There were fewer large associations 
and the analysis focused on these larger associations because they provided a more reliable 
insight into the relationships between the survey items. The complete correlation matrix can be 
found in Appendix L, p.269. Including it in this section was too cumbersome, instead tables of the 
survey items with large associations for each of the four resilience abilities are presented below.  
Table 5-9 shows the responding items with correlations greater than 0.5.  
 
Table 5-9 Correlations Greater Than 0.5 Between Responding Items and Other Survey Items 
Responding Survey Items Survey items with greater than 0.5 correlations (Resilience attribute) 
Judging when to escalate a 
patient to more senior 
colleagues if the clinical 
picture is unclear 
Escalating a deteriorating patient to the multi-disciplinary team (responding)  
Informing senior nursing colleagues when there are concerns about a 
patient (responding) 
Reporting adverse incidents e.g. patient fall, aggressive behaviour, 
medicine administration error (learning) 
Coordinating with the 
multidisciplinary team to 
facilitate the complex 
discharge of a patient 
Changing staffing allocation during a shift in response to changed 
workloads (responding) 
Escalating a deteriorating 
patient to the multi-
disciplinary team 
Identifying the causes of a patient’s clinical deterioration (responding) 
Knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating (responding) 
Informing senior nursing colleagues when there are concerns about a 
patient (responding) 
Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the Emergency 
Department when they have not yet been seen by a medical team 
(responding) 
Knowing what to do if the 
medical team’s response to 
escalating a deteriorating 
patient is insufficient 
Knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating (responding) 
Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the Emergency 
Department when they have not yet been seen by a medical team 
(responding) 
 
Involving nursing team 
members in assessing a 
patient’s mental capacity 
Supporting patients with mental health needs (responding) 
Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well 
(learning) 
Identifying the causes of a 
patient’s clinical deterioration 
Knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating (responding) 
Identifying the causes of challenging behaviour e.g. Delirium, dementia, 
withdrawal (responding) 
Providing additional help if 
someone has too much to do 
Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague earlier 
than the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) recommends (responding) 
Communicating with all members of the nursing team about patient care 
during a shift (responding) 
Working effectively as a team (responding) 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
Informing team members when there are new admissions coming into the 
zone (monitoring) 
Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well 
(learning) 




Changing staffing allocation 
during a shift in response to 
changed workloads 
Identifying the causes of challenging behaviour e.g. Delirium, dementia, 
withdrawal (responding) 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift (monitoring) 
Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
(learning) 
Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well 
(learning) 
Reporting adverse incidents e.g. patient fall, aggressive behaviour, 
medicine administration error (learning) 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
Knowing what to do when a 
patient is deteriorating 
Informing senior nursing colleagues when there are concerns about a 
patient (responding) 
Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the Emergency 
Department when they have not yet been seen by a medical team 
(responding) 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift (monitoring) 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high (anticipating) 
Identifying the causes of 
challenging behaviour e.g. 
Delirium, dementia, 
withdrawal 
Working effectively as a team (responding) 
Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
(learning) 
Including registered mental 
health nurses (RMNs) during 
handover to support a 
patient with mental health 
needs 
Supporting patients with mental health needs (responding) 
Informing senior nursing 
colleagues when there are 
concerns about a patient 
Informing all members of the nursing team in a zone about a patient with 
challenging behaviour (responding) 
Supporting staff to develop new skills (responding) 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high (anticipating) 
Supporting colleagues when 
responding to aggressive 
patients 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
Supporting patients with 
mental health needs 
Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) (learning) 
Escalating deteriorating 
patients who have just 
arrived from the Emergency 
Department when they have 
not yet been seen by a 
medical team 
Handing over a patient with challenging behaviour to the next shift 
(responding) 
Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague earlier 
than the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) recommends (responding) 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift (monitoring) 
Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) (learning) 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high (anticipating) 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
Handing over a patient with 
challenging behaviour to the 
next shift 
Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague earlier 
than the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) recommends (responding) 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift (monitoring) 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high (anticipating) 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
Appropriately escalating a 
deteriorating patient to a 
senior colleague earlier than 
the National Early Warning 
Score (NEWS) recommends 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift (monitoring) 
Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well 
(learning) 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
Working effectively as a 
team 
Supporting staff to develop new skills (responding) 




Informing all members of the 
nursing team in a zone about 
a patient with challenging 
behaviour 
Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) (learning) 
Communicating the learning from things that have gone well, despite 
challenges (learning) 
Supporting staff to develop 
new skills 
Agreeing the allocation of tasks between colleagues working in the same 
bay (responding) 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
Agreeing the allocation of 
tasks between colleagues 
working in the same bay 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well 
(learning) 
 
From the table, it can be seen there are complex, relationships between the responding survey 
items. For instance, the responding item Escalating a deteriorating patient to the multi-disciplinary 
team has large associations with other responding items and this suggests that escalating a 
deteriorating patient to the multidisciplinary team effectively means the nursing staff need to know 
when a patient is deteriorating, who they should escalate to and when they should do it. 
Responding activities are often strongly associated with a web of interrelated activities. Doing one 
of these activities effectively depended on doing a group of them effectively. And people seemed 
to think that if the unit was good at one of them, it was good at all of them. 
 
These relationships become more complex when considering the large associations between 
responding survey items and survey items associated with the other resilience abilities. For 
example, the responding item Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the 
Emergency Department when they have not yet been seen by a medical team had large 
associations with two responding items, one monitoring item, one learning item and two 
anticipating items. This suggests that to effectively escalate a deteriorating patient who has just 
arrived from the ED, the unit needs systems to monitor when it needs to adapt to new clinical 
priorities, communicate the learning when these things have happened in the past and anticipate 
what this will mean for the nursing staff on the next shift. This supports the view that the four 
resilience abilities are interrelated (Hollnagel, 2010). The four abilities do not happen in isolation 
and support each other’s effectiveness.  
 
There was a clear direction for the relationship between monitoring survey items and anticipating 
survey items. Monitoring survey items only had large associations with anticipating items. Table 





Table 5-10 Correlations Greater Than 0.5 Between Monitoring Items and Other Survey Items 
Monitoring Survey Items Survey items with greater than 0.5 correlations (Resilience attribute) 
Knowing when nursing 
colleagues in your zone need 
help 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high 
(anticipating) 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
As a zone, adapting to changed 
priorities throughout the shift 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high 
(anticipating) 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
Knowing how busy other zones 
are compared to yours 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating) 
Informing team members when 
there are new admissions 
coming into the zone 
Providing the right information to appropriately prepare for new 
admissions (anticipating) 
 
Learning items had large associations with other learning items and responding items. Table 5-11 
shows the Learning items with correlations greater than 0.5.   
 
Table 5-11 Correlations Greater Than 0.5 Between Learning Items and Other Survey Items 
Learning Survey Items Survey items with greater than 0.5 correlations (Resilience attribute) 
Communicating the learning 
from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
Communicating the learning from things that have gone well, despite 
challenges (learning) 
Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports 
(Datix/IR1) (learning) 
Communicating the learning 
from things that have gone well, 
despite challenges 
Informing all members of the nursing team in a zone about a patient 
with challenging behaviour (responding) 
Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
(learning) 
Changing practice in response 
to learning from incident reports 
(Datix/IR1) 
Changing staffing allocation during a shift in response to changed 
workloads (responding) 
Including registered mental health nurses (RMNs) during handover to 
support a patient with mental health needs (responding) 
Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) 
(learning) 
Communicating the learning from things that have gone well, despite 
challenges (learning) 
Changing practice in response 
to learning from things that have 
gone well 
Involving nursing team members in assessing a patient’s mental 
capacity (responding)  
Providing additional help if someone has too much to do (responding) 
Changing staffing allocation during a shift in response to changed 
workloads (responding) 
Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague 
earlier than the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) recommends 
(responding) 
Agreeing the allocation of tasks between colleagues working in the 
same bay (responding) 
Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports 
(Datix/IR1) (learning) 
Reporting adverse incidents e.g. 
patient fall, aggressive 
behaviour, medicine 
administration error 
Judging when to escalate a patient to more senior colleagues if the 
clinical picture is unclear (responding) 






The learning items associated with changing practice demonstrated more complex relationships 
with other survey items than the items associated with communicating learning. This suggests 
that changing practice is a more complex activity than communicating learning.  
 
Anticipating items had large associations with other anticipating items, responding items and 
monitoring items. Table 5-12 shows the anticipating items with correlations greater than 0.5.   
 
Table 5-12 Correlations Greater Than 0.5 Between Anticipating Items and Other Survey Items 
Anticipating Survey Items Survey items with greater than 0.5 correlations (Resilience attribute) 
Identifying when the 
workload on the next shift 
will be high 
Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift (anticipating)  
Taking action to reduce 
workload for the next shift 
Providing additional help if someone has too much to do (responding) 
Changing staffing allocation during a shift in response to changed 
workloads (responding) 
Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the Emergency 
Department when they have not yet been seen by a medical team 
(responding) 
Handing over a patient with challenging behaviour to the next shift 
(responding) 
Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague earlier 
than the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) recommends (responding) 
Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help (monitoring) 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift (monitoring) 
Knowing how busy other zones are compared to yours (monitoring) 
Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high (anticipating) 
Providing the right 
information to appropriately 
prepare for new admissions 
Informing team members when there are new admissions coming into the 
zone (monitoring) 
 
The item Taking action to reduce workload for the next shift had more strong associations with 
other survey items than the other anticipating survey items.  
 
5.4 Discussion  
 
Phase two explored the research question ‘How can the development of responding, monitoring, 
learning and anticipating survey items be informed by accounts of Work-As-Done?’. The aim of 
phase two was to develop survey items from the focus group data, administer the survey to the 
AMU nursing population and analyse the results. The beginning of phase two showed that it was 
feasible to develop a replicable, systematic process for generating responding, monitoring, 




survey results provided new insights for understanding resilient system performance on the AMU, 
building on the detailed accounts of everyday clinical work from the focus groups in phase one to 
reach a more comprehensive picture of resilient healthcare on the AMU. It was clear that nursing 
staff thought the AMU was the most effective at responding, the least effective at monitoring, with 
learning and anticipating somewhere in between. The survey results showed that there were 
consistent differences in opinion between the different nursing sub-groups. The results also 
provided insights into the conceptual relationship between the four resilience abilities, adding 
further support for their intricate interrelatedness (Hollnagel, 2015). 
 
This study showed it is feasible to develop a systematic and replicable process for generating 
responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items specific to a given healthcare 
system. There are clearly documented outcomes at each step and this means that other 
researchers or healthcare professionals could generate survey items for their healthcare system 
by following the same process. However, there is a strong imbalance in the number of items for 
each of the four resilience abilities. The focus group discussions in phase one suggest that most 
of the nursing work on the AMU is about responding and this means that most of the survey items 
are about responding. The survey results indicate how much the system (from a nursing 
perspective) focuses on responding and the AMU does not have a balance between the four 
resilience abilities. Theoretically, this limits the AMU’s potential for resilient performance 
(Hollnagel, 2010). However, it is unclear what the balance of the four resilience abilities should 
be. Resilience engineering theory recognises that different systems need different balances 
between the four resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 2010), but it does not provide any suggestion for 
understanding what the balance needs to be for a given system. This diagnostic element of the 
process is something that previous applications of the RAG have been unable to achieve. The 
original questions (Appendix A, p.210) had a balance between the four resilience abilities and 
previous applications informed by this approach (Hunte, 2016; Engvall, 2017), had similar 
numbers of questions for each of the four resilience abilities. By generating survey items from 
discussions with frontline healthcare professionals, the number of survey items themselves are 





Generating survey items from focus group discussion is challenging when participants’ views are 
constrained by their current experiences. This was evident when generating the learning survey 
items. Learning is one of the four resilience attributes and central to the potential for resilient 
performance (Hollnagel, 2010). However, when this was raised in the focus group discussions 
there was a poor response. This meant that focus group discussions were not an effective source 
for generating the sorts of learning items associated with resilience engineering theory. In this 
case, the researcher turned to resilience engineering theory and expert opinion to develop 
appropriate learning survey items from a resilience engineering perspective. This suggests that 
in the future, resilience engineering theory can inform the shortfall for developing survey items.  
 
The survey results provide further insights into resilient healthcare on the AMU. In phase one, the 
focus groups provided rich, detailed accounts of how nursing staff manage the complexity of their 
everyday clinical work. The survey results from phase two built on these accounts and 
demonstrate that nursing staff believe the AMU is most effective at responding and least effective 
at monitoring. Additionally, the results show that nursing staff believe the AMU is not uniformly 
effective at all responding activities. This suggests that the survey items captured intricacies of 
system performance in a way that the focus groups could not. There is a high level of face validity 
because the results fit the narrative of the focus group discussions. There is also high levels of 
internal consistency. This supports the value of data triangulation with qualitative and quantitative 
research methods for exploring resilient healthcare (Berg et al, 2018). It also shows that it is 
possible to use quantitative methods for exploring resilient healthcare that align with resilience 
engineering theory and do not reduce this complex, nuanced concept to simple numerical metrics.  
 
However, there was only 0.43 between the highest ranking and the lowest ranking resilience 
ability. This is not a statistically significant result. Using the statistical values in isolation, it is not 
clear how much of a meaningful differentiation this allows between how well nursing staff thought 
the four resilience abilities are conducted on the ward. This could potentially be a limitation and 
is a common difficulty of studying improvement in clinical micro systems. However, the aim of the 
survey was primarily to allow the whole nursing population on the AMU to participate in the 
process and engage with quality improvement. The question of whether this justifies the resources 




exploratory nature of the study. There is little understanding about how much this is related to this 
particular application of the process, or whether this is a limitation of the design of the process. 
For example, this might be a consequence of analysing the AMU from the perspective of the 
nursing staff. If this same process was applied to a different clinical setting or developed with a 
broader range of healthcare disciplines, perhaps there would be a more meaningful statistical 
result.   
  
On the other hand, the survey was not designed to be taken out of context and provide a 
comprehensive analysis of organisational resilience on its own. It was designed to be part of a 
three-step process. It is instrumentally, not intrinsically, valuable. The intention was that it could 
support the next stage of discussion and reflection in the final phase of the analytical process 
(Chapter 6 – Phase Three). The intention was not to take the survey out of context and reduce 
the four abilities to numerical values. This was a limitation of so many of the previous attempts at 
analysing or measuring organisational resilience (See Chapter 2 Narrative Review– Discussion). 
It could be argued that it is possible to remove the survey from this process of analysing 
organisational resilience of a healthcare system and use the focus groups from phase one and 
then the reflection in phase three to analyse a healthcare system. However, the value of the 
survey was providing direction to the reflection in phase three (See 6.3, p.153). Given there is still 
so much that is unknown about the process, further testing is required for any refinement.  
 
There are consistent differences in opinion between junior and senior nursing staff on the AMU.  
Junior nursing staff are consistently more sceptical of the AMU’s ability to respond, monitor, learn 
or anticipate than the senior nursing staff (including the management team). This shows that 
different people have different experiences, and this highlights the importance of capturing the 
views of everyone in the nursing population. This supports the narrative in the focus group 
discussions, which suggested that the less experienced staff are more involved with responding 
activities, whereas the senior nursing staff are involved with monitoring and anticipating activities 
(from a system perspective). Perhaps it is difficult for juniors to know about the activities they are 
not regularly involved in them and so are unaware of how well they are done in practice or perhaps 
senior nursing staff have a more realistic understanding of what is achievable in the context of 





Exploring the correlations between the survey items provides insight into the complex 
relationships between the responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating activities. Alongside 
the findings from phase one, this provides further support to the theoretical proposal that the four 
resilience abilities are interrelated (Hollnagel, 2010; Hollnagel, 2015). The results show that 
responding, the most comprehensive of the four resilience abilities, is strongly associated with 
monitoring, learning and anticipating. Suggesting that for the system to respond well, it needs to 
monitor, learn and anticipate well. The survey results also show that the nursing staff do not think 
the AMU is uniformly effective at all responding activities, but that it is effective at responding to 
clinically unwell patients and not to mental health patients. Even within the same resilience ability, 
there are complex relationships between the different groups of activities.   
 
On the other hand, monitoring has a much more direct relationship with anticipating. Other than 
suggest the resilience abilities are interrelated, Hollnagel does not provide much more detail about 
the relationship between them (Hollnagel et al 2006; Hollnagel, 2010). It is unclear what these 
relationships mean for the potential for resilient performance. For example, the survey results 
show that nursing staff think the AMU is least effective at monitoring and it is the only resilience 
ability to have such a direct association with another resilience ability (anticipating). There is little 
evidence in the literature of detailed explorations of the relationship between the four resilience 
abilities (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015), so it is unclear what this might mean. Conceptually, 
it makes sense that there is a more direct relationship between anticipating and monitoring than 
the other resilience abilities. However, resilience engineering theory suggests that there should 
be a balance between the four resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 2010). Perhaps the relationship 
between monitoring and anticipating is an indication that in its current form the system is not 
particularly resilient and there needs to be a better balance between the four resilience abilities.  
 
Phase two showed it was feasible to generate survey items grounded in the views of healthcare 
staff, which explored everyday clinical work and provided useful insights for analysing resilient 
healthcare. The survey results provided insights into the differences between the perspectives 




this was the case. In phase three, the next steps are to find out about why the nursing staff feel 
this way and how they might consider improving the system.  
 
5.5 Reflexivity  
 
Developing the process for generating responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating 
questions was the most challenging element of this part of the research. The volume of data from 
the focus groups was overwhelming and it was difficult to cast aside elements of the discussion, 
because it included such valuable accounts of everyday clinical work. However, it was clear from 
the start that most of the data should be discarded and only the very core of the focus group 
discussion could be represented in the survey. The whole process was developed with 
replicability in mind, so documenting and taking notes at each step was necessary. The effective 
collaboration with the expert group in phase one was essential for question development, because 
they could corroborate what should be included in the survey. Their feedback was vital for 
ensuring the survey items were representative of focus group discussions, relevant to resilience 
engineering theory and accessible to nursing staff. This level of corroboration was only possible 
because of the trust developed during the research design and the collaboration in the focus 
groups.    
 
Administering the survey was difficult because of the busy nature of the work on the AMU. The 
participants who completed the survey online were people who were most engaged at work and 
regularly read their work emails. Participants who completed surveys online did so within one 
week. However, this was only a small number of nursing population on the AMU. Most staff 
needed prompting to complete a paper survey. The demands of the clinical work on the AMU 
were such that if the researcher did not visit the ward regularly and prompt people to complete a 
survey daily, then there would have been a much lower response rate. This challenged the 
researcher’s relationship with the gatekeepers of the AMU. The researcher was often on the unit 
in the evenings and several times the gatekeepers made sure that the researcher was not 
interrupting clinical work when asking people to complete surveys. The researcher’s experience 




best times to ask nursing staff to complete a survey. It was only the combination of persistence, 
local knowledge and pre-existing relationships with nursing staff and gatekeepers that allowed 







Chapter 6 – Phase Three – Reflecting on Survey Results  
 
Phase three explored the research question ‘How can the results of applying the Resilience 
Analysis Grid inform quality improvement?’ The aim of phase three was to support nursing staff 
to reflect on the survey results, identify potential system improvements on the AMU and compare 
these perspectives with the ward management team’s current safety and quality priorities. This 
provided understanding about whether using a resilience engineering perspective to understand 
system performance focused attention on previously neglected areas. By supporting nursing staff 
to reflect on the survey results, further insights were gained into the complexity of resilient 
healthcare on the AMU. 
 
6.1 Design  
 
There were two parts to this qualitative study. For the first part, the researcher used semi-
structured interviews and one group interview to facilitate the expert group (recruited in phase 
one) to reflect on the survey results and identify system level interventions to improve the potential 
for resilient system performance on the AMU. The researcher used thematic analysis to explore 
this interview data. For the second part, the researcher used a survey to ask the ward 
management team about their safety and quality priorities to compare their perspectives with the 
survey results and expert group’s reflections.  
 
6.2 Method  
6.2.1 Participants  
 
For the first part of the study, the participants were the expert group recruited in phase one. The 
intention was to use the same expert group participants throughout the three phases of the 
research design for continuity. However, there was high turnover of nursing staff between the 
three phases of the study. To ensure there remained adequate representation of the range of 
nursing roles of the AMU, the researcher recruited three additional staff nurses by approaching 




participants for the semi structured interviews: one healthcare assistant, three staff nurses, two 
junior sisters and one deputy ward manager.  
 
For the second part of the study, the participants were the deputy ward managers and ward 
managers on the AMU. Purposive sampling was used to recruit one ward manager and two 
deputy ward managers to complete a simple survey exploring their safety and quality priorities for 
the AMU.  
 
6.2.2 Data Collection  
 
There were four semi structured interviews with individual members of nursing staff which lasted 
between twenty and thirty minutes. An opportunity arose to simultaneously interview all three of 
the staff nurses and this group interview lasted fifty minutes. The researcher used a list of the 
survey items, grouped into responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating, in order of mean 
score (highest to lowest) as an interview topic guide (Appendix M, p.272). During the interviews, 
nursing staff were asked to read through the items, describe what they thought about the order, 
explain why they thought the surveys items were ordered in that way and identify ways that these 
activities could be improved. The researcher encouraged them to consider improvements from a 
systems perspective, rather than an individual perspective. The interviews were conducted in a 
coffee shop on the hospital grounds, before the participants started a night shift. All participants 
gave their consent to be recorded and the interviews were recorded on the researcher’s phone.  
 
The ward managers were extremely busy, and it was challenging to support them to complete a 
survey. The researcher used opportunities when the ward managers were less busy to ask them 
the survey questions. The survey asked the ward management team to list three safety and 
quality priorities for the AMU (Appendix N, p.274).  
 
6.2.3 Data Analysis  
 
The researcher conducted a descriptive analysis of the interview data. This was much less 




descriptive analysis were to identify reasons nursing staff agreed with or were surprised by the 
survey results from phase two and capture any suggested interventions to improve system 
performance. The themes were examined at a semantic level, which focused on the explicit 
meaning of the discussion and was informed by Braun and Clarke’s (2006) analysis framework.  
 
The analysis started with data transcription and the researcher transcribed all the interview data 
using Tracy’s (2012) transcription guidelines (Appendix C p.216). The researcher took notes 
during transcription to document any ideas about themes or relationships between participant’s 
comments. Then, the researcher read all the transcripts together and made further notes about 
any overarching themes. Following this, the researcher read each transcript in more detail and 
gathered similar comments about survey items and system level interventions for improving 
resilient performance into groups. Each group was then examined to see how it related to the 
individual comments and the transcripts as a whole.  
 
6.3 Findings  
 
There was general agreement with the survey results, with only a few participants expressing 
surprise about the mean scores for some of the survey items. Most of the discussion in the 
interviews focused on the survey items with the highest and lowest mean scores. The participants 
talked about the responding items the most and there was correspondingly less discussion about 
monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items. The findings are split into perspectives on 
survey results, suggested interventions for improving potential for resilient performance and the 
ward management team’s safety and quality priorities. 
 
6.3.1 Perspectives on Survey Results  
 
The discussion of the responding survey items focused on managing deteriorating patients and 
supporting mental health patients. These are the highest and lowest scoring survey items 
respectively. There are a range of reasons why nursing staff thought the AMU is effective at 




Table 6-1 Perspectives on why the AMU was effective at managing deteriorating patients 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff 
Nurse  
Many systems in place support 
staff to escalate deteriorating 
patients  
I think it's just reinforced. So much. Because of SBAR1 
… And to do it. To call CRT2. If they're NEWSing3 
above a five. 
Staff 
Nurse  
Frequency of deterioration 
means staff are well versed in 
using the systems    
It's really rare. Where you get one shift. Where. You 
don't escalate anybody… So. Practicing a lot. That's 
probably. Why. It's done well. 
Junior 
Sister 
The systems provide structure 
to support escalation   
Who just. No matter. The experience. Like. To actually 
have a little bit of a structure. So. They can recognise. 
That. Oh wait. Actually. Is this a problem? Before. They 
actually call people. Because. 
Junior 
Sister  
Significant amount of resources 
in place to support effective 
escalation of deteriorating 
patients   
I think th. There's a huge amount of work. Done. With 
that. And the fact that. There's this. Huge. This. Team 
of. CRT and things. That's why. It's very. Very much. In 




Parameters for escalating are 
clear  
I think we are pretty good at that … It gets kind of 
drummed. Into everybody. As soon as they start. 
Escalate as soon as you get to a five. You know. 
Healthcare 
Assistant  
Systems provide effective 
instructions for escalating 
deteriorating patients   
How the thing. Is. Put in place. Like. When someone is 
NEWS scoring. And e noting4 is telling you that 
someone is NEWS scoring. It's telling you what you 
need to do. That you need to escalate that patient to. 
Note. SBAR1: Situation Background Assessment Response – a tool used to structure verbal communication 
CRT2: Clinical Response Team – a team of experienced intensive care trained nurses who support nursing 
staff in ward settings to manage deteriorating patients   
NEWS3: National Early Warning Score – a track and trigger observation tool for deteriorating patients  
E noting4 – IT system for documenting a range of patient information 
 
Nursing staff report they are frequently exposed to deteriorating patients and this means they are 
very familiar with the system responses, such as monitoring guidelines and escalation protocols. 
It also means they have a good understanding of when and how they need to adapt the way they 
use these system responses. For example, increasing the monitoring of a patient sooner than the 
NEWS suggests because of their previous clinical experiences. The nurses staff agree that the 
systems are useful because they provide clear instructions about what to do across a range of 
situations. There is a significant amount of system resources focused on managing deteriorating 
patients, such as the specialised clinical response teams (CRT). Nursing staff suggest that it is 
the combination of the regular exposure to deteriorating patients, frequency with which they use 




mean the AMU is effective at responding to deteriorating patients. Their comments suggest that 
this is the focus of the unit and an integral part of the identify of the AMU. This is a good example 
of how systems can be designed to support effective responding.  
 
There was universal recognition that the low mean scores for supporting mental health patients 
represent the experiences of nursing staff. This is due to a lack of system support and some 
nurses point out how this contrasts with how they feel the AMU manages deteriorating patients 
(Table 6-2).   
 
Table 6-2 Perspectives on why the AMU was not effective at supporting mental health patients 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse  Lack of knowledge about mental 
health affected nurses’ 
confidence  
I think it. Kind of. Reflects. What. Where people’s 
confidence as well. Cos. They won't. Well. I know 
that I don't feel tha:t comfortable. That well. With 
mental health patients. Because. I don't know an 
awful lot about it. 
Staff Nurse Lack of structure to support 
handover of mental health 
patients 
But. (2). I guess it's. How. Do you. Handover. Cos. 
We're so structured. With like. The folder. E noting. 
Medchart1. What they want to know. Probably isn't 
what. What they want to ask. 
Junior 
Sister 
Lack of training about mental 
health affected nurses’ 
confidence  
I'm not surprised … Because. We're not trained. 
Like. I think it's a shame actually. That. Like. In the 
nursing degree. We don't. Actually. Get any. [mental 
health] Training at all. 
Junior 
Sister  
No structure to support the work 
of RMNS or specials  
There's not structure around what RMNs2 and 
specials3 should be doing. 
Junior 
Sister 
Lack of understanding means 
nurses don’t know what RMNs 
should be doing 
From my experiences of working as a mental health 
nurse. The perception of. People. Who have never 
worked as a mental health nurse. May. Never. Have 
been in the hospitals. Don't actually understand. 




Considerable variability between 
individual RMNs   
It depends what RMN. Is on duty. Some of them are 




Considerable variability between 
individual RMNs   
When they are sitting with a patient and the patient 
just. Suddenly. Just. Wants. To walk off or something 
like that. They take a step back. And. They want our 
nurses to go in. And deal with the patient 
Note. Mechart1 – IT system for medication administration 




Specials3 – Individual nursing team member tasked with caring for one patient so that they can be observed 
closely, often because they are delirious or high risk of falls  
 
Nursing staff agree that a lack of knowledge and training is a considerable barrier to supporting 
mental health patients. The nurses who trained in the UK did not receive any formal mental health 
training. The system response for (most) mental health patients is to get the specialist mental 
health team to assess the patient and to put RMNs in place to care for the patient one-to-one. 
The RMNs are employed by a private agency and the unit has to hire them out on a shift by shift 
basis each time a patient with mental health needs is admitted to the unit (as assessed by the 
mental health team). This system response lacks structure and there is considerable variability 
about how well RMNs work with patients. Nurses thought this lack of structure is a barrier to 
supporting mental health patients effectively. This negatively impacted communication with RMNs 
and even with mental health patients. Some of the senior nurses had trained outside of the UK 
and had received formal mental health training as part of their nursing education. They had a 
broader understanding of how healthcare professionals interact with their patients in mental 
health settings and understood that RMNs did not need to be continuously interact with their 
patients during a shift. This further demonstrates how the lack of mental health training limits the 
nurses’ ability to support patients with mental health needs. The combination of no relevant formal 
training, little structure to guide work and variability between mental health professionals meant 
the nursing team are not confident in the AMU’s ability to support mental health patients.  
 
There was a mixed response to the effectiveness of communication between members of the 
nursing team (Table 6-3). Junior nursing staff thought there is effective communication and good 
team work between the nursing team, however senior nurses and healthcare assistants 
recognised there are ongoing problems on the unit with these elements of team working.  
 
Table 6-3 Perspectives on Results for Communicating with Nursing Team Members 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse  Unexpected low score for 
communicating between 
nursing team 
I’m surprised that this is so far down actually. The 
communicating with all members of nursing team 




Staff Nurse  Understanding that healthcare 
assistants have a different 
perspective 
I think. That's. I was just going to say that a lot of 
healthcare assistants voted that lower. 
Junior 
Sister 
Variability in team working from 
day to day 
I think there is a bit of variability. In how well that's 
done. Day to day. 
Junior 
Sister  
Definition of team can change 
depending on who is included  
If you're including in your team. Your RMNs. And your 
specials. I don't think we do that particularly well. 
They're left out on a limb. 
Healthcare 
Assistant  
Variability is due to which 
individuals are working each 
day   
Some days ... What was yesterday? It depends what 
team you have on. And. You just know what kind of 
day you're going to have. 
 
The senior nurses and healthcare assistant suggest that variability in the effectiveness of 
communication between members of the nursing team is due to the constantly changing 
individuals on each shift. Everyone worked in a certain way and when individuals combine into a 
nursing team on a shift, that team works in different ways. This highlights the complexity of team 
working in the dynamic environment on the AMU and the nursing staff suggest this directly 
influences the unit’s potential for resilient performance.  
 
The nursing staff agreed that the low mean scores for monitoring reflected their experiences 
working on the unit, but they also recognised the value of monitoring and suggest it is important 
for managing the challenges of their everyday clinical work (Table 6-4).  
 
Table 6-4 Perspectives on the Challenges with Monitoring on the AMU 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse  Physical layout of the AMU 
limited monitoring  
I think. In. Design of the ward. Doesn't favour. Kind of. 
Knowing. About other zones [areas on the AMU] 
Staff Nurse  More junior nursing team had 
reduced capacity for 
monitoring activities  
When. I. We. First started. And. I think. Back then. 
There was a lot. People. Were. The teamwork. Across. 
The floor was a lot better … Don't know whether that's 
been lost i:n. New starters. Just trying to really focus 
on. Getting their. Skills- 
Staff Nurse Variability of nursing teams 
limited monitoring   
I think it depends on how strong your team is as well. 
Like. A full zone. When you've got a crap team. Then 






The nurse in charge is 
responsible for monitoring 
functions on the unit 
There are some people that are very initiative and 
proactive. And that's fine. But. Normally. I would say. 
It's the nurse in charges. Role. In each zone. To be 





High patient acuity on the 
AMU limited capacity for 
monitoring 
I don't think we are. It's just because of. Sometimes. 
The acuity of the ward. You get so engrossed in your 
own job. And your own work. That you're like. Kind of. 
Screw everyone else. I'm already sinking here. 
Healthcare 
Assistant  
Healthcare assistants often 
had much better 
understanding status of the 
work across different zones 
than nursing staff  
I always touch base. It doesn't matter where I am 
working. In my zone. I went to [another healthcare 
assistant] and I was like. Are you alright? Do you need 
any help with your washes? 
 
Monitoring the status of the nursing work during a shift is a complex skill, which involves a 
nuanced understanding of the individual capabilities of the nursing team on each shift and the 
workload across the unit. Junior nursing staff tend to only have the capacity to manage their own 
workloads. So, only experienced nurses have the capacity to do the monitoring activities well. 
Many thought that it is the nurses in the coordinating roles (NIC and coordinator) that should be 
doing the monitoring activities because their role requires them to have a good understanding of 
the workload across the AMU. However, there is little system support or adequate time for 
monitoring in these coordinating roles and this means that monitoring functions rely on individual 
expertise. Consequently, there is considerable variability in how well these are carried out.  
 
The NICs and coordinators often need to provide closer support to individual nurses in their team 
for a range of reasons, such as the high number of newly qualified staff, unexpectedly high 
workload, unusually complex workload or insufficient staffing levels. When this is the case, there 
is no one else to do these monitoring activities. The experienced nurses talk about coming to the 
end of their shift and having no understanding of the workload of other zones on the unit. In 
contrast to this, the healthcare assistant reported they often move between different parts of the 
unit to help other healthcare assistants (or nurses) much more often than the nurses do. In doing 
so, they have a much better understanding of the workload across the whole unit than the staff 





The nursing staff recognise that learning is limited on the unit (Table 6-5). They felt that only the 
learning from significant adverse events is regularly communicated.   
 
Table 6-5 Perspectives on the challenges with Learning on the AMU 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse Learning from things that 
went wrong is repetitive  
I think. Because it's so repetitive. As well. You just zone 
out… The first time you hear it. It's like. Oh it's different. 
Yay! And then for the next three months. You're like. 
Staff Nurse Positive feedback was the 
only mechanism for learning 
from things that went well 
I think sometimes. They can be good with feedback. 
Like. With the end of life stuff. We're usually good at. 
Picking up things. And using good examples of stuff. 
Junior 
Sister 
Staff were frustrated at the 
lack of transparency with the 
learning process.  
You don't actually get told. This is why. This has gone 
wrong. And this is what happened. And this is why this is 
a better way of doing it. We don't go through that at all. 
Um. And maybe. Like. The. Deputies and the ward 
sisters do. Because. They are the ones that review the 
datixs. But we. As the staff. Don't. 
Junior 
Sister 
Learning was limited due to 
high turnover of junior staff  
They have such a huge turnover of staff. They do all this 
learning. If you went to. Any of the newly qualifieds. That 
have just started. And asked them. About. Falls. And 
curtains. And can you remember that. On the big four. 




Senior nursing staff involved 
in the learning process had a 
different perspective  
I think. Well. We try to do lots of learning. From. 
Especially in the big four1. For the datixs. 
Healthcare 
Assistant  
Nursing staff only hear about 
learning when it’s from things 
that have gone wrong  
Whenever an incident happens. Unless it's serious. And 
they come to you. And say. A series incident has 
happened. It's on the big four. Before that. I'm sure 
they've got lots of these datixs. But you don't get 
nothing. From it 
Note. ‘Big Four’1 -  strategy used by the hospital to highlight safety issues. At the beginning of each shift (the 
only time that all members of the nursing team for the shift were in one place) the coordinator read out four 
key messages about safety and quality concerns (selected by ward managers).  
 
Many nurses said they only receive the outcome of the investigations into adverse events and 
that this is very always helpful for understanding what went wrong. Some nurses expressed 
interest in having more information about the investigation process. They also expressed that the 
learning mechanisms on the unit are static because the ‘Big Four’ remains unchanged for long 
periods of time. One of the senior nurses suggested the high turnover of junior nursing staff limits 




from a series of inpatient falls and how none of the current junior nursing team worked on the unit 
when this happened. This highlights how the high turnover of junior nursing staff affects 
responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating and ultimately the potential for resilient 
performance. The nurses talk about positive feedback as the only mechanism for learning from 
things that go well. However, this is about recognising when an individual had done something 
well and giving them praise. It is not embedded at a system level and happens sporadically.  
 
There were only three anticipating items in the survey and this resilience attribute had the least 
amount of discussion. The nurses were unsurprised that the survey results suggest the unit ix 
more effective at identifying when the workload on the next shift will be so high, than being able 
to reduce it (Table 6-6).  
 
Table 6-6 Perspectives on the Challenges with Anticipating on the AMU 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse Limited ability to reduce 
workload for next shift  
. I think. Recognising that the next shift is going to be 
hard. But your shift is already heavy. Of course. There's 
only a limited effect that you can have. 
Staff Nurse There are tasks you can 
do to reduce workload for 
next shift  
One double handed. Because. You are going to change. 
And reposition your patient. Around six. Seven eight. 
Anyway. 
Junior Sister There are some things 
that you can do for the 
next shift that are more 
useful than others  
My first thought. Was. Oh. We are a nurse short. But. Not 
that I always action it. Oh. Ok. We should really start. We 
should do some meds. Where am I allocating that nurse 
in charge? Let’s do some meds. To take the pressure off. 
Junior Sister Senior staff do more 
anticipating work  
My personal experience. I will definitely. Always. Look at 
the staffing for the next shift. 
Deputy Ward 
Manager 
Senior staff are good at 
anticipating  
I think we're really good at that. Because. Everyone is 
always like. Oh. You can't put that patient in that bay. 
Because it is too heavy. 
 
There was overall agreement that the unit is effective at identifying when the workload on the next 
shift will be high. However, the junior nursing staff thought that the unit does not do this well, 
whereas the senior staff thought that the unit does this effectively. The anticipating activities are 
done by experienced nurses in coordinating roles. Senior nurses listed several specific activities 




systems in place to support nurses to carry out these anticipating activities and consequently 
there is variability between how well these are done each shift.  
 
6.3.2 Suggested Interventions for Improvement  
 
Nursing staff identified interventions for improving the AMU’s ability to respond, monitor, learn 
and anticipate. They had a range of suggestions that include training, changing the way of working 
and employing unused system resources. The researcher needed to direct the participants to 
focus on system level interventions, rather than focusing on individual activity.  
 
Nursing staff had a series of suggestions for improving the systems for supporting mental health 
patients on the AMU (Table 6-7).  
 
Table 6-7 Suggested Interventions to Improve Care for Patients with Mental Health Conditions on the AMU 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse More education about 
legislation to support staff 
with mental health patients  
I think it's probably. Just a case of. Making people more 
aware. Like. What is a sec. What is a section two under 
the mental health act? What is a five two? What. Does. 
Where does that? 
Staff Nurse More education for specific 
mental health conditions  
What. Some of the basic psych conditions are. Like. How 
you treat paranoid schizophrenia? What. What are the 
symptoms of that? 
Staff Nurse More training to support 
working with RMNs1 
Our expectation is that. You are a registered nurse. You 
will do the patient's observation. You'll check in with the 
nurse. And not wait for them to check in on you. 
Junior 
Sister 
Improve the systems to 
support communication 
between nursing team and 
psychiatric liaison team  
Because a lot of the time. You won't have a clue. If you're 
lucky. They've told you what the plan is. If not. It. Always 
requires you calling them to say. You haven't put it on. 
Even that. Or. We should have access to their system. 
To see what they've written 
Junior 
Sister 
Spend some time working in 
a mental health setting  
Spend more time. Like. At. We should spend time. On a 
mental health ward. Or. With RMNs. And. Actually like. 
Spend a day. With. A mental health nurse. In a psych 








Involve RMNs in nursing 
team handovers 
They need to be more involved in our handovers. The 
whole nursing team handover. So then. They're. I 
suppose. That. General medical staff. And can 
understand. What it is. They do handover. And what it is 
they're looking for. 
 
The nurses talked about lack of knowledge and training as a barrier to supporting mental health 
patients. Consequently, many of their suggested interventions involve training for supporting 
mental health patients on the AMU. This ranges from local training about specific conditions 
regularly seen on the unit, to more global changes to the way nurses are educated. Many nurses 
were in favour of introducing more structure for the interaction between nursing staff, RMNs and 
mental health patients. Some of these suggested interventions were a clearer handover structure 
and guidelines to clarify what is expected of the RMN and the nursing team when supporting a 
mental health patient. There were also more global suggestions that are beyond the scope of 
local quality improvement strategies, however the nursing team thought that these are necessary 
for improving the systems to support mental health patients.  For instance, one of the nurses 
thought working in a mental health setting would be beneficial because the nursing team could 
gain more experience working with mental health patients.  
 
Many of the nursing staff agreed that monitoring is important for managing their everyday clinical 
work more effectively and had suggestions for how this could be improved (Table 6-8). 
 
Table 6-8 Suggested Interventions for Improving Monitoring on the AMU 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse Huddles between the nurses 
in charge and coordinator  
Just between the nurses in charge. And be like. Look. 
This is what is going on. Because I think this links back 
to. The supporting staff to develop new skills. Because. It 
is a skill to be like. Looking out. And be like. I can 
recognise they are struggling. 
Junior 
Sister 
Huddles between the nurses 
in charge and coordinator 
Because you get in a bubble. And there's no 
communication. I think. I've said this before to you. I think 
that. Can change. By. Yes. You. We have these team. 
Zone huddles. But. If the nurses in charge all got together 
… It only needs to be two minutes.  
Staff Nurse Clearer criteria for 
appropriate admissions onto 
It could be stuff like. You know. Like. When they. Um. For 
DKA. If their ketones are still above seven or unreadable. 




the AMU from the 
Emergency Department  
a critical care setting. Or improve before they come 
round. (2). They could do more stuff like that. That. 
People still don't. Ask. On the phone. If you don't ask. 
They are going to come round. 
 
Some of the suggested changes are about improving communication between the nursing team 
on the unit and moving away from relying on individuals. Several nurses suggested introducing a 
new way of working where the nurses-in-charge and coordinators meet more regularly during a 
clinical shift to facilitate regular conversation and improve the shared understanding of the 
workload across the unit. Other suggestions involved bringing in more resources from other parts 
of the hospital to improve the process of transferring patients to other inpatient wards from the 
AMU. For example, one nurse suggested using a senior nursing role, such as a matron, from the 
other inpatient wards to assist with telephone handovers. One of the major barriers to 
communicating with the other wards is the poor telephone communication between them. By 
having a single point of contact to facilitate the telephone handovers to other wards, they thought 
this process could be improved.  
 
The nursing staff were frustrated at the lack of learning on the unit and had suggestions for 
improving this, including improving existing learning structures and introducing new learning 
structures (Table 6-9). 
 
Table 6-9 Suggested Interventions for Improving Learning on the AMU 
Role Theme Interview Extract   
Staff Nurse Use the big four as a 
platform for learning what 
goes right  
Find what's gone wrong. Definitely. But find. Something. 
That was actually a good example of. When it went right. 
Junior Sister Share the investigation 
process more clearly  
An email being like. Oh. By the way. We had this datix. 
This is what. How it happened. This. This is how we 
understand this took place. And this is why it needs to 




Involve more of the junior 
nursing staff in the 
investigation process 
Maybe. They need to come and spend. Maybe. Like. A 
random. Day. With management. Watch us sit there on 






Share suggestions for 
improvement between the 
nursing team more 
regularly  
And if anyone knows any more suggestions to make. To 
how to make this place better. Or to work well. Bring it 
out. 
 
Nursing staff suggested that the ‘Big Four’ could be used to share lessons from what goes right 
as well as what goes wrong. They thought that they would be able to learn as much from good 
examples of practice as they could from poor examples of practice. The healthcare assistant felt 
that this mechanism could be changed to include a discussion and opportunity to share 
suggestions for improvement between members of the nursing team. Some suggested that more 
of the investigation process should be shared, rather than just the outcomes, because this would 
be helpful for their learning. The deputy unit manager took this further and suggested that more 
junior members of staff could be involved in the process, so junior nurses understood it better.  
 
6.3.3 Ward Managers’ Perspectives  
 
The deputy ward managers and ward managers’ safety and quality concerns were balanced 
between short-term and long-term system demands (Table 6-10). Short-term system demands 
were immediate concerns about the safety and quality of system performance on a day-to-day 
basis. Long-term system demands were concerns about how to ensure the AMU could continue 
to provide safe and quality care in the future. There were mainly orientated towards staffing 
issues.  
 
Table 6-10 Ward Managers’ Safety and Quality Priorities 
Scope of concern  Concern  
Short-Term Ensuring there are enough nursing staff on each shift  
Short-Term Ensuring that there is an appropriate skill mix of nursing staff on each shift  
Long-Term Maintaining training and develop needs of nursing team   
Long-Term Supporting development of newly qualified nursing staff 
Long-Term   Recruiting new nursing staff  
Long-Term   Retaining existing nursing staff  
Long-Term   Adverse event investigations  
 
The short-term demands needed to be addressed before long-term demands. For example, much 




response to staff illness or inappropriate skill mix. Sometimes other demands, such as 
unexpectedly high patient acuity on the unit mean the ward management team need to provide 
more direct support to nursing staff. Only once these short-term demands are resolved, could the 
ward managers attempt to address the long-term demands. They have to constantly balance 
these different demands.  
 
6.4 Discussion  
 
Phase three explored the research question ‘How can the results of applying the Resilience 
Analysis Grid inform quality improvement?’. The aim of phase three was to support nursing staff 
to reflect on the survey results, identify potential system improvements on the AMU and compare 
these perspectives with the ward management team’s current safety and quality priorities. The 
findings demonstrate that it was feasible to support nurses to reflect on the results and they could 
identify system level interventions, with the appropriate support. However, these suggestions 
were high-level and underspecified meaning they cannot be taken forward without further 
development. The nurses could explain why some system activities on the AMU are done well 
and why some are much less effective. This provided further insights into understanding resilient 
healthcare performance on the AMU and shows that the findings from phase three effectively built 
on the findings from phase one and two. The nurses suggested system level interventions, which 
are different from the quality and safety concerns of the management team on the AMU. However, 
it was not clear whether the insights gained from applying the three-stage process for analysing 
organisational resilience added anything beyond pre-existing approaches for understanding 
performance in complex sociotechnical systems.  
 
Nursing staff were engaged with the research problem and provided detailed insights into the 
survey results. The findings demonstrate the value of involving the nursing staff in this process, 
as the experts of their system only they have the specific, detailed knowledge of how their system 
works. Without involving them in this way, it would not have been possible to reach this level of 
understanding. They could suggest interventions to improve the AMU’s systems, which are 




needed guidance to focus on system level interventions rather than individual level interventions 
and ensure the interventions were informed by resilience engineering theory. This suggests it is 
necessary to include researchers with sufficient knowledge of resilience engineering to make the 
most of these nuanced insights. 
 
However, the suggested interventions for improvement were high-level and underspecified. They 
require further elaboration and testing to inform interventions for improving the AMU’s ability to 
respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. The findings showed that it is possible to support 
healthcare staff to move from analysing organisational resilience to identifying ways to improve 
it. However, it was not clear the extent to which these suggestions could improve the 
organisational resilience of the AMU because this was beyond the scope of the study. Nor was it 
clear how specific to the resilience engineering theoretical lens these quality improvement 
suggestions were. Other approaches, such as Hierarchical Task Analysis (Stanton, 2006), may 
have been able to identify similar suggestions for quality improvement and have already been 
used in healthcare (Lane et al, 2006). Further applications of this process and exploration into 
developing interventions are necessary to understand what this process and the resilience 
engineering theoretical lens can add beyond pre-existing approaches for understanding and 
improving quality and safety issues in healthcare.  
 
The nurses provided valuable insights into why the AMU is effective at some responding activities, 
but not others. According to the nursing team, the unit is effective at responding to deteriorating 
patients because of the frequency they are exposed to these scenarios, intimate knowledge of 
relevant guidelines and the amount of system resources dedicated to this. This is a good example 
of how a system can effectively support nursing staff to manage the complexity of their nursing 
work. In direct contrast to this, the nursing team suggest that the unit is ineffective at supporting 
mental health patients because there is an absence of system level support. Consequently, these 
activities rely on individual practices and this leads to unwanted variability for how well they are 
carried out. Nurses supported the view that developing system level interventions could reduce 
this unwanted variability from relying on individuals to fulfil system level functions and provide 
support to manage the complexity of their everyday clinical work. The granularity of the survey 




they represented specific activities on the unit. Without this, identifying ways to improve the 
healthcare system may have required more detailed investigation. The extent to which the AMU, 
in its current format, relied on experienced nursing staff to fulfil system level functioning limits its 
potential for organisational resilience. The relationship between individual and system 
performance is not well explained by resilient healthcare theory. The reliance on individual 
performance for these system functions suggests that monitoring and anticipating are 
underdeveloped at a system level and there is space to develop these further. There is 
considerable agreement that involving healthcare staff in quality improvement is a useful 
endeavour (Dixon-Woods et al, 2012), so this is not a novel finding for this study or a resilience 
engineering lens of understanding. However, it does show how and why involving healthcare 
professionals in exploring the Work-As-Done in a healthcare system is useful. This should be 
more widely recognised in the resilience engineering literature.  
 
The nursing staff had good suggestions for improving the systems to support the way they 
manage the challenges of their everyday clinical work and these were different to the quality and 
safety concerns identified by the ward managers. The ward managers had to prioritise immediate 
staffing issues to ensure that the unit could function appropriately. This is a result of wider system 
pressures, such as ensuring the AMU is functioning sufficiently to respond to the flow of patients 
from the ED. The interview with one of the deputy ward managers suggested that the managers 
are aware of some of the issues raised by nursing staff in the semi-structured interviews, but the 
immediate demands of their daily work means they are unable to focus on them.  
 
This process demonstrated that it is possible to move from analysing the current state of a 
healthcare system, to begin to identifying ways to improve it. Nurses supported the view that 
developing system level interventions could reduce unwanted variability from relying on 
individuals to fulfil system level functions and provide support to manage the complexity of their 
everyday clinical work. The granularity of the survey items meant that it was relatively straight 
forward to identify ways to improve the system because they represented specific activities on 





6.5 Reflexivity  
 
The interviews with nurses in phase three benefited from the trust, collaboration and corroboration 
with the expert group in the previous stages of the research design. These were open and honest 
conversations about the survey results, the work on the AMU and ways to improve it. The 
researcher provided much less direction in these interviews than the focus groups in phase one 
because by this stage in the study, the expert group members felt empowered to reflect on the 
survey results and identify improvements for the AMU systems. This final phase was about 
working together with nursing staff to identify ways to improve the healthcare system. The nurses 
identified several interventions that the researcher had not considered, which provided further 
support for engaging healthcare professionals in the analysis and improvement of their healthcare 
system.  
 
It was challenging to engage with the ward managers to get their perspectives about their quality 
and safety priorities for the unit. They were willing to participate, however finding the necessary 
time and space to talk to them was difficult. Initially the researcher emailed them an online version 
of the survey, however after two weeks there were no replies. Then he handed the ward managers 
paper copies, but as soon as the ward managers put these down they were forgotten about. Their 
role is extremely challenging and involves constant problem solving for both short-term and long-
term challenges. Eventually, the researcher resorted to reading the questions out loud when the 
ward managers had ten minutes to spare during the day. This was the only way, in the time limits 
of the thesis, to capture their perspectives. They are the experts of the system and the most 
experience nurses on the AMU so their views are valuable for understanding the nuances of 
system performance on the AMU.  
 
When answering questions, it was clear the ward managers were thinking about particular 
challenges relevant to that clinical shift or upcoming week and their reflections were heavily 
influenced by this. If the researcher asked them the same questions four weeks later, they would 
probably have different answers. There are such great demands on their time, that they often only 




managers were aware of many of the issues raised in this process, for example the challenges 
with supporting mental health patients, however they did not have the capacity to devote as much 





Chapter 7 – Discussion  
 
7.1 Summary of Findings  
 
The RAG was proposed as a means to analyse organisational resilience, but at the time of writing 
there was little guidance available about how to apply it. In this study, the researcher developed 
and implemented a three-stage process for analysing how well a healthcare system can respond, 
monitor, learn and anticipate according to the views of the healthcare professionals working in 
the system. The findings of applying this three-stage process demonstrated that it could identify 
high-level interventions to improve the quality of care. However, these suggestions for quality 
improvement required further elaboration and testing. It is not yet clear what this process added 
to quality improvement beyond other pre-existing approaches. This is a novel approach for 
analysing and working towards improving the organisational resilience of healthcare systems. 
This study also provided a contribution to knowledge through the methodological and theoretical 
development of the resilience engineering field.   
 
The primary research questions were: 
 
How can the Resilience Analysis Grid be further developed to provide a replicable context specific 
process? 
 
How can the views of healthcare staff be incorporated for analysing organisational resilience?  
 
The secondary research questions were: 
 
What is Work-As-Done for nurses? 
 





How can the development of responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating survey items be 
informed by accounts of Work-As-Done? 
 
How can the results of applying the Resilience Analysis Grid inform quality improvement? 
 
This thesis answered the primary research questions through developing and implementing the 
three-stage reflective process for analysing the organisational resilience of healthcare systems.  
The process was replicable and systematic, with the intention that other researchers and 
healthcare professionals can use it to analyse and improve the organisational resilience of their 
healthcare systems. By starting with focus groups to explore the challenges of the everyday 
clinical work the data was grounded in the experiences of healthcare professionals and was 
therefore specific to their local context. Each stage of the multi-phase process built on the analysis 
of the previous stage and in an iterative manner each stage provided a different perspective for 
understanding system performance. The study used a social constructivist epistemology to 
design a participatory process, which effectively engaged nursing staff throughout and captured 
the complexities of everyday clinical work which is at the centre of resilient healthcare theory 
(Hollnagel et al, 2013; Wears et al 2015; Braithwaite et al, 2016).  
 
Focus groups were an effective method for engaging healthcare professionals and exploring the 
nurses’ Work-As-Done. Starting discussion with the challenges elements of the nurses’ work and 
exploring the four resilience abilities together proved to be a useful way to analyse resilient system 
performance. The systematic process for generating survey items from the focus group data 
showed that it was possible to develop survey items, grounded in the views of healthcare 
professionals, which explored how well a system can respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. The 
final reflective element to the process in phase three showed that when supported effectively, 
nursing staff could identify a range of interventions which were different to the current safety and 






7.2 Organisational Resilience of the AMU  
 
In its current form, the AMU is best at responding. Monitoring and anticipating activities are done 
by experienced individuals, with little system level support and therefore there is variability in how 
these activities are performed. There are no effective learning systems in place to support learning 
from things that go well and learning from adverse incidents is not rated very highly. 
 
Responding activities dominated the nurses’ everyday clinical work, had the highest number of 
survey items and the highest mean score of the four resilience abilities. There were many 
dimensions to responding activities on the AMU and it was important to examine the variability 
between them to fully understand the system’s ability to respond. Survey results showed that 
nursing staff thought the AMU is only effective in responding to some, not all, problems. Nursing 
staff could identify why there is such discrepancy between responding activities and, when 
supported appropriately, could suggest interventions to improve system support for those that 
were weak.  
 
It was particularly clear that nurses felt the AMU was poor at responding to patients with mental 
health problems. These findings supported the existing literature, which confirms healthcare staff 
in acute hospital settings lack training and knowledge for recognising and managing common 
mental health problems (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2013). A review by the Royal College of 
Nursing found there was a lack of knowledge and skills, as well as polices and guidance for nurses 
in acute hospital settings (Ford, 2017; Royal College of Nursing, 2019). Yet, there is an increasing 
prevalence of mental health problems in acute hospitals (Naylor et al, 2016). This is only expected 
to get worse as patient admissions with mental health problems in acute hospital settings are set 
to increase (Naylor et al, 2016; Ford, 2017). This means that a process for exploring what is 
challenging about responding to mental health patients in acute hospital settings could provide 
valuable insights for improving healthcare systems.  
 
Nursing staff thought the AMU is least effective at monitoring and had the lowest mean score of 




experienced nurses and consequently there is significant variability between how well these 
activities are carried out day to day. They recognised that relying on individuals to fulfil system 
level functions results in unwanted variability and consequently many of their suggestions focus 
on system level support for monitoring activities. This demonstrates that the three-stage process 
is effective at recognising the weaker resilience abilities and identifying ways to improve them.  
 
Learning was the most challenging resilience ability to analyse on the AMU. Any discussion of 
learning activities focused on learning from things that go wrong. As a result, the researcher 
needed to generate learning survey items from resilience engineering theory, rather than 
grounded in the experiences of nursing staff. Much of the improvements suggested by nursing 
staff were about improving their involvement in learning processes. Current systems for learning 
from adverse incidents occur in other areas of the hospital and are undertaken by staff from other 
areas.  This suggests that improving learning both from adverse incidents and positive outcomes 
should be a priority. On a positive note, the thematic analysis from the focus groups in phase one 
suggested that the focus groups themselves provided a space for learning from things that went 
right as the nursing staff shared their adaptations. Focus groups are known to be an effective 
approach to support learning. This fits with other research about informal mechanisms for learning 
(Sujan, 2015). There is also well-established research about communities of practice and how 
they support organisational learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Weneger & Snyder, 2002). They are 
known to be effective for sharing tacit knowledge and have been used in healthcare as a tool to 
improve clinical practice (Ranmuthugala et al, 2011). This literature supports the findings from the 
study. It emphasises the importance of developing time and space within healthcare systems to 
support healthcare to come together and reflect on their work. The process developed in this 
study provided structure to do this in a busy, acute hospital setting.  
 
Anticipating had the least amount of discussion. Focus group discussions in phase one focused 
on responding and monitoring activities. Since it had the least amount of discussion, anticipating 
had the fewest survey items of the four resilience abilities. Nursing staff suggested that 
anticipating is like monitoring, in that anticipating activities rely on experienced individuals to do 




The experienced nursing staff could identify effective activities for reducing the workload for the 
next shift, but this is not shared with the wider nursing team.  
 
The resilience engineering literature suggests that there should be a balance between the four 
abilities, however this is not prescriptive and recognises that the balance will be different for each 
complex system (Hollnagel et al 2006; Hollnagel, 2010; Berg et al, 2018). To improve its potential 
for resilient performance, the AMU should address the imbalance between responding, 
monitoring, learning and anticipating activities. The findings from the thesis suggest that some 
starting points would be introducing systems for learning from things that go well (the focus groups 
appeared to be an effective solution) and introducing system level support for monitoring and 
anticipating activities. 
 
This is the first study to use this three-stage process to analyse a healthcare system and 
demonstrates that the RAG can also inform quality improvement. It shows that nursing staff, when 
supported by researchers with sufficient knowledge of resilience engineering theory, could identify 
system level interventions to improve responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating activities. 
However, since implementing these interventions is beyond the scope of the thesis, it is unclear 
whether and how these interventions may affect system performance.  
 
7.3 Advancing the Resilience Analysis Grid  
 
One of the main contributions of the study is a systematic and replicable process for analysing 
and improving organisational resilience in healthcare systems. This represents a significant 
advancement to the RAG. The narrative review at the beginning of the thesis showed that a 
process for implementing the RAG had not been developed, limiting the usefulness of the 
proposed theory (see Resilience Analysis Grid, p.47). Although Hollnagel provides some 
theoretical questions as a basis for developing the RAG (Appendix A, p.210), it was not clear how 
to adapt them to specific systems (Hollnagel, 2010). Previous applications of the RAG have used 
different approaches for modifying the original theoretical questions (Van der Beek & Schraagen, 




questions specific to the system being analysed. The questions remained very abstract and 
theoretical rather than reflecting everyday clinical work (Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017). 
 
The thematic analysis of focus group data in phase one showed that the four resilience abilities 
are interrelated and occur simultaneously (see Discussion, p.119). This supports the theoretical 
claims about the complex relationships between the four resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 2010; 
Hollnagel, 2015). So, studying the four abilities in healthcare should start with everyday clinical 
work because this effectively represents how the work is done (Hollnagel et al, 2013). This 
suggests it would be methodologically ineffective to begin analysing resilient healthcare by 
separating the four resilience abilities because this would not represent the work as it is done. 
Previous applications of the RAG in healthcare have used the original questions as a starting 
point (Chuang, 2015; Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017) and therefore may not have 
comprehensively captured everyday clinical work. Future attempts at using the RAG or the four 
abilities should begin by studying everyday clinical work and recognising the interrelated nature 
of the four resilience abilities.   
 
Generating survey items directly informed by everyday clinical work was effective for analysing 
organisational resilience but can result in an imbalance between the number of survey items for 
each of the resilience abilities. Consequently, there may be a disproportionate analysis in terms 
of the number of items applied to each of the four resilience abilities. From a research design and 
quantitative data analysis perspective, this may limit the statistical methods that are appropriate 
for exploring the data (DeVellis, 2016). However, in line with resilience engineering theory, it is 
more important to have an exploratory qualitative analysis than inferential statistical analysis or 
psychometric testing. The quantitative elements of the process in this thesis demonstrated that 
descriptive statistical analysis can be useful for gaining an insight into system performance that 
qualitative data analysis cannot provide. However, any further statistical analyses risks lapsing 
into a reductive examination of system performance which fails to align with the core values of 
resilient healthcare theory, as shown in the findings of the narrative review at the beginning of the 





The number of survey items generated for each of the four resilience abilities is itself part of the 
analysis of the system’s potential for resilient performance. This highlights the strength of this 
process as a diagnostic tool and is the first-time survey items have been generated in this way. 
Hollnagel suggests plotting the results of a RAG analysis on radar star plots to facilitate 
comparison between applications of surveys over time (see Resilience Analysis Grid, p.47) 
(Hollnagel, 2010). However, the uneven number of survey items and likelihood that the survey 
items would change over time means this is not useful for presenting the results of three-stage 
process developed in this thesis. The effective engagement with healthcare professionals 
throughout this process suggests there needs to be a way of feeding the results of this process 
back to the healthcare professionals involved. Perhaps there should be two levels of feeding back, 
one level to the nursing staff on the AMU and another level to the ward management team who 
can effect change on the unit. There are several ways this could be done but starting with specific 
interventions or discrete problems is probably the most helpful.  
 
Relying on discussion with healthcare professionals to generate survey items meant that when 
discussion could not capture relevant theoretical elements, the researcher needed to develop 
them. This was most clear in the initial focus groups where nurses were unable to articulate 
learning experiences relevant to resilient healthcare (from things that go right) because they were 
constrained by current practices (see Learning From Each Other, p.115). Rather than have no 
learning questions, the researcher turned to resilience engineering theory to develop appropriate 
learning questions because learning is central to theoretical underpinning of the RAG (Hollnagel, 
2010). This means the learning survey items did not capture everyday clinical work in the same 
way as survey items for the other resilience abilities. Despite this, nursing staff could still identify 
potential interventions, informed by resilience engineering theory, to improve the learning systems 
on the AMU (see Suggested Interventions for Improvement, p.161). So, bridging any gaps in 
discussion about everyday clinical work with theoretical perspectives was effective because 
healthcare professionals could still engage with the results in a useful way.  
 
Hollnagel suggests using the RAG should be an ongoing process and the questions should be 
repeated over time to analyse how a system improves or changes (Hollnagel, 2010; Hollnagel, 




repeated applications or what should trigger this repeated application. For the process developed 
in this thesis, there appeared to be two ways for repeating it over time. One option would be to 
repeat the survey questions following the implementation of interventions to assess whether 
resilience improved. A second option could be to repeat the wider three-stage process for 
generating new questions and focus on new responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating 
activities. Perhaps a third option could be something between these two, with a few focus groups 
to discuss updating the questions.  
 
In phase three there was an explicit move from analysing organisational resilience to improving 
organisational resilience. It was clear that the suggestions for improvement were some way from 
being ready for implementation. There is already research on the challenges associated with 
quality improvement in healthcare (Dixon-Woods et al, 2012; The Health Foundation, 2018). 
Many of these challenges are related to sustaining quality improvement initiatives. If this process 
is to be effective at informing quality improvement initiatives, then some thought needs to be given 
to how improvement can be sustained (Dixon-Woods et al, 2012; Anderson et al, 2016). Involving 
healthcare professionals and paying close attention to local contexts are key for effective 
improvement initiatives (The Health Foundation, 2018). However, a significant barrier to quality 
improvement is the lack of expertise in local healthcare systems (Dixon-Woods et al, 2012; The 
Health Foundation, 2018). Further elaboration, testing and evaluation of this process is necessary 
to understand how it can effectively inform quality improvement and make use of what is already 
known in the literature about this.  
 
7.4 Methodological Implications for Resilience Engineering  
 
The main methodological contribution of the thesis to the resilience engineering field is a 
systematic, replicable process for using the RAG to analyse the organisational resilience of a 
healthcare system. As well, explore how the RAG could inform quality improvement. There was 
strong engagement from the expert group, confirming the importance of a participatory approach. 
With appropriate facilitation, the nursing staff could effectively identify system level interventions 




comprehensive system of support could reduce reliance on individual performance and reduce 
unwanted variability, without restricting their ability to adapt to the fluctuating circumstances of 
everyday clinical work (Suggested Interventions for Improvement, p.161). The survey items 
represented discrete activities on the AMU and this meant the nursing staff found it straightforward 
to focus on specific activities and suggest ways they could be improved. This was an effective 
way for including frontline healthcare professionals in improving their healthcare system, 
especially considering some of the challenges associated with involving them in quality 
improvement (Dixon-Woods et al, 2012). Literature reviews suggest the resilience engineering 
field has not yet produced methods or tools for improving the potential for resilient performance 
(Berg et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018). The development of a process for implementing the RAG 
addresses this gap.  
 
The three-stage process developed in this thesis is an integrated process, using mixed methods 
and drawing on core aspects of resilient healthcare theory (Hollnagel et al, 2013; Wears et al, 
2015; Braithwaite et al, 2016). It shows that a mixed method research design is effective for 
analysing the organisational resilience of a healthcare system according to the views of 
healthcare professionals working in the system. Each of the three stages built on the findings from 
the previous stage and provided different perspectives on the complexities of system 
performance. This answers the calls in the resilience engineering literature to combine qualitative 
and quantitative data analyses, to effectively understand the complexity of organisational 
resilience (Berg et al, 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018). Despite the effectiveness of the focus groups 
in exploring the nuances of Work-As-Done, they only provided one dimension for analysing the 
organisational resilience of a healthcare system. This dimension was important because it 
explored social interaction and learning, which are at the heart of resilience engineering theory. 
However, the complexity of system performance means that organisational resilience should be 
explored from several different dimensions (Berg et al 2018; Patriarca et al, 2018). The survey 
results in phase two and supported reflection in phase three provided insight into the system 
performance that could not have been achieved by further focus groups with more nurses or even 





One of the main challenges of using a systems perspective to understand safety in healthcare is 
deciding the scope of analysis. This thesis has a narrow scope, since it uses the perspectives of 
one healthcare discipline working on one unit. This narrow scope allows the study to reach deep, 
nuanced insights into the everyday clinical work of nursing staff on the AMU. However, the nurses’ 
everyday clinical work is affected by system pressures beyond the AMU. For example, the Critical 
Response Team (CRT) is responsible for responding to deteriorating patients across several 
inpatient wards. The way they respond to deteriorating patients on the AMU changes when there 
are many patients deteriorating at the same time, across different wards and this affects the way 
nursing staff on the AMU respond to their patients. Although these organisational processes which 
cross the boundaries of the unit clearly affect the nurses’ everyday clinical work, they were not 
explored in detail because of the limited scope of the thesis. Resilient healthcare theory 
recognises that micro, meso and macro system pressures affect every day clinical work (Berg et 
al, 2018). This systems perspective maintains that understanding adaptations should involve 
understanding the wider context of the work (Hollnagel et al, 2006). However, in practice it is not 
possible to explore every system pressure that affects adaptations used by healthcare staff. 
Therefore, using this theoretical perspective requires making pragmatic decisions about the 
scope of analysis. The implementation of this multi-stage process shows that it is possible to use 
this theoretical perspective to examine parts of system performance, for example on a specific 
ward, whilst recognising that wider system elements beyond the scope of analysis also affect 
system performance.  
 
Many previous studies of resilient healthcare have been observational studies (Wears & Perry, 
2006; Ross et al, 2014; Sujan et al, 2015; Back et al, 2017). In view of this, they have focused on 
the micro level of system performance because this is where resilient performance is most 
obvious (Berg et al, 2018). However, organisational resilience occurs simultaneously across 
micro, meso and macro levels. Study design necessarily involves trade-offs between breadth and 
depth of understanding. In this study deep understanding was prioritised and it would not have 
been possible to achieve this across the whole hospital or across several units. However, the 
three-stage process developed in this thesis could be effectively applied at micro, meso and 





Involving healthcare professionals was crucial to the study. Without the involvement of nursing 
staff, it would not have been possible to reach such detailed insights into the complexity of 
everyday clinical work on the AMU. Involving healthcare professionals helped generate relevant 
survey items and identify effective system level interventions for improving resilient performance. 
Previous applications of the RAG have involved healthcare professionals (Van der Beek & 
Schraagen, 2015; Hunte, 2016; Engvall et al, 2017), but not to the same extent they were involved 
in this thesis. So, future explorations of resilient healthcare should seek to effectively engage 
healthcare professionals in the research process because it is only through their involvement that 
deep insights can be reached to take full advantage of the resilient healthcare theoretical 
perspective. Researchers with sufficient understanding of resilient healthcare theory are also 
necessary to ensure that healthcare professionals can be effectively involved in this research 
process. This may limit the replicability of this process because it requires a researcher with 
sufficient understanding of resilience engineering theory, as well as effective engagement with 
healthcare professionals.  
 
The AMU changed during the study. Most of the expert group left the AMU or were promoted to 
different nursing roles as the study progressed from stage one to stage three. This meant that by 
the time the study was complete, there had been considerable turnover of nursing staff and there 
may now be different problems than at the start of the study. Since this study involved both 
developing and implementing the three-stage process for analysing resilient healthcare, it took 
longer than it would take to just implement the three-stage process on its own. Perhaps this could 
reduce the risk of the healthcare system changing during the analysis. However, this is a more 
general challenge for using resilient healthcare theory. This theoretical perspective advocates 
reaching a deep understanding of healthcare systems to sufficiently comprehend its complexity 
and how healthcare staff manage this complexity. Reaching this deep understanding takes time. 
However, healthcare systems are in constant flux and this means they change over time (Vincent, 
2010; Rouse & Serban, 2011). This is a methodological challenge for resilient healthcare and 
there is little discussion about this. This challenge further identifies the need to make pragmatic 





7.5 Theoretical Implications for Resilience Engineering  
 
The CARe resilience model was useful for informing a high-level deductive analysis of activities 
for understanding resilient system performance. For example, it was effective for identifying that 
many of the nurses’ adaptations involved re-aligning system capacity to effectively meet system 
demand (Anderson et al, 2016; Back et al, 2017). However, it was unable to inform a more 
granular understanding of these adaptations to explain how or why adaptations work. For this 
deeper level of understanding, it was necessary to use the four resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 
2010; Hollnagel, 2015), which can explain why adaptations may or may not work in practice (Berg 
et al, 2018). The four resilience abilities focus on concrete activities that can be observed in 
practice. By understanding these concrete activities, it is possible to comprehend why particular 
activities are effective for enabling resilient performance. The CARe resilience model cannot 
reach this level of granularity, which was necessary for understanding resilient performance.  
 
A consistent theme throughout this study was the extent to which the complexity of everyday 
clinical work is due to the central role of social interaction in nursing work. The findings from the 
thematic analysis of the focus group data, the survey results and interviews with nursing staff 
reflecting on survey results all provided compelling accounts that most of their work is about 
interacting with other people, both healthcare professionals and patients. This social interaction 
affects the work-arounds and trade-offs that the nurses use, as people behave in different ways. 
It informs decisions about which adaptations nurses use and how they use them. Adaptations 
cannot work without sufficient interaction with other healthcare professionals and patients. 
Resilience engineering theory recognises the social element of sociotechnical systems and the 
value of an individual’s ability to adapt to the changing circumstances of their daily work (Hollnagel 
et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2008; Nemeth et al, 2009). Observational studies of resilient 
healthcare also support this (Sujan et al, 2015; Back et al, 2017). However, resilience engineering 
theory does not acknowledge how central social interaction is to achieve clinical outcomes, and 
how it greatly increases the complexity of everyday clinical work. The results from this thesis 
suggest a much more central role for social interaction in theories of resilient healthcare than has 





There is an ongoing tension between individual, team and system level performance. Throughout 
the study, the accounts from nursing staff suggested that individual performance affects both 
team and system performance. For example, experienced members of the nursing team often 
conducted monitoring and anticipating activities that directly affected how well the AMU managed 
patient flow on a particular shift. It is clear that resilience engineering theory is concerned with a 
system perspective for understanding the performance of complex sociotechnical systems 
(Hollnagel et al, 2006; Hollnagel et al, 2015). It also recognises that complex systems are made 
up of individuals and that the ability of individuals to adapt to the variability of everyday working 
conditions contributes to resilient system performance. However, it does not provide enough 
detail about the relationship between individual, team and system level performance. The findings 
from the thesis suggest that individual and team performance directly affects system 
performance. They are therefore relevant to resilience engineering theory for understanding 




So far, the thesis has focused on the strengths of the study and its contributions to resilience 
engineering theory. However, it is equally important to consider the limitations of the study since 
this process is at such an early stage of development. The main limitations were the findings 
restricted to a nursing population, the lack of evaluation, the limited findings on quality 
improvement and the lack of Patient and Public Involvement (PPI).  
 
It should be recognised that the findings of the study were limited to a nursing population and 
therefore conclusions about the wider healthcare system cannot be drawn. The rationale for 
focusing on the nursing population on the AMU was provided in the methodology section of the 
thesis (3.2 Theoretical Underpinning p.77). However, the findings showed that much of the 
complexity of the everyday clinical work involves the interaction between different healthcare 
disciplines. This sort of cross-boundary interaction is known to be a source of complexity in 




explored this from a nursing perspective, it can be questioned how effective it was for exploring 
the organisational resilience on the AMU. This is an ongoing challenge for studying the complexity 
of successful performance in sociotechnical systems. It is necessary to draw some boundaries 
around the research phenomenon for the pragmatic purposes of data collection and analysis. The 
challenges of including just one healthcare discipline in this study were considerable and the 
researcher worked hard to gain such detailed insights from the nursing staff. Including more 
healthcare disciplines would introduce greater challenges. Further applications of this process 
should consider involving a wider range of healthcare disciplines. Conceptually, this is more 
aligned with the resilience engineering theoretical lens. However, this might mean having to trade-
off between the breadth and depth of analysis. For example, rather than analysing the 
organisational resilience of a system, the focus may have to be on analysing a process. Further 
research is needed to better understand the challenges and limitations of applying this process.  
  
There was a lack of evaluation embedded in this study. This limited the ability of the thesis to 
conclude about the effectives of the process to analyse or improve the organisational resilience 
of a healthcare system. A comprehensive evaluation of this three-stage process would require 
implementation of the suggested interventions for improvement and this was outside the scope 
of the study. This sort of evaluation was not appropriate given the early stage of development of 
the RAG. Aside from the effective engagement and positive comments from the nurses involved, 
there was no evidence for how useful this process was for analysing or improving organisational 
resilience. This is significant because the resilience engineering field has yet to establish an 
evidence base for its effectiveness. Further iterations of the process should include evaluative 
elements to develop an evidence base of effectiveness. This would eventually provide more 
evidence to justify using the resilience engineering theoretical lens in the future.  
 
The quality improvement suggestions from the nursing staff in phase three were high-level and 
underspecified. It was clear that these suggestions needed further development before they could 
be used in practice. It was not clear whether this process could suggest interventions that would 
be any more effective than pre-existing approaches used for quality improvement, such as 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (Stanton, 2006) or Process Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Johnson & 




2006). The resilience engineering theoretical lens is still developing its maturity and evidence 
base for interventions. Further applications of this process and exploration into developing 
interventions needs to be done to understand what this process and the resilience engineering 
theoretical lens can add beyond other approaches for understanding and improving quality and 
safety issues in healthcare. 
 
There was a lack of Public and Patient Involvement (PPI) in this study. PPI is recognised as a 
core element of healthcare research (National Institute for Health Research, 2014). However, this 
is not reflected in the resilience engineering literature. There is very little discussion about how 
PPI relates to exploring organisational resilience in healthcare systems. Understanding complex 
sociotechnical systems is a complex task and the driving force of resilience engineering theory is 
that other theoretical perspectives have not been able to fully explain how performance is 
successful in these types of systems (Hollnagel et al, 2006). It is not clear how PPI should be 
included in this. There are known challenges with involving non-experts in the research process 
(Oliver et al, 2019). At this early stage of development, it is unclear what involving patients or the 
public could add to these research endeavours (although this may very well be the reason for 
including them). Perhaps once the resilience engineering lens has undergone further 
methodological development it will be clearer how and where PPI should be involved in resilience 
engineering research endeavours.  
 
7.7 Recommendations for Implementing the RAG   
 
The findings from this thesis suggest that the three-stage process developed in this study for 
implementing the RAG is a useful process for analysing resilient healthcare and identifying 
interventions to improve responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating activities. It is 
especially informative when healthcare staff are effectively engaged throughout the process. They 
can identify problems and suggest solutions that are not currently captured by current safety and 
quality concerns. Healthcare staff can generate interventions which are specific to the local 
context, which move beyond the short-term immediate problem solving of current safety and 





Below are some simplified guidelines for repeating this process in other healthcare settings: 
 
1. Identify scope and intention of analysis, for example inpatient ward, senior management team, 
board of directors 
2. Recruit expert group to represent the different roles and levels of experience of the people that 
work within the scope of analysis.  
3. Hold focus groups to discuss everyday work. This discussion should focus on identifying what 
is challenging about the work, why it is challenging and how people manage the challenges.  
4. Identify questions from focus group discussions. In the beginning, this should be about 
generating as many questions as possible. Read through the notes or transcripts from the focus 
group discussion and generate questions about important points. Then, once the questions have 
been generated, group them into similar categories to identify any overlap between them. The 
number of questions can be tailored to the breadth and depth of the intended analysis. For 
example, a quick analysis would involve a few questions about key responding, monitoring, 
learning and anticipating activities, whereas a more comprehensive analysis would involve more 
questions covering a broader range of these activities.  
5. Edit questions so they represent the focus group discussion and are relevant to resilience 
engineering theory. The expert group should review the questions. 
6. Administer the survey to the wider population within the scope of chosen analysis. Self-
administered surveys are the simplest way to collect data. However, this should be adapted to fit 
local context and other survey designs could be as effective for capturing data from a population. 
7. Analyse the survey results with simple descriptive statistics calculating the mean, standard 
deviation and range for each of the subscales. More advanced statistics, such as Cronbach’s 
Alpha and Spearman’s rank order correlation are useful for understanding more about the data, 
but the intention of the analysis should inform the level at which the data are explored. 
8. Facilitate the expert group to reflect on the survey results and identify system level 
interventions, informed by resilience engineering theory. 
9. Feedback the findings from this process to the expert group and the wider population who 
completed surveys. It is also a good idea to feed results back to those in a position to make 





In the initial focus groups, it was clear that the nurses did not normally have the time and space 
to discuss and reflect on the challenges of their everyday clinical work. Many of them commented 
on how valuable this process was for sharing experiences and learning from each other. The 
value of spending 45 minutes reflecting on the challenges of their clinical work was clear. Showing 
the value of this to the ward managers could support this process to become a regular part of 
nursing work and could support learning from things that go right at a systems level. However, 
during the study the researcher was not able to feedback to the ward managers or the research 
participants about the findings from the study. Perhaps this should be built into the process of 
implementing the RAG to increase the chances of this research having a positive effect on the 
organisational learning in healthcare systems. This does not pertain to just the AMU in this study, 
but to other healthcare contexts, where there should be similar value in staff discussing and 
reflecting on the challenges of their work.  
 
Applying this process to other healthcare settings and populations may introduce further 
challenges. Throughout this discussion chapter it was clear that involving a wider range of 
healthcare professionals in this process could provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
organisational resilience. Different roles have different pressures and it would be challenging to 
find a time that all the different healthcare disciplines would find mutually accessible. One of the 
most helpful facilitators for engaging with the nursing population on the AMU was the ability to 
use the ward managers’ offices for the focus groups. This meant that the nurses could participate 
in the research during their working hours in their working location. If such a location was not 
available in a different research location, then it would be harder to support healthcare staff to 
participate in the focus groups during their working hours. Asking healthcare staff to participate in 
research outside of their working hours or location introduces further barriers, such as travel costs.  
 
7.8 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
This is the first time this process has been used to analyse resilient healthcare. Consequently, 




same setting and in different settings, in order to further explore its effectiveness for analysing 
and improving resilient healthcare.  
 
A natural place to start would be to develop and implement the interventions suggested by nursing 
staff in the final phase of the thesis. Once these interventions have been implemented in practice, 
the survey could be repeated to explore if there are any changes to nurses’ perceptions about 
how well the AMU can respond, monitor, learn and anticipate. Then it would be possible to 
compare the results from the initial survey application and explore any changes. Finally, once this 
has been completed, the process of generating survey items could be repeated so that new 
responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating activities could be analysed.  
 
To explore the complexity of system performance on the AMU further, this process could be 
repeated with the other healthcare disciplines that work alongside nursing staff, such as doctors, 
pharmacists and social workers. It would be interesting to see what challenges they face in their 
everyday clinical work and how this relates to the nurses’ challenges. Using a broader range of 
healthcare disciplines could create challenges for reaching the same depth of analysis reached 
in this thesis. Perhaps then, using a broad range of healthcare disciplines would be best suited 
for specific tasks, such as discharging patients home.   
 
This process should also be used in other healthcare settings, for example different inpatient 
wards or outpatient clinics, as well as across the different micro, meso and macro levels of system 
performance. Applications of this three-stage process across different healthcare settings would 
allow for the comparison of different challenges. It would also allow for comparison between the 
survey questions of different healthcare systems to reach a higher level of understanding about 
how responding, monitoring, learning and anticipating manifest across different healthcare 
systems. These questions could be collected in a shared repository so that other researchers and 






7.9 Reflexivity  
 
Attia and Edge (2017) suggest reflexivity involves both prospective and retrospective reflexivity. 
The researcher explored the elements of prospective reflexivity in the earlier sections of the 
thesis. In this section, the researcher explores the retrospective reflexive elements from the study. 
Retrospective reflexivity is about understanding how the research journey has changed the 
researcher (Attia & Edge, 2017). The researcher experienced this research process as both 
researcher and clinician, therefore this research process has changed the researcher’s practice 
for both elements of work. This was the first interaction the researcher has had with post graduate 
research. Consequently, this was the first time they experienced facilitating focus groups, 
transcribing focus group data, qualitative data analysis, survey design, quantitative data analysis 
and academic writing at a postgraduate level. Each time the researcher engaged with these 
research activities there was a steep learning curve.  
 
This thesis was the first time the researcher had any involvement with resilience engineering 
theory. It took about six months to understand these complex theoretical components at a level 
that was necessary for doctoral research and this was essential for effective research design. For 
example, understanding the distinction between measuring and analysing organisational 
resilience had a significant impact on the way the researcher approached the research problem. 
The researcher was strongly motivated to move from these abstract theoretical concepts to 
concrete research activities. Developing a research design that could do this in a rigorous, 
systematic way is what took the most time.  
 
Despite these challenges, the researcher now has an effective grasp on the core principles of 
resilience engineering theory and appreciates their value for understanding and improving the 
safety of healthcare systems. They strongly reflected the researcher’s own experiences as a 
nurse working on the AMU. This was a significant motivation to engage the nursing staff on the 
AMU in this research process because resilient healthcare theory recognises the work that 
healthcare professionals do in maintaining the quality and safety of healthcare. This is not well 




nursing staff engaged with the research project and many commented that no one talks about 
safety in this positive light. It was especially rewarding to see how much the healthcare assistants 
engaged in this process, because their voices are often not well represented. It was unclear how 
much the nurses were involved in the research process because of the pre-existing professional 
and social relationships with the researcher and how much because they were empowered by 
resilient healthcare theory. Regardless, the researcher will continue to use resilient healthcare 
theory for understanding and improving the safety and quality of healthcare systems beyond the 
end of this thesis.   
 
As a clinician, the researcher is more aware of the adaptations they use to regularly manage their 
own everyday clinical work. They found that resilient healthcare provides a language to talk about 
their work and helps make sense of negative or unexpected outcomes in a way the researcher 
could not do before. The researcher uses these insights to teach nursing students and support 
newly qualified nurses to develop; for example, moving discussion from talking about how to send 
a particular referral on the electronic patient records system, to understanding how to make these 
system elements helpful for clinical practice. Talking about the distinction between Work-as-
Imagined and Work-as-Done is particularly helpful when teaching nursing students about clinical 
work. For many of the students, a placement on the AMU is the first time they are exposed to 
such a complex system and many students struggle to understand how to manage this 
complexity. The distinction between Work-as-Imagined and Work-as-Done is helpful for them to 
balance their expectations of the clinical work with the reality of the clinical work.  
 
Balancing research and clinical roles was challenging. In particular, working part-time shift work 
alongside the full-time thesis work was hard. It was only by maintaining a part-time role that the 
researcher was able to access the training and development benefits available to regular (as 
opposed to temporary) members of nursing staff on the AMU. The researcher had only been 
qualified for six months before starting the thesis and was keen to continue to develop as a newly 
qualified nurse. Working at weekends and night shifts often prevented the researcher from 
developing an effective routine for engaging with the research work. Despite these challenges, it 
was incredibly valuable and without these dual perspectives, it would not have been possible to 





7.10 Concluding Remarks   
 
After four years of study, this study demonstrated that the resilient healthcare theoretical lens is 
a worthwhile endeavour for understanding and improving the safety of healthcare systems. 
Researchers should continue to pursue ways to understand and improve the organisational 
resilience of healthcare systems. There should be more application of this theory in practice to 
develop an evidence base of its value. The multi-phase process developed and implemented in 
this thesis provides a means for doing so. Researchers should continue to work together with 
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Appendix A. Original Resilience Analysis Grid Questions 
From: Hollnagel, E. 2010. Epilogue: RAG. the resilience analysis grid. In. Hollnagel, E., Paries, 
J., Woods, D., Wreathall, J. (Eds). Resilience Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook. Ashgate 
Publishing. Farnham, UK.  
 
Questions for Responding  
Event List What are the event for which the system has a prepared response? 
Background How were these events selected (tradition, regular requirements, design basis, 
experience, expertise, risk assessment, industry standard, etc.)? 
Relevance When was the list created? How often is it revised? On which basis is it revised? Who 
is responsible for maintaining and evaluating the list? 
Threshold  When is a response activated? What is the triggering criterion or threshold? Is the 
criterion absolute or does it depend on internal/external factors? Is there a trade-off 
between e.g. safety and productivity? 
Response List  How was the specific type of response list decided? How is it ascertained that it is 
adequate? (Empirically, or based on analyses or models?) 
Speed How fast is full response ability available? How fast can an effective response be 
implemented?  
Duration For how long can a 100% effective response be sustained? What is the minimum 
acceptable response level and how long can it be sustained? 
Stop Rule What is the criterion for ending the response and returning to a ‘normal’ state? 
Response 
Capability  
How many resources are allocated to ensure response readiness (people, equipment, 
materials)? How many are exclusive for the response potential? Who is responsible 
for maintaining the response ability? 
Verification How is the readiness to respond maintained? How and when is the readiness to 
respond verified? 
 
Questions for Monitoring  
Indicator List  How have the indicators been defined? (By analysis, by tradition, by industry 
consensus, by the regulator, by international standards, etc) 
Relevance When was the list created? How often is it revised? On which basis is it revised? Who 
is responsible for maintaining the list? 
Indicator Type How many of the indications are of the ‘leading’ type and how many are of the 
‘lagging’? Do indicators refer to single or aggregated measures? 
Validity How is the validity if an indicator established (regardless of whether it is ‘leading’ or 




What is the nature of the ‘measurements’? Qualitative or quantitative? (If quantitative, 










What is the delay between measurement and analysis/interpretation? How many of 
the measurements are directly meaningful and how many require analysis of some 
kind? How are the results communicated and used? 
Stability  Are the measured effects transient or permanent? 
Organisational 
Support 
Is there a regular inspection scheme or schedule? Is it properly resourced? 
 
Questions for Learning  
Selection 
Criteria  
Which events are investigated and which are not (frequency, severity, value, etc.)? 
How is the selection made, which criteria are used? Who makes the selection?  
Learning Basis Does the system try to learn from success (things that go right) as well as from failures 
(things that go wrong)? 
Classification  How are events described? How are data collected and categorised? 
Formalisation  Are there any formal procedures for data collection, analysis and learning? 
Training Is there any formal training or organisational support for data collection, analysis and 
learning? 
Learning Style  Is learning a continuous or discrete (event-driven) activity?   
Resources  How many resources are allocated to investigation and learning? Are they adequate? 
Which criteria do they depend upon?  
Delay  What is the delay in reporting and learning? How are the outcomes communicated 
internally and externally? 
Learning target  On which level does the learning take effect? (For instance, individual, collective, 
organisational? 
Implementation How are ‘lessons learned’ implemented? Regulations, procedures, norms, training, 
instructions, redesign, reorganisation, etc?  
 
Questions for Anticipating  
Expertise What kind of expertise is relied upon to look into the future (In-house, outsourced?) 
Frequency  How often are future threat and opportunities assessed?  
Communication How are the expectations about future events communicated or shared within the 
system? 
Strategy Does the system have a clearly formulated ‘model of the future’? 
Model Is the model or assumptions about the future explicit or implicit? Qualitative or 
quantitative? 
Time Horizon  How far ahead does the system look ahead? Is the time horizon different for, e.g., 
business and safety?  
Acceptability of 
risk  
Which risks are considered acceptable and which unacceptable? On which basis? 
Aetiology  What is the assumed nature of the future (threats, opportunities)? 




Appendix B. Search Results for Narrative Review   
From 2.2.3 Search Method, p.37 
Resilience engineering books series and chapters relevant to the narrative review   
Book No. of 
chapters 
Chapters included in review  
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. & 
Levenson, N. (2006) Resilience 
Engineering. Concepts and 
Precepts. Ashgate.   
22 N/A 
Hollnagel, E., Nemeth, C. P. & 
Dekker, S. (2008). Resilience 
Engineering Perspectives, Volume 
1: Remaining sensitive to the 
possibility of failure. Ashgate.  
21 Mendonca, D. (2008). Measures of Resilient 
Performance. 
 
Woods, D. & Wreathall, J. (2008). Stress-strain plots 
as a basis for assessing system resilience. 
Nemeth, C. P., Hollnagel, E., & 
Dekker, S. (2009). Resilience 
engineering perspectives, Volume 
2: preparation and restoration. 
Ashgate.  
13 Wreathall, J. (2009). Measuring Resilience.  
 
 
Hollnagel, E., Paries, J., David, D. 
W., & Wreathall, J. (2010). 
Resilience engineering in practice: 
A guidebook. Ashgate.  
(Including 2nd Edition published in 
2013)  
19 Ferreira, P., Wilson, J., Ryan, B., & Sharples, S. 
(2010). Measuring Resilience in the Planning of Rail 
Engineering Work 
 
Hollnagel, E. (2010). Epilogue: RAG – The Resilience 
Analysis Grid. 
Sundstrom, G. & Hollnagel, E. 
(2011). Governance and Control of 
Financial Systems. Ashgate.  
11 N/A 
Hollnagel, E., Braithwaite, J., & 
Wears, R. L. (2013). Resilient 
health care. Ashgate.  
(Including 2nd edition published in 
2015) 
19 N/A 
Nemeth, C. & Hollnagel, E. (2014) 
Resilience Engineering in Practice, 
Volume 2: becoming resilient. 
Ashgate.  
12 Rankin, A., Lundberg, J. & Woltjer, R. (2014a). A 
Framework for Learning from Adaptive Performance. 
Wears, R., Hollnagel, E., 
Braithwaite, J. (2015). Resilient 







Resilience Engineering Association symposia and proceedings relevant to the narrative review 
Symposium Conference 
proceedings   
Conference proceedings included in review  
2nd Resilience Engineering 
Association Symposium. 
Sophia Antipolis, France. 
November 2006.   
45 Woods, D., Wreathall, J. & Anders, S. (2006). Stress-strain 
plots as a model of an organisation’s resilience  
3rd Resilience Engineering 
Association Symposium. 
Antibes – Juans les Pins, 
France. October 2008.  
33 Johansson, B. & Lindgren, M. (2008). A quick and dirty 
evaluation of resilience enhancing properties in safety 
critical systems 
 
Stolker, R., Karydas, D., & Rouvroye, J. (2008,). A 
comprehensive approach to assess operational resilience 
 
Woltjer, R. (2008). Resilience assessment based on 
models of functional resonance. 
4th Resilience Engineering 
Association Symposium. 
Sophia Antipolis, France. 
June 2011.  







Catalan, C. & Robert, B. (2011) Evaluation of 
organisational resilience: application to essential systems 
in Quebec.  
 
Unavailable in English  




41  Grecco, C., Vidal, M., Cosenza, C., dos Santos, V. & 
Carvalho, P. (2013). A Fuzzy Model to Assess Resilience 
for Safety Management 
 
Herrera, I. A., Vennesland, A., Pasquini, A., & Silvagni, S. 
(2013). Planning Measuring Resilience Potential and Early 
Warnings (SCALES). 
 
Lundberg, J. & Woltjer, R. (2013) The Resilience Analysis 
Matrix (RAM): Visualising functional dependencies in 
complex socio-technical systems.  
 
Siegel, W. & Schraagen, J. (2013). Developing resilience 
signals for the Dutch railway system. 
 
Woods, D., Chan, Y. & Wreathall, J. (2013). The Stress-
Strain model of resilience operationalizes the four 
cornerstones of resilience engineering. 
6th Resilience Engineering 
Symposium Association. 
57 Rigaud, E., Neveu, C., Langa, S. & Obrist, M. (2015). 





Lisbon, Portugal. June 
2015.  
 
Saurin, T. (2015). Classification and assessment of slack: 




Belgium. June 2017. 
29 Patriarca, R., Di Gravio, G., Constantino, F. & Tronci, M. 
(2017). FRAM to assess performance variability in 
everyday work: functional resonance in the railway domain. 
 
Peer-reviewed academic journals and articles relevant to the narrative review 
Journal Title No. of articles 
after search 
criteria applied 
Articles relevant to the review  
Reliability 
Engineering and 




65 Furniss, D., Back, J., Blandford, A., Hildebrandt, M. & Broberg, H 
(2011). A resilience markers framework for small teams. 
 
van der Beek, D., & Schraagen, J. M. (2015). ADAPTER: 
Analysing and developing adaptability and performance in teams 
to enhance resilience 
 
Francis, R. & Bekera, B. (2014). A metric and frameworks for 
resilience analysis of engineered and infrastructure systems. 
 
Mendonça, D. & Wallace, W.A. (2015). Factors underlying 
organizational resilience: The case of electric power restoration 
in New York City after 11 September 2001. 
 
Saurin, T., & Werle, N. (2017). A framework for the analysis of 







32 Shirali, G., Motamedzade, M., Mohammadfam, I., Ebrahimipour, 
V. & Moghimbeigi, A. (2015). Assessment of resilience 
engineering factors based on system properties in a process 
industry.  
 
Raben, D., Bogh, S., Viskum, B., Mikkelsen, K. L., & Hollnagel, 
E. (2017). Proposing leading indicators for blood sampling: 









153 Azadeh, A., Salehi, V., Arvan, M. & Dolatkhah, M. (2014) 
Assessment of resilience engineering factors in high-risk 
environments by fuzzy cognitive maps: A petrochemical plant 
 
Stroeve, S. & Everdij, M. (2017). Agent-based modelling and 
mental simulation for resilience engineering in air transport 
 
Rubio-Romero, J., Pardo-Ferreira, M., De la Varga-Salto, J. & 
Galindo-Reyes, F. (2018). Composite leading indicator to assess 
the resilience engineering in occupational health & safety in 
municipal solid waste management companies 
 
Jain, P., Mentzer, R., & Mannan, M. (2018). Resilience metrics 
for improved process-risk decision making: Survey, analysis and 
application. 
 
Further literature identified from reading the references and citations of relevant books chapters, 
symposia proceedings and journal articles 





Management conference 10 
Conference 
Proceeding 
Øien, K., Massaiu, S., Tinmannsvik, R. & Størseth, F. 
(2010). Development of early warning indicators based 
on resilience engineering. 
International Journal of 
Industrial Economics  
Journal 
Article  
Saurin, T. & Junior, G. (2012). A framework for 
identifying and analyzing sources of resilience and 
brittleness: a case study of two air taxi carriers.  
Journal of Cognitive 




Rankin, A., Lundberg, J., Woltjer, R., Rollenhagen, C. & 
Hollnagel, E. (2014). Resilience in Everyday Operations: 
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Appendix E. Questions Generated from Focus Group Data  
(From 5.2.1.1 Step One – Generate Questions from Focus Group Data, p. 128) 
Challenging Patients 
1 Do you have multiple strategies for supporting patients with challenging behaviour? 
2 As a team do you work together to support someone with challenging behaviour? 
3 Do you use different ways to communicate with challenging patients? 
4 Do you share ways with other people in your team that are effective for communicating 
with challenging patients? 
5 Do you talk to other members of the team about the decisions you are making for 
supporting challenging patients? 
6 Do you know when you need to escalate the behaviour of a challenging patient? 
7 Do you know what strategies to use as a team to support a patient with challenging 
behaviour? 
8 Do you talk about what works and what doesn’t work to support a patient with 
challenging behaviour? 
9 Do you talk to other people in your team when you notice someone is behaving in a 
challenging way? 
10 Do you feel as confident to support the behaviour of challenging families as you do 
challenging patients? 
11 Do you know what to do when a patient absconds? 
12 Do you ask for help from other members of the team when you are supporting the 
behaviour of a challenging patient? 
13 Do you think about how disruptions early on in your shift are going to effect you later on 
in your shift? 
14 Do you know when to ask for help with a challenging patient? 
15 Do you know the best way that everyone can work together to support a patient with 
challenging behaviour? 
16 Are you careful to not assume a patient is challenging from handover from the previous 
shift? 
17 As a team do you talk about what worked for a challenging patient? Do you share this 
with others? 
18 Does the previous shift give you objective information about a challenging patient? 
19 When you are getting frustrated with a challenging patient do you tell someone else? 
20 Do you use different ways to care for patients with challenging behaviour? 
21 Do you share with other members of the team about what has worked well or what has 
not worked so well when caring for a patient with challenging behaviour? 
22 Do you talk to other people in your team about what might be challenging behaviour 
before it reaches a crisis point? 
23 Do you use a series of steps to support a confused patient? Do you talk to other people 
about what steps are the most appropriate for your particular scenario? 
24 Do you talk to your team about what are the most appropriate steps for supporting a 
confused patient? 
25 Do you talk to the other members of the team in the bay about how the interventions to 
support confused patients are working? 
26 Are you involved in conversations about supporting confused patients? 
27 Does the team work well together to identify why a patient might be confused and 
discuss how to ensure they remain safe? 
28 Does the team work together so that when there is a challenging patient, the other 




29 Do you objectively hand over to the next shift what has worked well for a challenging 
patient? 
30 Does information about challenging patients get saved in a place that can be used for 
the next admission? 
31 Do you know when security has been called for a patient in another zone? 
32 Do you have the training you need to support mental health patients? 
33 Do you talk to the RMN to discuss how you can work together to best support the 
mental health needs of a patient? 
34 Do you talk to the RMN about what is expected of them during the course of their shift? 
35 Does the team discuss the criteria for escalating the behaviour of a challenging patient 
to security? 
36 Do you feel confident identifying a pattern of deteriorating behaviour and understand 
when this may escalated to a crisis point? 
37 Do you know what to do when a patient absconds and there are concerns about 
capacity/IV access? 
38 Is the team good at discussing complex decisions regarding the capacity of a patient 
with everyone that is involved with their care? 
39 Are you confident with assessing capacity? 
40 Are you involved with capacity assessments of patients that you are looking after? 
41 Do you know when you need to escalate decisions regarding patient capacity? 
42 Do you understand the legislation around capacity and deprivation of liberty? 
43 Do you feel confident caring for someone that is under section? Do you know how to 
talk to them? 
44 Does the team share successful ways of caring for patients with challenging behaviour 
in a structured way? 
45 Do you know when a patient’s behaviour may be challenging later in the day? Do you 
tell someone about this? 
46 Are you involved in decisions around supporting confused patients to prevent them 
falling out of bed? 
47 Do you know when someone requires specialing in your zone? In another zone? 
48 Who decides what gets mentioned in handover? 
49 Do you know when someone gets confused in your bay? 
50 Does the team support families to get the information they need about their relative’s 
condition? 
51 Deteriorating Patients 
52 Do you have multiple strategies to deal with challenging patients? 
53 Do you feel confident to raise your concerns about a deteriorating patient to other 
members of the team? 
54 Do you feel confident to raise your concerns about a deteriorating patient? To HCAs? 
To nurses? To doctors? 
55 Do you find the protocol for escalation helpful? 
56 If the protocol for escalation is not helpful, do you know what to do? 
57 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate? 
58 Do you know what to do when the protocol for escalation is not helpful? 
59 Do you involve the team allocated to look after that patient in decisions regarding how 
to escalate that patient? 
60 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate? 
61 Do you know what to do when you don’t get the response to escalating your patient? 
62 Are you always aware when a patient you are looking after is deteriorating? 
63 When you are looking after a deteriorating patient, do you know where can get support 
for your other patients? 
64 Do you feel able to delegate to others when your work load is too much? 




66 Do you get feedback about a patient’s condition once you have escalated them? 
67 Are you involved with the decision making around deteriorating patients? 
68 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate a deteriorating patient? 
69 Is the protocol for escalation (always?) helpful? When it is not do you know what to do? 
70 Do you feel confident making decisions around prioritisation of care for your allocated 
bay of patients when you’ve got a deteriorating patient? 
71 Do you know where and how to get help when your workload is too much? 
72 When you are looking after a deteriorating patient, do you know where to get support for 
your other patients? 
73 Do you feel confident getting prepared for a sick patient coming from ED? 
74 Do you feel confident delegating tasks when it is busy? 
75 Do you feel confident making decisions about care when it is busy, e.g. prioritising? 
76 Do you ask for help when you have an unwell patient? 
77 Do you feel confident escalating when your workload has unexpectedly increased? 
78 Do you tell other members of the team in your zone when there is an unwell patient? 
79 Do you tell other members of the team in your bay when there is an unwell patient? 
80 Do you feel confident escalating a patient early? 
81 Do you feel confident escalating a patient when their NEWS is >2? 
82 Do you feel comfortable escalating who you are worried about before they deteriorate? 
83 Do you feel confident using your clinical judgement in combination with the escalation 
protocol? 
84 Do you feel comfortable escalating a patient early? 
85 Do you let other people in your team know that you are escalating a patient early? 
86 Do you involve others in the decision making around deteriorating patients? 
87 Do you involve other members of the team in the bay you are working with decisions 
around prioritisation of care? 
88 Do you involve other members of the team in the zone you are working with decisions 
around prioritisation of care? 
89 Do you always put observations into enoting straight away? 
90 Are you always aware when one of your allocated patients is deteriorating? 
91 Do you feel confident with knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating? 
92 Do you know what is going on with the plans of care for the patients in your allocated 
bay? 
93 Do you know when there are unwell patients in other zones? 
94 Do you tell the nurse in charge when have an unwell patient? 
95 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours? 
96 Do you know when other zones have unwell patients? 
97 Do you feel confident supporting bank or agency staff when they are in your zone? 
98 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate? 
99 Are you aware of how your current work load will affect your future work load? 
100 Do you know what to know when you don’t get the response to escalation you were 
expecting? 
101 Once you have escalated a deteriorating patient, are you aware of the decisions made 
to support that patient? 
102 When looking after a deteriorating patient, do know when you should delegate to others 
to help care for the other patients in the bay? 
Deteriorating Patients 
103 Do you have multiple strategies to deal with challenging patients? 
104 Do you feel confident to raise your concerns about a deteriorating patient to other 




105 Do you feel confident to raise your concerns about a deteriorating patient? To HCAs? 
To nurses? To doctors? 
106 Do you find the protocol for escalation helpful? 
107 If the protocol for escalation is not helpful, do you know what to do? 
108 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate? 
109 Do you know what to do when the protocol for escalation is not helpful? 
110 Do you involve the team allocated to look after that patient in decisions regarding how 
to escalate that patient? 
111 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate? 
112 Do you know what to do when you don’t get the response to escalating your patient? 
113 Are you always aware when a patient you are looking after is deteriorating? 
114 When you are looking after a deteriorating patient, do you know where can get support 
for your other patients? 
115 Do you feel able to delegate to others when your work load is too much? 
116 Do you feel ‘everyone is on the same page’ when you are working in a team? 
117 Do you get feedback about a patient’s condition once you have escalated them? 
118 Are you involved with the decision making around deteriorating patients? 
119 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate a deteriorating patient? 
120 Is the protocol for escalation (always?) helpful? When it is not do you know what to do? 
121 Do you feel confident making decisions around prioritisation of care for your allocated 
bay of patients when you’ve got a deteriorating patient? 
122 Do you know where and how to get help when your workload is too much? 
123 When you are looking after a deteriorating patient, do you know where to get support for 
your other patients? 
124 Do you feel confident getting prepared for a sick patient coming from ED? 
125 Do you feel confident delegating tasks when it is busy? 
126 Do you feel confident making decisions about care when it is busy, e.g. prioritising? 
127 Do you ask for help when you have an unwell patient? 
128 Do you feel confident escalating when your workload has unexpectedly increased? 
129 Do you tell other members of the team in your zone when there is an unwell patient? 
130 Do you tell other members of the team in your bay when there is an unwell patient? 
131 Do you feel confident escalating a patient early? 
132 Do you feel confident escalating a patient when their NEWS is >2? 
133 Do you feel comfortable escalating who you are worried about before they deteriorate? 
134 Do you feel confident using your clinical judgement in combination with the escalation 
protocol? 
135 Do you feel comfortable escalating a patient early? 
136 Do you let other people in your team know that you are escalating a patient early? 
137 Do you involve others in the decision making around deteriorating patients? 
138 Do you involve other members of the team in the bay you are working with decisions 
around prioritisation of care? 
139 Do you involve other members of the team in the zone you are working with decisions 
around prioritisation of care? 
140 Do you always put observations into enoting straight away? 
141 Are you always aware when one of your allocated patients is deteriorating? 
142 Do you feel confident with knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating? 
143 Do you know what is going on with the plans of care for the patients in your allocated 
bay? 
144 Do you know when there are unwell patients in other zones? 
145 Do you tell the nurse in charge when have an unwell patient? 
146 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours? 
147 Do you know when other zones have unwell patients? 




149 Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate? 
150 Are you aware of how your current work load will affect your future work load? 
151 Do you know what to know when you don’t get the response to escalation you were 
expecting? 
152 Once you have escalated a deteriorating patient, are you aware of the decisions made 
to support that patient? 
153 When looking after a deteriorating patient, do know when you should delegate to others 
to help care for the other patients in the bay? 
Equipment Problems 
154 Is it easy to report broken equipment? 
Language Barrier 
155 Do you have multiple strategies for communicating with patients that do not speak 
English? 
156 Do you feel confident communicating with a patient that does not speak English? 
157 Do you think you have a good understanding of the language skills of your team? 
158 Do you know what to do when you are having difficulty communicating with a patient 
that does not speak English? 
159 Do you involve other members of the MDT to help communicate with patients that do 
not speak English? 
160 Do you think that your team is effective at communicating with patients that do not 
speak English? 
161 Do you know what to do when your attempt at communicating with a non -English 
speaker does not appear to be working? 
162 Do you know when other members of the team speak a language that you require to 
communicate with your patients?  
163 When your attempts to communicate with a patient are not effective, do you know what 
you should do next? 
Admissions  
164 Do you tell someone when an admission from the ED is more unwell then you were 
initially informed? 
165 Is there always a mismatch between the ED handover and the patient condition on 
admission? 
166 Do you have difficulty escalating a patient who has just arrived from the ED? 
167 Do you do things differently when the transfer nurse brings a patient round from the 
ED? 
168 Are you confident responding to an unwell patient from the ED? 
169 Do you feel confident escalating a new patient from the ED to the medical team? 
170 Do you talk to the ED nurse about your concerns with new patients? 
171 Do you know what to do if you don’t get the response to escalation that you wanted? 
172 Do you ask for help when you receive multiple patients from ED at the same time? 
173 Do you know what is wrong with a new patient when they arrive on the ward? 
174 Are you always aware that you are getting a new patient from the ED? 
175 Do you always know what the presenting complaint of the new patient is? 
176 Does someone tell you what a new patient is being admitted with? 
177 Do you know if a new patient needs a pat slide before they arrive on the ward? 
178 Do you always know if a patient needs an air mattress before they arrive? 
179 Do you normally have an air mattress inflated for a patient that needs one before they 




180 Do you get the information you need from the transfer nurse? 
181 Do you know when you are getting multiple admissions into the same bay? 
182 Do you feel you are able to prepare sufficiently for new admissions with the information 
you are given from ED handover? 
183 Do you know enough about the patient from the bed manager handover on the phone? 
184 Do you know enough about the patient from the bed manager handover? 
185 Do you feel confident preparing for a new admission if you sufficient information? 
186 Do you feel you have more time to prepare for admissions on a night shift? 
187 Do you feel confident checking treatment protocols for new patients from the ED? 
188 Do you ask for help when a new patient is admitted from the ED with a complex 
treatment protocol? 
189 Do you feel able to handover a workload to the next shift? 
Discharges 
190 Do you feel confident managing the discharge process? 
191 Are you confident with your knowledge about what can hold up a discharge and what 
you can do about it? 
192 Do you get enough support from other members of the MDT to support complex 
discharges? 
193 Do you feel confident managing patient expectations about discharge information? E.g. 
Times 
194 Do you know what the criteria are for using the discharge lounge? 
195 Do you feel confident to facilitate complex discharges? 
196 Do you feel you get enough support from other team members with complex 
discharges?  
197 Is it always the same things that are difficult about complex discharges? 
198 Do you always have the information you need for complex discharges? 
199 Do you feel able to raise your concerns about sending someone home? 
200 Do you know what needs to be done to discharge a patient at the weekend? 
201 If you cannot get the information you need about a complex discharge do you know who 
to talk to? 
202 When there are multiple people involved in a complex discharge, do you know the 
current state of the work? 
203 Do you think that complex discharges fail for the same reasons? 
204 Do you feel confident with responding to unexpected difficulties with complex 
discharges? 
205 Do you tell others when you are having difficulty with complex discharges? 
206 Do you feel able to raise your concerns with discharging patients home? 
207 Are other members of the MDT effective at communicating when involved in complex 
discharges? 
208 Do you know when other members of the MDT have completed their element of the 
work involved with a complex discharge? 
209 Do you have multiple strategies for facilitating a complex discharge? 
210 Do you find the discharge care plan useful? 
211 Do you get enough information about discharging a patient from the admission 
process? 
212 Are you confident in managing the expectations of patients around the day and time of 
their discharge? 
213 Do you feel confident talking to patients about their discharge? 
214 Do you feel confident talking to other members of the MDT about a complex discharge? 




216 Do you feel confident communicating with patients about their discharge when there are 
delays? 
217 Do all the members of the MDT communicate to patients in the same way about their 
discharge? 
218 Is everyone on the same page when many people are involved in a complex discharge? 
219 Do you get the support you need when facilitating a complex discharge? 
220 When there are others involved in facilitating a complex discharge, do you feel that you 
have the most up to date information? 
221 Do huddles help with your understanding of what is going on in the zone? 
222 Do you feel able to raise your concerns about patients in a huddle? 
223 Do you know how to use the pharmacy tracker for information about TTO’s? 
224 Do you know when the TTOs are ready for a patient? 
225 Do you feel confident explaining TTOs to a patient? 
226 Is booking transport straightforward?  
227 Do you regularly send patients to the discharge lounge? 
228 Do you think that everyone has the same checklist (internal) when they are discharging 
patients? 
229 When it gets busy do you ask for more help with facilitating a complex discharge? 
230 Do you feel you have enough time to sit with patients and go through their complex 
discharge with them? 
231 Do you use the discharge lounge for patients going home? 
Transfers 
232 Do you have multiple ways for facilitating the transfer process to other wards? 
233 Do the decisions you make about transferring patients change in response to pressure 
from the ED? 
234 Do you know what to do when a ward says they are not ready to take handover? 
235 Do you tell other people in your zone when you have unsuccessfully attempted to 
phone another ward to handover a patient? 
236 Do you find it difficult to talk to other wards to handover? 
237 Do you know what to do when a ward says they are not ready to take handover? 
238 Do you know when you need to talk to the bed manager when trying to Transfer a 
patient? 
239 Do you tell other people in your zone when you are having difficulty transferring a 
patient? 
240 Do you know where to look for porters when you can’t see them? 
241 Do you tell someone if you are having difficulty finding porters? 
242 Do you tell everyone in the bay allocated to look after that patient about the status of 
their transfer? 
243 Are you aware when one of your allocated patients is due to move to another ward? 
244 Are you aware when one of your allocated patients has been handed over to another 
ward and has been packed up? 
245 Do you tell all the other members of the team allocated to look after a patient that they 
are due to go to another ward? 
246 Are you comfortable sending patients to another ward without all of their care tasks 
being completed? 
247 Do you tell others when your priorities change about transferring patients due to 
pressure from the ED? 
248 Do you know when other members of your team change their priorities about 
transferring patients due to pressure from the ED? 
249 When your patient has been allocated a bed on another ward, do you talk to other 




250 When your patient has been allocated a bed on another ward do you know who is going 
to do the telephone handover? 
251 Do you know what to do if relatives are refusing to let a patient go to another ward? 
Workload 
252 Do you tell someone when a new admission means that you are no longer able to do 
the work you wanted with other patients? 
253 Do you know when the team in your zone has been reconfigured to account for 
specialing in the numbers, sickness etc? 
254 Do people in your zone discuss when they are changing the way they work in response 
to the pressure in the zone? 
255 Do you tell the people you are working with in your bay about the prioritisation decisions 
you are making with patient care? 
256 Do you tell people when your patient requires complex interventions according to 
protocol? 
257 Do you tell someone when your patient requires complex treatment? 
258 Do you tell someone when your workload changes unexpectedly and you are worried 
that you going to get behind? 
259 Do you have a clear discussion with the RMN about how you will work together to 
support a patient with mental health needs? 
260 Do you tell others in your zone when you need to change the way you are working in 
response to pressures in your bay, e.g. specialing a patient, looking after a deteriorating 
patient? 
261 Do you involve other people in your bay or zone about the decisions you are making 
about the prioritisation of care for your allocated patients? 
Agency and Bank Staff 
262 Do you work differently when you are working with an agency staff member? 
263 Do you check the medication case load of agency/bank nurses that are in your zone? 
264 Do you know what situations it would be appropriate to do the morning medications for 
the next shift coming in? 
265 Do you talk to other people when you think it might be appropriate to do the morning 
medications for the next shift coming in? 
266 Do you need to regularly support agency nurses with accessing computer systems to 
document patient care? 
267 Do you know how to change the way you work to support bank/agency staff? 
268 Are you confident with how to change your priorities when you are short staffed? 
269 Do you regularly monitor the progress of workload for agency/bank staff? 
270 Do you feel confident supporting RMNs to do their work? 
271 Are you confident with introducing an agency/bank member of staff to the work on the 
ward? 
272 Do you feel confident supporting members of staff that are less experienced than you? 
273 Do you feel that you work well with RMNs? 
274 Do you always tell someone when you need to ‘special in the numbers’? 
Newly Qualified Staff 
275 Do you feel confident supporting new members of staff? 
276 Do you understand how the work changes when there are new members of staff in your 
team? 




278 Do you know what skills/expertise the other members in your team have? E.g. Bloods, 
male catheters 
279 Did you find the preceptorship programme at St.Thomas’ useful? 
280 Do you know when people in your team are unable to perform certain tasks, e.g. unable 
to administer medication? 
281 Do you tell others when members of your team are unable to do certain tasks, like 
administer medication? 
282 Do you feel comfortable escalating to more senior members of staff when you think your 
team is unable to manage? 
283 Do senior members of staff know when you are unable to do certain tasks? 
284 Do you feel confident delegating work to others? 
285 Do you feel confident delegating to other members of your team? 
286 Do you know how busy other people in your zone are? 
287 Do you know when other people in your zone are busy? 
288 Do you consider yourself to be new to the ward? 
289 Do you feel able to say when you are too busy? 
290 Are you confident with raising a red flag? 
291 Do you ask for help from your team? 
292 Do you feel able to support others in your team? 
293 Do you tell other people in your team what you are doing? What you have done? What 
you are going to do? What you are going to do in the next two hours? 
294 Do you tell others when you are getting busy? 
295 Do you know where to get help when you need it? 
296 Do you feel confident talking to a member of the team when you see them doing 
something wrong? 
297 Do you feel able to support members of the team with less experience than you? 
298 Do you tell others when you are feeling overwhelmed? 
Skill Mix 
299 Do you know what skills your team are credited with? 
300 Do you know which members of your team have passed which competencies? 
301 Do you feel confident to support new staff develop new skills? 
302 Is the team able to identify when an incoming shift needs additional support, e.g. with 
morning medications, due to skill mix? 
303 Do people listen to you at work? 
304 Do you understand how the team needs to change when working with 
agency/bank/short staffing? 
305 Do you feel comfortable supporting an RMN to care for someone with mental health 
needs? 
Staff Shortages 
306 Is the team good at recognising when the next shift will struggle due to skill mix and 
attempt to alleviate some workload, e.g. do medications early? Move unwell patients? 
307 Do you know how the team needs to change the way it works due to short staffing? 
Teamwork 
308 Do you get help from others when you are busy? 
309 Do people help you when you ask for help with your workload? 
310 Do you feel that you know what is going on with the patients in your bay? 
311 Do people tell you when there is a change in the plan with one of your patients? 




313 Do you feel like your opinion is valued when decisions are made about patient care in 
your allocated bay? 
314 Do you ask for help when you need it? 
315 Does everyone in the bay know when someone is poorly? 
316 Do you tell everyone working in your bay when a patient is unwell AND what needs to 
happen next? 
317 Does someone tell you when a patient in your bay is sick and what you need to do 
next? 
318 Do you know what to do if someone in your team isn’t working well? 
319 Are you aware when there is not much team work between people in your bay and can 
you address this? 
320 Does everyone in the zone know when there are new admissions coming in? 
321 Do you know what to do when you don’t get the response from other teams that you 
need? 
322 Do you tell everyone in the zone when the team needs to reconfigure to account for 
specialing in the numbers, sickness, someone can’t do meds etc? 
323 Do you know when other members of your team are more free than you and can help? 
324 Do you know where to get help outside of the team in your bay? 
325 Do you know when you need to get help from outside the bay? 
326 Do you involve all members of the team in your bay with decisions around patient care? 
327 Do you feel like a valued member of the team? 
328 Do you tell the nurse in charge/coordinator when the work load increases 
unexpectedly? 
329 Do you know when there is a sick patient in your zone? 
330 Do you know when there is a deteriorating patient in your zone? 
331 Are you involved in discussions about supporting patients that do not have capacity?  
332 Do you find the huddles useful for understanding what the workload is like for other 
members of your team in your zone? 
Communication 
333 Do you feel like there is good communication between the team you are working with? 
334 Do you always feel that you are able to raise your concerns about the patients you are 
working with? 
335 Do you have multiple strategies for dealing with people in the team do not communicate 
well? 
336 Do you make sure that everyone in your team knows when you have an unwell patient? 
337 Do you get the information you need when you move to a different part of the ward/zone 
in response to patient demand/short staffing? 
338 Are you confident with communicating when the demands of the zone mean that things 
need to be rearranged? 
339 Do you feel confident to gain help from the rest of the team when your workload is 
beyond your individual capacity? 
340 Do you have multiple strategies to respond to a lack of communication between your 
team? 
341 Do you feel able to raise your concerns about lack of communication with members of 
your team? 
342 Do you know how busy other zones are compared to yours? 
343 Do you know about the status of other team members in the zone? 
344 Do huddles help with your understanding of the work load of the zone? 
345 Do you have multiple strategies for dealing with other members of the MDT that do not 
communicate effectively?  




347 Do people communicate their decisions regarding patient care to you? 
348 Does everyone communicate in the same way? 
349 Do you tell the other people working with the same patient allocation what you are going 
to be doing? 
350 Do you know where to go to get support for communicating with other members of the 
MDT? 
351 Do you feel like other members of the team looking after patients in a bay communicate 
their decisions with you? 
352 Does the effectiveness of communication change throughout the day? 
353 Do you have multiple strategies for communicating with healthcare professionals that 
are not based on the admissions ward?  
354 Experience 
355 If you can’t get the help you need from your team, do you know where to go? 
356 Do you get support from senior colleagues? 
357 Do you have the training you need to do your job? 
358 Do you feel confident to make decisions around medication administration? 
359 Is the team good at anticipating when the next shift on my struggle with skill mix and 
identify how this should be supported? 
360 Do you ask for help from more senior colleagues when you are unsure how to manage 
a situation? 
361 Do you feel confident supporting patients with mental health needs? 
362 Do you feel confident supporting patients in a mental health crisis? 
363 Do you share with your colleagues which strategies have helped for caring for them? 
364 Do you know when to ask for help with challenging patients or patients with mental 
health needs? 
365 Are there some parts of the discharge process that are always difficult? 
366 Do you know where to find the numbers you need to contact the various teams 
necessary to support a patient when they are discharged? 
367 Are you able to find the numbers you need for discharging patients from the information 
we have on the ward? 
368 Do you know when other zones have patients to be transferred to the same ward as 
yours? 
369 Do you know why a patient needs to be in a sideroom? 
Context 
370 Do you feel confident with your ability to prioritise patient care? 
371 Is it easier to know what is going in across the whole ward when you are in certain 
zones? 
372 Does everyone do the nurse in charge role the same? 
373 Do you involve all the nursing team in the decisions around caring for complex patients? 
374 Do you feel confident with your ability to prioritise when there are external pressures to 
the ward? 
Nurse in Charge 
375 Do you feel confident to talk to your colleagues when they are doing things you are 
concerned about? 
376 Do you feel confident in raising concerns about the workload of your zone? 
377 Do you know what is going on in the other zones? 
378 Do you always get your breaks? 
379 Is it difficult to support others to take their breaks? 
380 Do you know when someone in the zone is worried about a patient? 




382 Do you involve other members of the team in your bay about how you are deciding to 
do your work? 
383 Do other members of the team in your bay involve you in their decision making? 
384 Does everyone do the nurse in charge role in the same way? 
385 Do you know who needs support in your zone? 
386 Do you know who are the most unwell patients in your zone? 
387 Do you involve other members of the team in that bay/zone about how to care for 
challenging patients? (And the reverse of that) 
388 Do you know when someone else has handed over your patient to another ward? 
389 Do you think that it is important to know? 
Coordinator  
390 Do you feel able to approach senior staff when you are unsure how to respond to a 
situation? 
391 Do you feel confident to approach senior staff when you are struggling with your 
workload? 
392 Is there much difference between the way the coordinators work? 
393 Does the nurse in charge know how busy other zones are? 
394 Do you tell the coordinator when you are busy? 
395 Does the nurse in charge know when you are busy? 
396 Does the coordinator know when you are busy? 
397 Do senior members of the team help support your development? 
398 Do you feel able to communicate your concerns when external/internal pressures are 
pulling you in different directions? 
Reflection 
399 Do you get a chance to talk to other people in your team about why you thought a day 
went well or not so well? 
Tension Between Roles 
400 Do you tell someone when you are feeling stressed about your workload? 
401 Are you involved with care decisions in the bay you are working in? 
402 Are you involved with decisions for patient care? 
403 Do you tell other members of the team about the progress being made with plans of 
care for patients in your bay? 
404 Do you know what to do when you get the response you need? 
What it feels like to work on the ward 
405 Do you notice when other people in your zone are struggling? 
406 Do you get help from other zones when you need it? 
407 Do you help others stay positive at work? 
408 Do people tell you when they need help? 
409 Do you feel like you get recognition for working hard during the day? 
410 Can you tell when you need a break? 
411 Do you get frustrated when the workload prevents you from doing certain 
tasks/elements of patient care? 
412 Do you talk to people about this frustration? 
413 Are you more likely to ask for someone to help if you know them better? 
414 Does everyone help you out equally? 
415 When you are unsure about something do you tell someone? 




417 Are you confident with caring for someone that has been sectioned? 
418 Do you tell someone when your response to a situation isn’t working? 
419 Do you think about things that have happened at work outside of the ward? 
420 Do you recognise when someone else has done well and tell them? 
421 Do you feel able to raise your concerns about decisions made around patient care? 
422 Do you consider changing your actions based on negative responses from other 
members of the MDT? 
423 Do huddles help you communicate how your day is going? 
424 Do you know when the pharmacists have spoken to patients about their TTOs? 
425 Are you aware when you are no longer able to keep up with your workload? 









Appendix F. Duplicate Questions Removed in Question 
Generation Process  
(From 5.2.1.3 Step Three – p. 129) 
1 Does the previous shift give you objective information about a challenging patient? 
2 Do you use a series of steps to support a confused patient? Do you talk to other people 
about what steps are the most appropriate for your particular scenario? 
3 Does the team discuss the criteria for escalating the behaviour of a challenging patient 
to security? 
4 Do you feel as confident with supporting the challenging behaviour of family members 
as you do supporting the challenging behaviour of a patient? 
5 Are you involved with capacity assessments of patients that you are looking after? 
6 Are you confident with assessing capacity? 
7 Is the protocol for escalation (always?) helpful? When it is not do you know what to do? 
8 Do you feel confident escalating a patient early? 
9 Are you always aware when a patient is deteriorating? 
10 Do you feel comfortable escalating a patient early? 
11 Once you have escalated a deteriorating patient, are you always aware of the decision 
made for that patient? 
12 Do you know what to do when your patients have absconded? 
13 Do you tell someone when an admission from the ED is more unwell then you were 
initially informed? 
14 Do you tell someone when an admission from the ED is more unwell then you were 
initially informed? 
15 Do you feel confident escalating a new patient from the ED to CRT? 
16 Do you tell someone when an admission from the ED is more unwell then you were 
initially informed? 
17 Do you feel confident escalating a patient early? 
18 Do you ask for help when you receive multiple patients from ED at the same time? 
19 Do you escalate to other members of your team when you receive multiple patients 
from ED at the same time? 
20 Do you feel confident with knowing where to go to find the information out about a new 
admission from the ED? 
21 Are you always told when a patient you are looking after is deteriorating? 
22 Do you feel confident knowing how to prepare for the different admissions from the ED? 
23 Do you feel confident escalating a new patient from the ED if they are unwell? 
24 Do you feel confident knowing what to do if you don’t get the response you required 
when escalating a new unwell patient from the ED? 
25 Is it always the same things that are difficult about complex discharges? 
26 Is it always the same things that are difficult about complex discharges? 
27 Is it always the same thing that is difficult about facilitating a complex discharge? 
28 When there are many people involved in a complex discharge, do you always feel that 
you are up to date with the progress of work? 
29 Do you know what the criteria to send a patient to the discharge lounge are? 
30 Do you ask for help with complex discharges?   
31 Do you tell other people in your zone when you have unsuccessfully attempted to 
phone another ward to handover a patient? 
32 Do you have multiple ways of getting in touch with other wards to hand over? 
33 Do you know when to talk to other people in your team if you are having difficulty 
handing over a patient? 
34 Do you tell someone when a new admission means that you are no longer able to do 




35 Do you know how to change the way you work when working with an agency/bank 
member of staff? 
36 Do you feel confident supporting new members of staff? 
37 Do you feel confident changing the way you work to accommodate agency/bank staff? 
38 Do you feel confident changing the way you work to accommodate agency/bank staff? 
39 Do you feel comfortable delegating to some more than others? 
40 Do you understand how the team needs to change when working with 
agency/bank/short staffing? 
41 Do you feel comfortable delegating to others? 
42 Is the team good at recognising when the next shift will struggle due to skill mix and 
attempt to alleviate some workload, e.g. do medications early? Move unwell patients? 
43 Do you feel confident using a variety of approaches to care for a confused patient? 
44 Do you tell someone in your zone when you need support with your workload? 
45 Do you tell someone when you are having difficulty with your workload? 
46 When it is getting busy, do you talk to people to tell them what you are prioritising? 
47 Do you tell someone when you need help with your work? 
48 Do you know when other people in your zone are busier than you? 
49 Do you ask for help when your workload increases unexpectedly? 
50 Do other people help you when your work load increases unexpectedly? 
51 Do you get told information about a new patient that is coming into the ward? 
52 Do you involve all the members of a team in a bay when new admissions arrives? 
53 Do you know when you need to involve other members of the team to support patients 
with challenging behaviour? 
54 Do you get the support from other members of the team for discharging a patient from 
hospital? 
55 Do all members of the MDT present the patient with the same information about 
discharge? 
56 Do you know when a patient in your bay has been handed over to another ward and 
has been packed up to be transferred? 
57 Do you have multiple strategies for contacting other wards? 
58 Do you find huddles useful for finding out everything going on in your zone? 
59 Do you know when there is an unwell patient in your team? 
60 Do you feel you are involved in the decision making with unwell patients? 
61 Do you feel able to escalate your patient caseload when it is beyond your capability to 
care for patients? 
62 Do you feel confident to escalate to other members of your zone when your workload is 
beyond your capacity? 
63 Do you know when other people in your zone are busier than you? 
64 Do people communicate what is going on with the patient caseload in the team you 
have been allocated? 
65 Do you talk to all the members of the nursing team allocated to your patient case load 
about your decision making/prioritisation etc? 
66 Do people tell you how busy other parts of the zone are?  
67 Do you feel confident using a range of approaches to communicate to other members of 
the MDT? 
68 Do you feel confident to use a range of strategies to communicate with other members 
of the MDT? 
69 Are you always aware when a patient you are looking after is going to be transferred or 
discharged?  
70 Do you feel confident to communicate with patients around the status of their 
discharge?  





72 Are you always aware when a patient you are looking after is going to be transferred or 
discharged? 
73 Do you feel comfortable talking to other members of your team in the bay you are 
working about concerns you have with patients? 
74 Is the protocol for escalation helpful? 
75 Do you share decisions about how to respond to deteriorating patients with other 
members of your team? 
76 Do you know what to do when you don’t get the response to escalation that you need? 
77 Do you get the support you need when your workload is too much? 
78 Are you confident asking for help? 
79 Do you get enough information for incoming admissions from the bed manager 
handover? 
80 Do you feel confident to escalate a patient early? 
81 Are you always aware when there is an unwell patient in your bay? 
82 Do you know if other people in your zone are behind with their work? 
83 Do you know if other people in your zone are managing their work? 
84 Do you get handover for the new patients when they arrive from the ED? 
85 Do you feel comfortable prioritising your work load? 
86 Do you do things differently with different people? 
87 Do you know who to talk to if you need help? 
88 Do you prepare for new admissions coming in? 
89 Do you ask for help with challenging patients with escalating behaviour? 
90 Do you feel confident with your ability to help your colleagues? 
91 Do you have multiple strategies for caring for confused patients? 
92 Do you know when to ask for help with challenging patients or patients with mental 
health needs? 
93 Do you feel confident caring for someone that does not have capacity? 
94 Do you know when to involve other people in decision around capacity? 
95 Do you involve everyone in the bay when making decisions around a patient’s capacity? 
96 Do you use the discharge care plan? 
97 Do you find the discharge care plan helpful? 
98 Do all members of the MDT give the patient the same information about discharging 
patients? 
99 If there are several members of the team involved in discharging a patient, do you know 
what the status of the workload is? 
100 Do you feel confident raising your concerns about a patient’s discharge? 
101 Do you think everyone has the same internal checklist for discharging a patient? 
102 Do you think everyone has the same internal checklist for discharging a patient? 
103 Do you have multiple strategies for transferring patients to another ward? 
104 Do you tell someone if you are having difficulty handing over another patient on the 
phone? 
105 Do you know when one of your patients has been handed over to another ward? 
106 Does someone tell you when one of your patients is being transferred? 
107 Do you involve other people in planning of patient care when external pressures may 
change this? 
108 Do you feel comfortable handing over patients with tasks that are still to do/admission 
work that still needs to be done? 
109 Do you have multiple strategies for getting in touch with other wards on the phone? 
110 Do you feel like you get all the information you need about new admissions from the 
bed manager handover on the phone? 
111 Do you feel comfortable to escalate a patient early? 
112 Do you know when there are unwell patients in your zone? 




114 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours? 
115 Do you feel confident identifying when the workload of the patients you have been 
allocated is too much for one person to do? 
116 Do you know how busy other people in the zone are compared to you? 
117 Does everyone in the zone know when you are getting a new patient? 
118 Do you feel confident getting help from other zones? 
119 Do you know when other zones are less busy than you? 
120 Are you confident to change the way you are working when working with agency or 
bank staff? 
121 Do you know how to get the help you need with a new patient from the ED before they 
have been seen by the team? 
122 Do you know how to get the help you need with a new patient from the ED before they 
have been seen by the team? 
123 Do you feel confident asking for help with challenging patients? 
124 Do you feel confident in using a range of strategies for caring for a confused patient? 
125 Do you feel confident in supporting an RMN to care for the needs of a mental health 
patient? 
126 Do you feel confident escalating challenging patients to other members of the MDT 
(security, SNPs, medical team, psych)? 
127 Do you feel confident escalating challenging patients to other members of the MDT 
(security, SNPs, medical team, psych)? 
128 Do you know what to do when you don’t get the response to escalation that you need? 
129 Do you know when the pharmacists have given and explained the TTOs to the patient? 
130 Do you involve all members of the team involved with your patient caseload with the 
progress of the patient and any changes to the plan? 
131 Do you confident handing over patients to another ward without a full admission 
completed? 
132 Do you tell others when you are changing your priorities due to external pressures to 
the ward, e.g. ED needs to transfer patients imminently? 
133 Do you know who to talk to when you are having difficulty transferring patients to 
another ward? 
134 Do you know who to talk to when you are having difficulty transferring patients to 
another ward? 
135 Do you know when there is an unwell patient in your zone? 
136 Do you know what to do if you don’t get the response from other members of the team 
that you need? 
137 Do you tell others when you need help with your workload?  
 
138 Do you feel confident supporting other members of your team? 
139 Do you feel confident identifying when other members of your team need some 
support? 
140 Do you feel confident escalating your concerns to more senior members of staff? 
141 Do you feel confident escalating your concerns to senior members of staff? 
142 Do you know when someone else’s bay is busier than yours? 
143 Do you know when other zones are busy? 
144 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours?  
145 Do you feel confident talking to others when you need help? 
146 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours? 
147 Are you able to identify when someone in your team needs some help? 
148 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours? 
149 Do you tell others when the workload of your zone is getting too much? 
150 Do others tell you when they need help? 




152 Do you know when someone in your team receives an unwell admission? 
153 Do you tell others when there is an unwell person in your bay?  
154 Do you tell others how you are changing your work in response to an unwell patient? 
155 Do you feel confident supporting other members of your team? 
156 Do you tell others when there is an unwell person in your bay? 
157 Do you know when someone else is escalating a patient early because they are worried 
about them?  
158 Do you know when there is an unwell patient in the zone?  
159 Do you know how people are getting on with their work in your zone? 
160 Do people in your zone tell you when they need help? 
161 Do you know when there is an unwell patient in the zone? 
162 Do you know how everyone is getting on with their work? 
163 Do you ask for help when you get multiple admissions at the same time? 
164 Do you feel like you get the support you need to look after your patients? 
165 Do you know the presenting complaints of new admission from the ED? 
166 Do you get the support that you need in order to care for unwell patients in your bay? 
167 Are you confident with your knowledge of the capability of your team? 
168 Do you know who are the busiest people in your zone? 
169 Do you ask for help from other members of the team in your zone? 
170 Do you feel like you have a good awareness of the workload of other team members in 
the zone? 
171 Do you feel confident in your ability to help other members of the team in your zone? 
172 Do you get support for complex discharges? 
173 Do you know the status of a discharge when there are other people involved in it? 
174 Do huddles help your understanding of the workload of the zone? 
175 Do you have a good awareness of the transfers of your patients? 
176 Does everyone do the nurse in charge role the same? 
177 Do you feel able to approach senior staff when you are unsure how to respond to a 
situation? 
178 Do you think that the ward is good at identifying when the next shift will be difficult and 
taking action pre-emptively, e.g. doing morning medications? 
179 Do you feel confident to approach senior staff when you see others struggling with their 
workload? 
180 Do you feel confident to approach senior staff when you see others struggling with their 
workload? 
181 Do you know when other zones are busier than you? 
182 Do you know when other zones are busier than yours? 
183 Do others know when you need help? 
184 Do you get the support you need from senior staff? 
185 Do you get support from senior staff when you are busy? 
186 Do you have a good enough understanding of a patient’s condition before they come 
around from the ED? 
187 Do you know when other members of your team need help? 
188 Do you know when there is an unwell patient in your zone? 
189 Do you feel confident escalating the behaviour of a challenging patient to other 
members of the team? 
190 Are you involved with the capacity assessments of the patient you are looking after? 
191 Do you feel confident to undertake a formal capacity assessment? 
192 Do you feel confident managing a situation with a patient that does not have capacity? 
193 Do you know how to use the pharmacy tracker to look at the status of TTOs? 
194 Do you know the criteria for using the discharge lounge? 




196 Do you feel involved with the decision making for patient care with the bay you are 
working in? 
197 Does someone tell you what the plan is for a patient that is deteriorating in your bay? 
198 Do you involve other members of the team working in your bay with the decisions you 
make for patient care? 
199 Does someone tell you what the plan is for a patient that is deteriorating in your bay? 
200 Are you aware when decisions are made around reconfiguring the team due to skill mix 
or staff shortages? 
201 Do you feel comfortable delegating other members of the team in your bay/zone? 
202 Do you talk to people when there is not good team work in the bay you are working? 
203 Are you involved in decisions around patient care for the bay where you are working? 
204 Do you get handover for a new patient that has been admitted to your bay? 
205 Do other members of the team involve you in decisions being made for the patient care 
in the bay you have been allocated? 
206 Do you involve all team members in the bay about what works best for caring for a 
patient with challenging behaviour? 
207 Do you feel confident supporting an RMN to care for a patient with mental health 
needs? 
208 Do you know when a patient has been handed over and waiting for porters? 
209 Do you know when a patient has been handed over and waiting for porters? 
210 Do you tell someone when the workload in your zone is increasing? 
211 Do you tell someone when a patient deteriorates? 
212 Do you find huddles useful? 
213 Do you find out who the sick people are in your zone in a huddle? 
214 If you’re getting frustrated do you tell someone? 
215 Do you feel comfortable delegating work to other people in your bay or zone? 
216 Do you know what is going on with the patients in your bay during the day? 
217 Can you tell when your workload is increasing beyond your individual capacity? 
218 Do you feel isolated when your workload is increasing? 
219 Do all members of the MDT provide the patient with the same information about 
discharge? 
220 If you are falling behind with your work do you tell people? 
221 Do you tell others when you are stressed at work? 
222 Do you feel comfortable caring for patients with mental health needs? 
223 Do you get enough support caring for patients with mental health needs? 
224 Do you tell someone when a patient has been aggressive towards you? 
225 Do you feel comfortable with decisions around capacity? 
226 Do you feel able to raise your concerns about discharging a patient home? 






Appendix G. First Draft of Survey Questions   
(From 5.2.1.3 Step Three – , p.129) 
1. Do you feel confident identifying the causes of challenging behaviour? E.g. Delirium, 
Dementia, Mental health needs, Withdrawing? 
2. How confident do you feel de-escalating an aggressive patient? 
3. How confident do you feel about monitoring patients’ emotional state? 
4. How confident do you feel about responding appropriately to a patient’s changed 
emotional state? 
5. How often do you have the opportunity to learn from observing how others deal with 
difficult patients? 
6. Do you talk to other members of the team about what has worked with supporting 
patients with challenging behaviour? 
7. How often is there good teamwork with medical staff to manage a difficult patient? 
8. Do you feel confident knowing when to escalate a patient with challenging behaviour? 
9. How comfortable do you feel judging whether to escalate a patient when the clinical 
picture is unclear? 
10. How confident do you feel that haven’t missed anything with a deteriorating patient? 
11. How confident do you feel about your judgement about what to do when a patient is 
deteriorating? 
12. How confident do you feel matching your observations/assessment to knowledge about 
individual patients’ reactions/physiology? 
13. How confident do you feel managing the social interaction side of escalation? With 
senior staff, medical staff? 
14. How confident are you that there are sufficient resources to provide 1-2-1 care? 
15. Do you feel confident supporting a family member with challenging behaviour? 
16. Do you feel confident managing a situation where a patient has absconded? 
17. Are you involved with discussions around assessing the capacity of a patient you are 
looking after? 
18. Do you feel able to raise your concerns about patient care decisions? 
19. Do you feel confident prioritising patient care as things change throughout the day? 
20. Do you feel able to tell someone when you feel overwhelmed at work?  
21. Does everyone help you out equally? 
22. Do you feel confident asking for help? 
23. How confident are you that you will receive information in handover allowing you to 
manage a challenging patient? 
24. How confident are you that there is backup/support available if you need it? 
25. How often is work left undone because of the workload? 
26. Do you know when other people in your team need help? 
27. Is there much difference between the way the nurses in charge work? 
28. Is there much difference between the way the coordinators work? 
29. Does the nurse in charge know when you are busy? 
30. Does the coordinator know when you are busy? 
31. Do you feel able to support others in your team? 
32. Do senior members of the team help support your development? 
33. Do people listen to you at work? 
34. Do you feel included as a member of the healthcare team? 
35. How confident do you feel that responsibility for patients is shared amongst the team? 
36. Do you feel confident talking to a member of the team when you see them doing 
something you do not agree with? 
37. Do you tell someone more senior than you if you are worried about your workload? 




39. Do you feel confident escalating a patient earlier than the protocol suggests? E.g NEWS 
<2 
40. When the protocol for escalation is not helpful do you know what to do? 
41. Do you tell other people in your team when you have concerns about a patient? 
42. Do you think about how disruptions early on in the shift are going to affect you later on 
in the shift? 
43. Do you feel able to raise your concerns about a lack of communication between your 
team? 
44. Do huddles help with your understanding of what is going on in the zone? 
45. Do you know when the team in your zone has changed the way it is working in 
response to new demands? Eg. Specialing in the numbers, short staffing, patient acuity 
46. How often is the organisation of work/roles and responsibilities discussed within the 
team? 
47. Do you tell other people in your team when a patient in your bay is deteriorating? 
48. Are you involved with decisions about care for your allocated patients? 
49. Do you know when there is a deteriorating patient in your zone? 
50. Do you know when there is a deteriorating patient in your bay? 
51. Do you know how busy other zones are compared to yours? 
52. Do you feel confident delegating work to other members of your team? 
53. Does the team work together so that when there is a challenging patient, the other 
patients are also cared for? 
54. Do you feel confident supporting RMNs to care for patients with mental health needs? 
55. Do you have a discussion with an RMN about how you can work together to support a 
patient with mental health needs? 
56. Do you feel confident supporting patients with mental health needs? 
57. Do you know what to do when you are having difficulty transferring a patient? 
58. When your patient has been allocated a bed on another ward do you know who is going 
to do the telephone handover? 
59. Do you know when one of your allocated patients has been handed over to another 
ward? 
60. Do you know when other zones have patients to be transferred to the same ward as 
yours? 
61. Is it easy to report broken equipment? 
62. How often do you need to adjust the way you work if there are bank/agency staff? 
63. Do you know how the workload of a zone changes when working with agency or bank 
staffing? 
64. Do you monitor the work of agency or bank staff? 
65. Do you feel confident supporting agency or bank staff when they are on the ward? 
66. Do you find the discharge care plan useful? 
67. Do you know when it is appropriate to use the discharge lounge? 
68. Do you feel confident with understanding the difficult aspects of a complex discharge? 
69. Do you know where to get the information you need for a complex discharge? 
70. Do you get enough information about discharging a patient from the admission 
process? 
71. Do you know how other members of the MDT are doing with a complex discharge of 
one of your patients? 
72. Do you get enough support from the MDT with complex discharges? 
73. Do you think other members of the MDT could be involved to a greater capacity? 
74. Do you feel able to raise your concerns with discharging patients home? 
75. Do you feel confident talking to patients about the status of their discharge? 
76. Do you know how to use the pharmacy tracker for information about TTO’s? 




78. Do you think that everyone thinks about the same things when they are discharging 
patients? 
79. Do you feel confident using a range of approaches to care for a patient that does not 
speak English? 
80. How confident do you feel that you are able to mentally keep track of what needs to be 
done without missing things? 
81. How confident are you about assessing risk? 
82. Do you know what languages your team members speak? 
83. Do you have a good understanding of the skills/competencies of the team you are 
working with? 
84. Do you think the team is good at identifying when the next shift may struggle due to skill 
mix and take pre-emptive action? 
85. Do you tell others when members of your team are unable to do certain tasks, like 
administer medication? 
86. Do senior members of staff know when you are unable to do certain tasks? 
87. Do you feel confident to support new staff develop new skills? 
88. Do you feel you able to prepare for new admissions from the ED with the information 
you get from the initial telephone handover? 
89. Does everyone in the zone know when there are new admissions coming in? 
90. Are you always aware that you a new patient is coming into your bay? 
91. Do you ask for help when a new patient is admitted from the ED with a complex 
treatment protocol? 
92. Do you have difficulty escalating a patient who has just arrived from the ED? 
93. Do you change the way you escalate new admissions from the ED according to which 
members of the MDT are on the ward? 
94. How often is poor communication a problem for providing care to patients? 
95. Do you get the information you need from the transfer nurse? 
96. Is there always a mismatch between the ED handover and the patient condition on 
admission? 
97. How often do you provide feedback to the ED about patients/handover problems? 
98. Does someone tell you what a new patient is being admitted with? 
99. Do you think about things that have happened at work outside of the ward? 
100. Do you get frustrated when the workload prevents you from doing certain 
tasks/elements of patient care? 
101. Do you recognise when someone else has done well and tell them? 
102. Do you feel like you get recognition for working hard during the day? 
103. Can you tell when you need a break? 
104. Do you tell someone if you are distressed by something at work? 
105. Do you consider changing your actions based on negative responses from other 
members of the MDT? 
106. Do you help others stay positive at work? 
107. Do you have the training you need to do your job? 
108. How often do you feel clear about the organisation of work and roles in your ward? 





Appendix H. Rejected Questions from Question Generation 
Process in Phase Two  




1. Does information about challenging patients get saved in a place that can be used for 
the next admission? 
2. Do you know when security has been called for a patient in another zone? 
3. Are you careful to not assume a patient is challenging from handover from the previous 
shift? 
4. Does the previous shift give you objective information about a challenging patient? 
5. Do you objectively hand over to the next shift what has worked well for a challenging 
patient? 
6. Are you confident in ensuring that you hand over the a challenging patient in an 
objective way? 
7. Do you feel able to handover a workload to the next shift? 
Admissions 
8. Do you feel able to handover a workload to the next shift? 
9. Who decides what gets mentioned in handover? 
Communication 
10. Does the effectiveness of communication change throughout the day? 
11. Is it easier to know what is going in across the whole ward when you are in certain 
zones? 
12. Who decides what gets mentioned in handover? 
13. Does the effectiveness of communication change throughout the day? 
Experience 
14. Is it easier to know what is going in across the whole ward when you are in certain 
zones? 
15. Are you comfortable sending patients to another ward without all of their care tasks 
being completed? 
Transfers 
16. Are you comfortable sending patients to another ward without all of their care tasks 
being completed? 
Agency and Bank Staff 
17. Do you work differently when you are working with an agency staff member? 
Discharge 
18. Is booking transport straightforward?  
19. Do you feel you have enough time to sit with patients and go through their complex 
discharge with them? 
20. Do you know when the TTOs are ready for a patient? 
Admissions 
21. Do you feel you have more time to prepare for admissions on a night shift? 
Newly Qualified Staff 
22. Did you find the preceptorship programme at the hospital useful? 
23. Do you consider yourself to be new to the ward? 
24. Do you finder it harder to work during a night shift? 
25. What it feels like to work on the ward 
26. Do you finder it harder to work during a night shift? 
27. Do you tell someone if you are having difficulty finding porters? 





29. Do you tell someone if you are having difficulty finding porters? 
Deteriorating Patients 
30. Do you always put observations into enoting straight away? 
31. Are you more likely to ask for someone to help if you know them better? 
32. Do you tell people when your patient requires complex interventions according to 
protocol? 
33. Does everyone communicate in the same way? 
Nurse in Charge 
34. Is it difficult to support others to take their breaks? 





Appendix I. Survey for Focus Group Participants in Phase Two 















































































Appendix J. Questions Remaining After Review by Expert 
Group in Phase Two 
 
(From 5.2.1.6Step Six – Send Questions to Expert Group for Review p.130) 
 
1. I feel confident identifying the causes of challenging behaviour E.g. Delirium, Dementia, 
Mental health needs, Withdrawal. 
2. I feel confident judging when to inform others about a patient with challenging behaviour. 
3. I feel confident judging when to escalate a patient when the clinical picture is unclear. 
4. I feel confident that I haven’t missed anything with a deteriorating patient. 
5. I feel confident knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating. 
6. I feel confident talking with other members of the MDT about escalating a patient. 
7. I always ask for assistance when my workload increases unexpectedly. 
8. I am confident that there is backup/support available if I need it. 
9. I am aware when others in the team need help. 
10. I offer help when I know someone is busy. 
11. I know what to do if I don’t get the response to escalation that I wanted. 
12. I feel confident escalating a patient earlier than the protocol suggests E.g NEWS <2  
13. I am confident to tell other people in the team when I have concerns about a patient. 
14. I feel able to raise my concerns about a lack of communication between team members. 
15. I am aware how busy other zones are compared to mine. 
16. I work together with an RMN to support a patient with mental health needs. 
17. I feel confident supporting patients with mental health needs. 
18. I feel confident facilitating a complex discharge. 
19. I am aware of the progress of the work of MDT members in a complex discharge.  
20. I feel able to raise my concerns when discharging a patient home. 
21. I feel confident to support new staff develop new skills. 
22. I get enough information to be able to prepare for new admissions from the ED. 
23. I get support from the team when de-escalating an aggressive patient.  
24. As a team we discuss priorities as things change throughout the day. 




26. Huddles help with awareness of the progress of patient care in the zone.  
27. The allocation of tasks is agreed within the team. 
28. I know when other zones have patients to be transferred to the same ward as mine. 
29. The team effectively identifies when the workload on the next shift will be high and takes 
pre-emptive action. 
30. Everyone in the zone knows when there are new admissions coming in. 
31. It is difficult to escalate a patient who has just arrived from the ED. 
32. There is often a mismatch between the ED handover and the patient condition on 
admission. 
33. The team discusses when things have gone well, despite challenges.  
34. The information I receive from handover helps me to effectively care for a challenging 
patient.  
35. I am involved with discussions around assessing the capacity of a patient I am looking after. 





Appendix K. Final Survey from Phase Two 
 
(From 5.2.1.9 Step Nine – Pilot Testing, p.132) 
 
Acute Medical Unit Survey 
Welcome to the study. This questionnaire forms part of my PhD research project developing a 
reflective process for analysing organisational resilience to improve the quality of care. 
The research is being conducted by Matt Alders at the Centre for Applied Resilience in Healthcare 
(CARe). The questionnaire will enable us to gather information about how nursing staff feel about 
managing some of the challenging elements working on the Acute Medical Unit. We would greatly 
value your opinions.  
 
All the information that you give us will be kept confidential. Your name will not appear on the 
questionnaire and any reports of the information will be completely anonymous so that your 
identity cannot be connected to specific answers you give.  
 
There are 2 parts to this questionnaire. The first part involves 3 questions about your role. The 
second part involves 37 questions about your experiences managing the complex challenges on 
the Acute Medical Unit. The questionnaire should take about 10 minutes to complete. Please 
return completed questionnaires to the box labelled ‘Acute Medical Unit Questionnaires’ by the 
coordinator’s desk or give them to Matt Alders in person. 
 
Questions about your Role 
1. What is your role on the Acute Medical Unit? 
Please tick one box from the options below 
 Healthcare Assistant 
 Staff Nurse  
 Senior Staff Nurse  
 Junior Sister 





2. How long have you been qualified in your role? 
Please tick one box from the options below  
 Less than 1 year 
 
 1 year to 2 years 
 
 3 years to 4 years 
 
 5 years + 
3. How long have you worked on the Acute Medical Unit? 
Please tick one box from the options below  
 Less than 1 year 
 
 1 year to 2 years 
 
 3 years to 4 years 
 
 Since it opened  
 






Questions about your experiences working on the Acute Medical Unit 
 
The 37 questions below relate to the work that you do on the Acute Medical Unit.  
Please think about them in the context of how the ward operates. 
 
Please rate how well you think these activities are done on the ward. 
 
 
Please tick one box for each question 




1. Judging when to escalate a patient to 
more senior colleagues if the clinical 
picture is unclear 
     
2. Coordinating with the MDT to facilitate 
the complex discharge of a patient 
     
3. Communicating with all members of the 
nursing team about patient care during a 
shift 
     
4. Coordinating patient transfers across 
zones to the same destination 
     
5. Raising concerns about discharging a 
patient home if this is unsafe 
     
6. Involving team members in assessing a 
patient’s mental capacity 
     
7. Identifying the causes of a patient’s 
clinical deterioration 
     
8. Providing additional help if someone has 
too much to do 
     
9. Knowing what to do if the medical team’s 
response to escalating a deteriorating 
patient isn’t sufficient 








10. Informing team members when there are 
new admissions coming into the zone 
     
11. Changing staffing allocation during a 
shift in response to changed workloads 
     
12. Escalating a deteriorating patient to the 
MDT 
     
13. Knowing what to do when a patient is 
deteriorating 
     
14. Identifying the causes of challenging 
behaviour E.g. Delirium, dementia, 
withdrawal, etc. 
     
15. Communicating the learning from 
incident reports 
     
16. Communicating the learning from things 
that have gone well, despite challenges 
     
17. Changing practice in response to 
learning from things that have gone well 
     
18. Including RMN’s during handover to 
support a patient with mental health 
needs 
     
19. Informing senior nursing colleagues 
when there are concerns about a patient 
     
20. Informing all members of the nursing 
team in a zone about a patient with 
challenging behaviour 
     
21. Taking action to reduce workload for the 
next shift 
     
22. Identifying when the workload on the 
next shift will be high 
     









24. Escalating deteriorating patients who 
have just arrived from the Emergency 
Department when they have not yet 
been seen by a medical team 
     
25. Supporting colleagues when responding 
to aggressive patients 
     
26. Reporting adverse incidents      
27. Changing practice in response to 
learning from incidents reports 
     
28. As a zone, adapting to changed priorities 
throughout the shift 
     
29. Agreeing the allocation of tasks between 
colleagues working in the same bay 
     
30. Supporting patients with mental health 
needs 
     
31. Handing over a patient with challenging 
behaviour to the next shift 
     
32. Knowing how busy other zones are 
compared to yours 
     
33. Having huddles to understand the 
workload of the zone 
     
34. Working effectively as a team      
35. Providing enough information to 
appropriately prepare for new 
admissions 
     
36. Appropriately escalating a deteriorating 
patient to a senior colleague earlier than 
the National Early Warning Score 
(NEWS) recommends 
     
37. Knowing when nursing colleagues in 
your zone need help 





Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this 
questionnaire. 
Please return completed questionnaires to the box labelled 
‘Acute Medical Unit Questionnaires’ by the coordinator’s 
desk or give them to Matt Alders in person. 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of the study 
you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and information:  
Dr. Janet Anderson 
Florence Nightingale Faculty of Nursing and Midwifery 
King’s College London 
James Clerk Maxwell Building 
57 Waterloo Road 
London 
SE1 8WA 
Office Telephone Number: 0207 848 3788 
Email address: Janet.anderson@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Alternatively, you can contact the King’s College London Research Ethics office:  
Research Ethics Office 
Room 5.11 Franklin Wilkins Building 




Office Telephone Number: 020 7848 4077 





Appendix L. Spearman’s Rho correlation matrix for all survey items 
 
Questionnaire Items  
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1. Escalate senior 
colleague if unclear 
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  = Small effect size (0.1)  
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Medium effect size 
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  = Large effect size (0.5)  
          




















                              



















            
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 


























           
 
                




























                           

































                          




















































































































































16. Escalating patient 
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19. Communicating 
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24. Knowing 
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27. Knowing how 
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31. Communicating 
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33. Changing practice 
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35. Identifying 
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Appendix M. Information Sheet for Semi-Structured Interviews with 
Expert Group in Phase Three 
(From 6.2.2 Data Collection, p.152) 
 
Escalating a deteriorating patient to the multi-disciplinary team - 4.5 
Knowing what to do when a patient is deteriorating - 4.37 
Informing senior nursing colleagues when there are concerns about a patient - 4.33 
Judging when to escalate a patient to more senior colleagues if the clinical picture is unclear - 4.22 
Identifying the causes of challenging behaviour e.g. Delirium, dementia, withdrawal - 4.11 
Appropriately escalating a deteriorating patient to a senior colleague earlier than the National Early 
Warning Score (NEWS) recommends - 4.09 
Working effectively as a team - 4.07 
Supporting colleagues when responding to aggressive patients - 4.06 
Handing over a patient with challenging behaviour to the next shift - 4.06 
Escalating deteriorating patients who have just arrived from the Emergency Department when they 
have not yet been seen by a medical team - 4.02 
Identifying the causes of a patient’s clinical deterioration - 3.96 
Informing all members of the nursing team in a zone about a patient with challenging behaviour - 3.96 
Raising concerns about discharging a patient home if this is unsafe - 3.94 
Knowing what to do if the medical team’s response to escalating a deteriorating patient is insufficient - 
3.87 
Supporting staff to develop new skills - 3.87 
Coordinating with the multidisciplinary team to facilitate the complex discharge of a patient - 3.83 
Communicating with all members of the nursing team about patient care during a shift - 3.8 
Providing additional help if someone has too much to do - 3.6 
Agreeing the allocation of tasks between colleagues working in the same bay - 3.56 
 Supporting patients with mental health needs - 3.31 
Changing staffing allocation during a shift in response to changed workloads - 3.15 
Involving nursing team members in assessing a patient’s mental capacity - 3.07 
Including registered mental health nurses (RMNs) during handover to support a patient with mental 





Knowing when nursing colleagues in your zone need help - 3.8 
As a zone, adapting to changed priorities throughout the shift - 3.71 
Having huddles to understand the workload of the zone - 3.53 
Informing team members when there are new admissions coming into the zone - 3.42 
Coordinating patient transfers from different zones to the same destination - 3.02 




Reporting adverse incidents e.g. patient fall, aggressive behaviour, medicine administration error - 
4.02 
Changing practice in response to learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) - 3.72 
Changing practice in response to learning from things that have gone well - 3.61 
Communicating the learning from incident reports (Datix/IR1) - 3.57 




Identifying when the workload on the next shift will be high - 4.02 
Providing the right information to appropriately prepare for new admissions - 3.8 




Appendix N. AMU Management Survey   







Questionnaire for AMU Management  
 
Welcome to the study. This questionnaire forms part of a research project developing a 
reflective process for analysing organisational resilience to improve the quality of care. The 
research is being conducted by the Centre for Applied Resilience in Healthcare (CARe). The 
questionnaire will enable us to gather information about current safety and quality 
concerns for patient care on AMU. It will allow us to compare these concerns with the 
results of a different questionnaire exploring how nursing staff feel about managing some of 
the challenging elements of the work on AMU. As managers on AMU, we believe that you 
have the best understanding of the current safety and quality concerns. We would greatly 
value your opinions.  
 
 
All the information that you give us will be kept confidential. Your name will not appear on 
the questionnaire and any reports of the information will be completely anonymous so that 
your identity cannot be connected to specific answers you give.  
 
 
The questionnaire should take about ten minutes to complete. When you have finished please 
return this to Matt Alders or the box by the coordinator’s desk labelled ‘Matt’s PhD Project’. 
 
Many thanks for your time 
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Please answer the questions below by writing in the space provided. There is space to 
write up to three quality or safety concerns. Please write what you feel is important and what 
you are most concerned about. It is not necessary to complete all three concerns. 
 
1st Quality and/or safety concern 












2nd Quality and/or safety concern 
















3rd Quality and/or safety concern 








C. What steps have been taken/planned to address this? 
 
 
 
